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Introduction∗ 
In 1975 Christopher D. Stone stated that “there is no simple answer to why 
existent legal mechanisms so often seem less than satisfactory when it comes to 
coping with business corporations” (Stone 1975: 1). This statement still holds 
true and not only with regard to business corporations but for all organizations. 
The ‘regulation’ of organizational behavior – understood as the attempt to 
achieve a desired, favored behavior by means of legal rules – often not only 
produces unintended side effects and the like, but also maneuvers the law in 
conflict. This latter statement contains an obvious ambiguity as it can be read in 
at least two different ways. Firstly, as law in conflict. Here law implicitly 
seems to be invoked as a conflict-solving resource. Secondly, as law in con-
flict. In this case, the law itself appears as the source of a conflict. These inter-
pretations are not as exclusive as they might be at first glance but hold true 
both since legal norms often become the trigger of a new conflict while trying 
to solve another conflict. Quite often this was – and still is! – seen as a token 
for the law’s failure, its inability to fulfill its task: the stabilization of normative 
expectations (Luhmann 1993) and, consequently, the prevention or settlement 
of conflicts. 
In the context of the present study instead, such an event is not under-
stood as pathological but is rather be described as the normal case. Thus, it is 
based upon the assumption that the law cannot help but transform a societal 
conflict into a legal conflict. Each legal reformulation of a societal conflict 
therefore has to be understood as a legal distortion (Teubner & Zumbansen 
2000). Consequently, the legal regulation of a societal conflict must remain 
inadequate in a non-normative sense. Law’s inadequacy in dealing with socie-
tal conflicts is not seen as a deficiency that could be resolved, but rather refers 
to law’s rationality and the fact that the legal system perceives conflicts in its 
environment through its distorting lens. 
Although this inadequacy is inherent in each legal rule, it often lies quiet. 
But, the more contested the empirical matter, the more likely it is that the legal 
regulation will meet with open or hidden opposition in the field, which it was 
originally designed to regulate. In such cases, the legal rule itself runs the risk 
of becoming the trigger of a new conflict. It is thus uncontested that the degree, 
                                                     
∗  The present study was conducted between 1999 and 2002; references, cited laws and guide-
lines reflect the status quo of March 2003. 
To avoid misunderstandings or distortions, citations of the interviews in Germany have not 
been translated. Names of agencies and associations are either given in their established 
English form together with the German version in parentheses or are left uninterpreted. 
Quotes from sources other than English are my own translations. 
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to which a legal rule will meet with opposition in its field, depends upon the 
empirical matter that is to be regulated. The next section therefore is dedicated 
to an overview over the plurality of perspectives, from which genetically modi-
fied foods can be observed as relevant. 
Approaching the Matter in Question: Genetically Modified Food 
Since the mid 1990’s genetically modified food (GM Food hereafter)1 has 
taken over an increasing prominent role in public debates surrounding the risks 
and the chances of the application of modern biotechnology in food production. 
Consequently, GM Food also became a popular subject for research in most 
various contexts such as science (e.g. biology, food chemistry), ethics, econ-
omy, jurisprudence, and the social sciences. Unsurprisingly, numerous studies 
have been published that deal specifically with the technology, its background, 
scientific methods, and the safety aspects of such products (e.g. Koschatzky & 
Maßfeller 1994; Gassen & Katzek 1998; Belton 1999). These studies not only 
provide an insight into the scientific debate and thus give an idea of what is 
seen as a problem with GM Food in this context. Most notably, these studies 
demonstrate the contestedness of the issue already in the scientific community. 
Unsolved scientific questions also have triggered studies that aim to cap-
ture the implications of such products from an ethical perspective (e.g. Thomp-
son 1997; Mieth 1999), arguing that “(w)hichever perspective one takes, there 
appears to be an ethical issue lurking here somewhere” (Thompson 1997: 1). 
Even though ethical questions often appear more pressing in contexts such as 
cloning, for instance, new methods for the production of foods also have raised 
questions such as in which ways do new products hurt religious food taboos? 
(e.g. Mettke 1999) or who has the right of altering food?. 
Especially the latter question leads over to the complex of problems con-
nected with presumed risks of GM Food and the consequences thereof. Given 
the fact that unsolved questions concerning, for instance, the potential aller-
genicity of GM Food have led to a widely consented perception of GM Food as 
risk-technology, a vast numbers of studies and articles have been issued that 
most appropriately must be described as located at the interface between econ-
omy, jurisprudence and psychology (e.g. Streinz 1995; Hoban 1996; Anwander 
Phan-huy 1998; Gath 1998; Wahl 1998; Mc Gaughey et al. 2000; Meier 2000; 
Kraus 2001). Following a risk-centered approach to GM Food, these studies 
deal with questions of lacking consumer-acceptance – or how this can be 
achieved – and with the possibilities of risk management by considering legal 
                                                     
1  Within the present study the term GM Food is applied to foods and food ingredients con-
taining or consisting of genetically modified organisms and to foods and food ingredients 
produced from but not containing genetically modified organisms.  
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and economic instruments as appropriate means for an adequate way of dealing 
with GM Food. 
Not only the characterization of GM Food as a risk-technology but also 
the increasing globalization of the food supply make it a challenging endeavor 
for policy makers to put such products under a legal framework that is capable 
to react to the problems that evolve with the introduction of the products into 
the market in a socially most accepted way. This complex of problems has 
been the subject of a host of legal studies. More specifically, these studies have 
dealt with the application of the precautionary principle in the realm of food 
law (e.g. Hufen 2000), with the question of labeling (e.g. Meyer 1998), with 
the product approval of GM Food (e.g. Gross 2001), with administrative com-
petence and legal protection (e.g. Gärditz 1998) and with the relation between 
information and liability (e.g. Meyer 1996). In addition, questions concerning 
possible tensions between separate legal spheres (e.g. Schlacke 1996), between 
European and international agreements (e.g. Spranger 2000) and between the 
German and European level (e.g. Wahl & Gross 1998) have been tackled. 
Last but not least several studies have been dedicated to the contested-
ness of GM Food and its consequences for society (e.g. Behrens et al. 1995, 
1997; Wiesenthal et al. 2001), to the issue’s representation in the media (e.g. 
Kohring & Görke 2000) and to the perception of GM Food in national and in-
ternational perspective (e.g. Hampel & Renn 1999; Gaskell et al. 2001a). 
Comparative perspectives on the issue to which the both last mentioned 
studies are cited as an example have shown striking differences between Ger-
many and the United States, for instance. These differences have been spotted 
in a variety of phenomena such as the public discourse, media coverage or just 
the (pure) number of modified products available on the market, which in their 
total have been assessed as a “transatlantic divide on biotechnology” (Gaskell 
et al. 2001b: 96). But the most tangible difference between Germany and the 
United States seems to be found in their respective regulative approaches to 
GM Food, letting the legal regulation evolve as “the significant locus of differ-
ence” (ibid.: 99).  
The observation that different countries tend to regulate seemingly iden-
tical issues in disparate ways is not new but has triggered a wide range of re-
search, which became popular under the concept of ‘national styles of regula-
tion’ (e.g. Vogel 1986). Within this context, national differences are asserted 
while the concept remains silent as to the question of how exactly these differ-
ences can be grasped. In order to achieve a more adequate understanding of 
these observable differences, the regulatory process itself has to be closer ex-
amined. 
Introduction 
 
4
Aim of the Study 
The present dissertation therefore aims to add a new perspective on GM Food 
in that the relation between the applicable legal framework and those to be 
regulated is put in the fore in the analysis. By asking how this relation between 
a given legal regulation and those to be regulated can be grasped most ade-
quately, a genuine socio-legal question is raised. Instead of presuming that the 
law ‘guides’ the behavior of its addressees in a rather naive sense of the word, 
or that the law instead is guided by its addressees in return, the claim is made 
that this relation has to be understood in a more complex way, that cannot suf-
ficiently be described in terms of impact or influence. In order to do justice to 
the complex and mutual constitution of both, the law and its addressees, the 
concept of legal endogeneity is invoked, reflecting the idea that the specific 
content and meaning of a legal regulation is shaped by those to whom it was 
originally addressed and, further, that this meaning shapes social relations in 
return (Edelman et al. 1999). Consequently, law shapes social relations as well 
as it is shaped itself throughout these ongoing social relations. 
Thus, the respective legal frameworks are considered as only one side of 
a medal, while their addressees are conceptualized as its complement. In order 
to achieve a comprehend understanding of the regulatory process, organiza-
tions as well as their environments become the focus of analysis. Based upon 
theoretical assumptions derived from modern systems theory and the new insti-
tutionalism a concept of organizations is introduced, that conceives organiza-
tions as norm followers and as knowledge-generating systems. In so doing, 
organizational sensemaking and enactment processes are taken into account, 
which are responsible for the mobilization of the respective legal regulations in 
the context of GM Food in the both countries.2 
Finally, the central aim of the present study is the achievement of an ap-
propriate description of the differences that can be observed in the societal way 
of dealing with GM Food in the United States and in Germany. The central 
question to be tackled reads: Can the observable differences be described as 
expressions of fundamental national differences or have they to be understood 
rather as the outcome of interorganizational dynamics that have unfold around 
the respective issue GM Food? 
                                                     
2  In order to avoid any misunderstandings, the legal regulation of the introduction of GM 
Food into the German market comprises European regulations and domestic rules. Prob-
lems that therefore are expected to arise for the comparative design of the present study, are 
addressed in chapter 3.1. 
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Scope of the Study 
The first chapter Genetically Modified Food: Law in Conflict is dedicated to 
the problems the law encounters in the regulation of a so-called risk technol-
ogy. Most obviously, these problems arise out of the impeding structures of the 
law on the one side and risk on the other, leading to a regulatory dilemma. This 
regulatory dilemma, which has not only emerged with the regulation of GM 
Food, has triggered a variety of legal developments that can also be seen as 
law’s reaction to changing societal conditions. Since these problems are not 
limited to individual countries but can rather be observed as global phenomena, 
the question arises, if not only differences are to be found between the individ-
ual countries but also, most notably, how these differences can be adequately 
described. In this context, the national styles of regulation-approach is dis-
cussed rather as stating such differences – instead of revealing what is hidden 
behind these admittedly observable differences. Therefore, the chapter con-
cludes with the suggestion to shift attention to the level of organizations. 
The momentous consequences for the understanding of the regulatory 
process itself then are the subject of the second chapter Regulation within an 
Interorganizational Network. This chapter aims to bring together theoretical 
assumptions that stem from modern systems theory and new institutionalistic 
approaches to organizations. In so doing, the organizations’ functioning as well 
as their embeddedness in their environments is conceptualized, thus delivering 
the foil for the relation between organizations and the law as legal environ-
ment, which comprises not only the legal rules but also societal norms and the 
culture surrounding the law. Given that organizations are treated as knowledge-
generating systems of interpretation, which make sense of the legal environ-
ment surrounding them on the background of their foregoing wisdom, ‘regula-
tion’ emerges as a dense social act that results in regulatory structures. Most 
notably, these structures are treated as contingent and dependent upon the em-
pirical matter in question.  
The third chapter Securing Food Safety: The Legal Frameworks turns to 
the ‘empirical realities’ of GM Food in that the particular legal regulations of 
GM Food in Germany and in the United States are introduced. In addition to a 
pure description of these frameworks, moreover their implications are dis-
cussed, whereby emphasis is laid upon the definition of GM Food and thus 
upon the problem that is to be regulated. These definitions are considered as 
momentous for the design of the regulatory instruments employed in the both 
contexts as well as decisive for what is going to happen when they are intro-
duced into their respective networks.  
Thus, while the third chapter is dedicated to law-on-the-books, the fourth 
chapter turns to law-in-action. Under the title From Norm to Action: Organiza-
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tional Responses, the organizations’ sensemaking and enactment processes of 
the organizations involved are introduced. Throughout the description of these 
organizational responses to what the organizations had perceived as legal envi-
ronments convergences in the normative orientations but divergences in the 
cognitive orientations between the organizations in the American and in the 
German network will become obvious. In that it will become revealed how the 
organizations perceived themselves as constrained or enabled by their respec-
tive legal environments as well as they themselves shaped the actual meaning 
of the legal rules, which were originally designed to regulate them. 
The observations made in the fourth chapter are discussed in the fifth 
chapter Unpacking ‘National Styles’: Discussion. As already indicated in the 
chapter’s title, it is dedicated to the description of the observable differences in 
the German and in the American approach to GM Food. This description is 
contrasted with assumptions made in the context of the national styles-
approach and, by discussing the varying regulatory structures that could be 
observed in the both networks, reveals what is hidden behind the talk about 
‘national differences’. The chapter results with a rejection of the national 
styles-approach since differences in the individual countries’ approach to regu-
lation no longer are considered as the result of specific national idiosyncrasies 
that can be found regardless the matter of regulation. Instead, the conclusion is 
drawn that each empirical matter will ‘produce’ its own network wherein regu-
latory structures occur that are likely to differ in various national settings. 
The sixth chapter finally is dedicated to a more common conclusion re-
garding regulatory processes. Under the title The ‘Regulatory Dilemma’ recon-
sidered: Outlook the concept of regulation will be reexamined. Here, the focus 
lies on questions such as which legal mechanisms can be considered as appro-
priate in a conflict that is characterized foremost by the underlying cognitive 
uncertainty of the issue in question? How can the regulatory process be carried 
out under such conditions? Moreover, what can be seen as the law’s role in the 
regulation of such conflicts? By raising these questions, the problems that have 
been fanned out in chapter 1 become readdressed and discussed under the im-
pression of the empirical findings of the present study. 
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“If you don’t know for sure what will happen, 
but you know the odds, that’s risk, 
 and if you don’t even know the odds  
that’s uncertainty”  
(Frank Knight, 1921) 
 
1 Genetically Modified Food: Law in Conflict 
The development of GM Foods brings into being a new category of food that 
combines two sensitive social topics: genetic engineering and food. Even be-
fore the development of GM Food, both these areas have been contested – al-
though to differing degrees. Therefore one can assume that the specific prob-
lems that arise with the development of GM Food and its introduction into the 
market to a certain extent can be traced back to GM Food’s ‘antecedents’. 
The area of genetic engineering1 undoubtedly has to be described as 
highly controversial. The technology has had its proponents and its opponents 
from its beginnings2 and the conflicts over an appropriate way of dealing with 
this technology are still not yet resolved and, one might add, maybe never will. 
The problems society faces in the course of the implementation of genetic en-
gineering can be considered as typical for contemporary society that is increas-
ingly confronted with the consequences of its own technological developments, 
but is not able to cope with them adequately. Technological developments like 
nuclear energy, information and communication technology and genetic engi-
neering have created new hazards not only for specific groups, individuals or 
organizations, but also for the whole society and for future generations. Thus, 
the reach of decisions made within the context of these technologies has be-
come incalculable and unpredictable. This unpredictability of possible harmful 
consequences for environment and human health has triggered broad protests 
                                                     
1  The term ‘genetic engineering’ within the present study only refers to green biotechnology, 
which are all applications of agricultural biotechnology. It is distinguished from red bio-
technology, which refers to biotechnological applications in medicine. 
2  A pivotal point in the public debate over rDNA-techniques was the ‘Asilomar’ Conference 
(known officially as the ‘International Congress on Recombinant DNA Molecules’) in Feb-
ruary 1975. At that meeting scientists working in the field discussed the issue and came to 
the conclusion that most rDNA work should continue, but appropriate safeguards in the 
form of physical and biological containment procedures should be put in place. Whether 
this instance is interpreted as a landmark of social responsibility and self-governance by 
scientists or as an attempt to ‘just’ get in ahead of planned government’s regulations, it is 
uncontested that the Asilomar Conference made the technique and its possible hazards pub-
lic to a greater auditorium (Radkau 1988). 
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against such technologies. Further, the fact that possible hazards can be attrib-
uted as the consequences of a certain decision has opened up a divide between 
the decision maker(s) and those affected by the decision. In a case like genetic 
engineering, this divide has boosted social explosive forces which became 
manifest in various acts of resistance such as, for example, the destruction of 
crop trials with genetically modified plants. 
Although to date no serious environmental damage has been reported3, 
the conflict over genetic engineering still circulates around suspected risks re-
lated to the technology and the societal need for the technology. The propo-
nents of the technology claim environmental as well as economic benefits for 
the farmers that grow genetically modified crops; a (predicted) reduced use of 
pesticides may lead to an enhanced harvest, which therefore is expected to 
have positive effects on the soil and the ground water (e.g. AgrEvo et al. 1998). 
The opponents argue that these benefits cannot compensate the risks of the 
technology that they see not only in a possible irreversible damage for the envi-
ronment and for human health (e.g. the danger of unrestricted spread causing 
increased herbicide resistance and having an unknown impact on the ecological 
balance), but as well in social and ethical consequences that “may prove to be 
even more disruptive than their ecological effects” (Tokar 2001: 6). Although 
the public debate has become less intense compared to the early 1990s, there 
are still expressions of resistance like crop destructions reported from various 
parts of the world.4 Additionally, public attention has to some degree shifted 
away from agricultural biotechnology and focused stronger on applications of 
the technology in medicine, as demonstrated by the recent debate over stem 
cell research.5 But here again, even though public acceptance of the so-called 
‘red biotechnology’ is supposed to be higher as several studies indicate (e.g. 
Hampel & Pfenning 1999) genetic engineering, its applications and its possible 
(medical as well as social) consequences becomes hotly contested. In sum, 
genetic engineering can - for the time being - be described as a prototypical 
                                                     
3  In May 1999, a communication in the journal Nature (Losey et al. 1999) on negative im-
pacts of transgenic pollen on monarch butterflies triggered not only an extensive debate 
over potential environmental effects of GM Crops but also several follow-up studies. In 
February 2002 the results of a study launched by the USDA were published, claiming that 
transgenic pollen is not considered as a threat to monarch butterflies (Kaplan 2002). This 
issue has gained more public attention in the United States than in Germany where the 
Monarch Butterfly is not very well known. In contrast, in the United States the Monarch 
Butterfly holds an outstanding position as the “Bambi Of Insects” (Reiss 1999). 
4  For a cross-national overview over resistance to genetic engineering see Gaskell & Bauer 
2001. 
5  This debate is reflected not only in the report of the Commission of Inquiry [Enquete 
Kommission Recht und Ethik der Modernen Medizin] (Deutscher Bundestag 2002) but most 
notably in the vast number of articles published in German newspapers over the last years. 
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example of a risk technology that is characterized by an insuperable disagree-
ment concerning its potential benefits and hazards. 
In contrast, the production of food usually is not described as a risk tech-
nology. Food generally is still regarded as safe; its production is expected to be 
based on established knowledge and longtime experience. But even though, 
due to several high-profile food scares such as dioxin eggs or sewage sludge in 
animal feed, an erosion of consumer confidence into food and food safety can 
be observed. Lately with the UK’s BSE crisis it became obvious that the realm 
of food production is also marked by imperfect knowledge and unpredictable 
hazards: since the late 1980s the British Government and its advisers had re-
peatedly stated that the transmission of the cattle disease to humans was 
impossible. In 1996 the government had to announce that ten cases of 
Creutzfeld-Jakob disease (CJD) in human patients had been identified as most 
likely to be caused by exposure to the related cattle disease (Jasanoff 1997). 
The BSE crisis spread throughout Europe in the late 1990s, leading to a 
growing public distrust in the mechanisms of food production. As a result, the 
system of food production not only in Great Britain but in several European 
Member states has undergone public, scientific, and political scrutiny, which 
has led to restructurations of government departments (e.g. in Germany) and, in 
parts, to the introduction of new or revised regulation.6  
These former and recent food scares have given rise to a variety of alter-
native food production and marketing approaches as well as to a still growing 
demand for organic products (Belasco 1993). Food has thus become a social 
issue that entered the political agenda not only in terms of scarcity but also 
increasingly in terms of safety (e.g. Maurer & Sobal 1995). Even though the 
production of food still is usually not described as a risk technology in the clas-
sical sense, the  increasing occurrences of food scares in modern societies are 
home-made: they have less, or only on a very concrete level, to be considered 
as signs of the weakness of an industrialized food production.7 Moreover, on a 
more abstract level, they are to be understood as one expression of the growing 
relevance of knowledge production within all societal fields. The increasing 
amount of food scares can therefore be described as the somewhat paradoxical 
result of a growing demand for food safety (e.g. Erlinger 2002). 
                                                     
6  The most prominent and momentous consequence is the White Paper on Food Safety that 
was issued by the European Commission in early 2000 (EC 2000). It introduces new sys-
tems of consumer protection and makes way for the establishment of a European Food Au-
thority to which the American Food and Drug Administration (FDA) serves as a role 
model. 
7  This is a common argument by the critiques of industrialized agriculture and food produc-
tion.  
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Mixing Biotechnology and Food 
Taking into account that these problems set the context for the introduction of 
GM Food into the market, this can be expected to be a potentially conflict-
laden project as the difficulties society faces with genetic engineering and with 
food production are likely to become multiplied when both these fields are 
merged. For instance, the gap between the claimed benefits and the feared po-
tential hazards is even more important since no consumer-ready biotech-
products, which are available to date, provide tangible direct benefits to con-
sumers. Therefore, although these first wave products8 are claimed to provide 
environmental benefits as well as economic advantages for farmers, the con-
sumers only perceive these advantages as quite indirect. On the other hand, the 
potential hazards of GM Food (e.g. the introduction of unknown allergens or 
antibiotic resistance) are experienced much more imminent by the consumer 
since food is essential to life. Further, as many studies in the field of food con-
sumption have shown, eating and food are highly social and of symbolic sig-
nificance (e.g. Hoban 1995; McIntosh 1996; Beardsworth & Keil 1997). An-
thropologists have claimed that attitudes towards food are culturally deter-
mined and that words such as ‘natural’ or ‘organic’ have connotations that have 
more to do with ritual cleanliness than with actual content. They are more ex-
pressions of the consumers’ worldview or lifestyle than of scientific assess-
ments of nutritive value (e.g. Counihan & van Esterik 1997; Weiner 1994). 
Thus, food evokes many images that can be changed by new food technologies. 
The introduction of new inputs or new products therefore has the potential to 
violate one or another food norm or taboo.  
But beside these more normative-based reasons for the rejection of, or, 
more moderately, the unease with new food products, another reason is to be 
found within the cognitive dimension. As Lee (1989) has pointed out, reasons 
for fears related to new foods, so-called food neophobia, involve the fact that 
many consumers know very little about chemistry and view new food tech-
nologies as artificial and dangerous. Although this might hold true, this argu-
ment has to be reformulated in a more radical manner. As presented by Lee it 
seems to be a problem of the distribution of information, leading to the (false) 
conclusion that food neophobia can be cured by more and better information 
                                                     
8  So-called First and Second Wave Products are distinguished with regard to their consumer 
health benefits. Second Wave Products ought to provide direct consumer health benefits 
such as reducing cholesterol or help people with iron deficiency. The most prominent ex-
ample for a second wave product is ‘golden rice’, which contains vitamin A. Proponents of 
GM Food often cite this product as enhancing the health of undernourished populations in 
third world countries (e.g. Potrykus & Beyer 2001). For their at least asserted beneficial ef-
fects the acceptance of Second Wave products is expected to be higher than the acceptance 
of First Wave Products. But, as Second Wave Products are not available on the market yet, 
this assumption will have to be proven.  
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for the consumer. But this conclusion has to be questioned because the tensions 
that arise in the field of food production (and especially in the production of 
new foodstuffs) can be traced back to the same dilemma that has already led to 
the description of genetic engineering as a risk technology: it is this the di-
lemma between the necessity to make a decision and the increasing awareness 
that this decision will be based upon an insufficient knowledge base. This ‘in-
sufficient knowledge base’ does not refer to a lack of knowledge that can be 
caused by various factors and in principle is resolvable. In fact, it relates to an 
even more fundamental problem that lies at the heart of contemporary society: 
the increasing relevance of non-knowledge as a consequence of knowledge 
production.  
Knowledge, Non-Knowledge, Uncertainty 
Non-knowledge does not only refer to a lack of knowledge but has rather to be 
understood as knowledge about yet still unknown knowledge (e.g. Luhmann 
1993a, Japp 1997). Therefore, it does not point to deviant, ‘untruthful’ or sim-
ply wrong knowledge. Moreover, the relation between knowledge and non-
knowledge must be considered as symmetrically as they not only emerge si-
multaneously but also are constitutive for one another. The awareness that all 
available knowledge refers at the same time to non-knowledge has also ques-
tioned the predominant role of science in society. Science now seems more 
likely to produce further open questions than answers (e.g. Luhmann 1990), 
thus more uncertainty than certainty. This precarious status of science on the 
one side led to a revaluation of knowledge9 that is produced within all societal 
fields on the other side. Consequently, the status of scientific knowledge be-
came even more questioned and instead the in-context mode of knowledge 
production was strongly emphasized. This development became more popular 
under the buzzword Mode 2 (e.g. Gibbons et al. 1994). While problem-solving 
according to the so-called Mode 1 “is carried out following the codes of prac-
tice relevant to a particular discipline […] problem-solving which is organized 
around a particular application” (Gross 2002: 19-20, emphasis added AE) is 
referred to as Mode 2. Thus, problem solving is carried out in a process in 
which varieties of actors from different societal fields partake in, leading to a 
result that stems from a broader range of considerations. However, this must 
not be misunderstood in the sense that the various existing forms of knowledge 
such as religious, economic, political or legal knowledge can easily be ex-
changed or be transformed from one form to another. Moreover, one can as-
sume that the hinted negotiation processes among these various actors are car-
                                                     
9  The notion of knowledge invoked here refers to an epistemological concept of knowledge 
that is not limited to scientific knowledge but embraces all forms of cognitive reference to a 
system’s environment (Bora 2002: 256, N. 5). 
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ried out in a probably conflict-increasing process (e.g. Bora 2002), that in the 
end may lead to transdisciplinary knowledge10.  
Hence, as knowledge production can be observed in all societal fields, so 
can the production of non-knowledge. Science, but also the political, the legal 
and the economic system increasingly have to deal with non-knowledge as the 
downside of an increasing knowledge generation in these fields. 
Non-knowledge can be subdivided into specific and unspecific non-
knowledge, whereas in the present context only specific non-knowledge is fur-
ther examined (Japp 1997). Specific non-knowledge refers to an imperfect 
knowledge base with regard to something familiar. For instance, the still un-
solved question if GM Food triggers allergies refers to specific non-knowledge; 
whereas human health is the familiar variable, the possible harmful conse-
quences of GM Food are the unknown variables. This cognitive uncertainty can 
be ‘resolved’ by referring to established knowledge (certainty) or to risk. By 
referring to established knowledge, cognitive uncertainty evolves as a scientific 
problem that can be solved by scientific methods (e.g. hazard identification and 
management). By referring to risk, cognitive uncertainty in shape of unspecific 
non-knowledge is invoked. Unspecific non-knowledge often is communicated 
in terms of catastrophes throughout society. Thus, the description of genetic 
engineering as risk technology is only one possibility to deal with the underly-
ing cognitive uncertainty of the issue. The distinction between specific and 
unspecific non-knowledge explains why non-knowledge, i.e., cognitive uncer-
tainty, only becomes problematic in cases where this uncertainty is communi-
cated in terms of risk. And it also clarifies that every description in terms of 
risk must be traced back to cognitive uncertainty. 
Having said this, the conclusion can be drawn that the developments, 
which characterized the ‘risk society’ have been radicalized within knowledge 
society. The more the distinction between knowledge and non-knowledge be-
comes the center of attention in contemporary society, knowledge society in-
creasingly replaces risk society (e.g. Weingart 2001; Willke 2001). It can be 
considered as one outstanding characteristic of knowledge society that a ‘risk’ 
increasingly is described as a social construction which but points to a funda-
mental cognitive uncertainty as a ubiquitous phenomenon. Dependent upon 
several factors, this cognitive uncertainty can cut both ways – it can be re-
solved by established knowledge that has been defined as suitable and ade-
                                                     
10  Here, Gibbons et al. (1994) draw the conclusion that “knowledge will not be produced 
unless and until the interests of the various actors are included” (4). Even though this might 
hold true, it is unlikely that this precondition can be fulfilled in everyday-practice. Thus, it 
is more likely that these negotiation processes sooner or later will be decided by power – al-
though this might be organized differently. For further inquiries of this problem see below, 
chapter 2. 
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quate, and, by so doing, be turned into certainty or, if no knowledge can be 
distinguished as appropriate in a given case, this places emphasis again on 
cognitive uncertainty that is then likely to be communicated in terms of ‘risk’. 
This overall development also has had consequences for the regulatory 
process. The more scientific knowledge has become the central basis of control 
and regulation, the more this basis becomes precarious as science loses its posi-
tion as epistemological authority.11 Therefore, legal decisions increasingly run 
the risk of being unmasked as based upon an imperfect knowledge base and 
thus as illegitimate.12 This may be the case in the legal regulation of GM Food: 
this issue is marked by a cognitive uncertainty that has not yet been resolved by 
scientific knowledge. For instance, questions concerning its potential to trigger 
allergenicity have not yet been definitely answered. Until to date, no such case 
has become public. But even though this last statement might not be uncon-
tested among those who are concerned with this issue, it is the law’s function 
to establish the normative expectation that GM Food is safe to eat.  
In the remainder of this chapter first of all the regulatory dilemma will be 
outlined, that occurs in cases where the law has to provide certainty under con-
ditions of cognitive uncertainty. This description is then followed by the intro-
duction of legal developments in this area, i.e., law’s efforts to adapt to the 
problems it is increasingly faced with in knowledge society. Given the fact that 
a number of these problems no longer can be understood as limited to territori-
ally bordered entities, not only the regulatory dilemma but also the legal reac-
tions to this dilemma will be put into the broader context of world society. By 
so doing, attention will be called to the observable fact that seemingly identical 
technologies are regulated differently in various countries, which leads over to 
the ‘national styles of regulation’ approach. This model will be introduced as 
the prevailing but insufficient model for the explanation of differences between 
regulatory approaches. Instead of following this line of research, this chapter 
ends with the proposition to shift attention to the level of organizations, in or-
der to overcome shortcomings of prevailing assessments, and thus making way 
for an adequate description of observable differences. 
                                                     
11  For the complex and problematic relation between science and the law see also Jasanoff 
1995.  
12  Here it might be added that each regulation is to a certain extent based upon an insufficient 
knowledge base without causing further problems for its legitimacy. On the contrary, a cer-
tain degree of uncertainty has to be considered as essential for a legal system, as, like Bora 
(referring to Popitz) points out, “[k]ein Normsystem kann sich einer perfekten Verhalten-
stransparenz aussetzen (…), denn umfassende Information über das Ausmaß abweichenden 
Verhaltens ruiniert die Geltung von Normen durch den Nachweis ihrer empirischen Un-
wirksamkeit” (Bora 2002: 254). 
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1.1 Introducing the Regulatory Dilemma 
In cases where decisions may have potentially harmful consequences usually 
the law is invoked for several reasons. Firstly, the law is considered to be an 
instrument which can avoid potential damage, or, that at least is seen as a guar-
antor for security. However, the protection against threats to public safety is 
only one of the law’s tasks that usually are invoked by those affected by a deci-
sion that might have harmful consequences. Another task is to provide a struc-
ture for the planning and the promotion of a technology. Thus, the law can be 
seen as enabling as well as constraining the implementation of a technology. In 
addition, it has to fulfill both these tasks in a way that meets the majority of 
societal expectations most adequately, in order to prevent or avoid societal con-
flicts.  
But under conditions of cognitive uncertainty as they become not only 
obvious but most notably problematic in the realm of a technology like GM 
Food, law’s capacity to combine the fulfillment of both these tasks has to be 
questioned. In cases where a contested technology like GM Food is to be put 
under a legal framework, quite often not only the technology itself but even its 
legal regulation becomes contested: in some cases already the process of the 
development of the law is ridden with conflict, but, as will be pointed out fur-
ther below, at latest the problems arise with the implementation of the law. In 
the context of risk regulation, the law is thus being driven into a regulatory 
dilemma because it has to provide certainty under conditions of ubiquitous and 
apparently indissoluble uncertainty. The reason for the law’s difficulties in the 
regulation of risk is to be found in the impeding structures that characterize risk 
and law and which can be put in a nutshell with the contrast of uncertainty ver-
sus certainty. This becomes even more obvious if law’s function is explored 
more thoroughly.  
Law’s Function 
Law’s function refers to the function the law has to fulfill for society at whole 
and it thus has to be distinguished from law’s performance, which describes 
the relations between the law and other social subsystems. Implicitly these 
have already been mentioned; besides permitting planning, demanding preven-
tion, providing a structure for the resolution of conflicts, it also provides sev-
eral services like the regulation of conduct and the legitimation of the social 
order.  
Nevertheless, these services can only be provided if law’s societal func-
tion is fulfilled, the stabilization of social expectations. Expectations that are 
backed by the law are called normative expectations since they are upheld even 
if they do not become fulfilled. Normative expectations thus differ from cogni-
tive expectations since the latter are adapted or changed in the case of deviant 
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behavior. Cognitive expectations can be considered the basis for learning proc-
esses. The disappointment of a normative expectation on the contrary will be 
sanctioned as a breach of law. By so doing, the expectation will become re-
confirmed as ‘expectable’. Hence the law’s function for society at whole is to 
stabilize certain expectations over time – what accounts today as legal will still 
be legal tomorrow – and over facts – with regard to certain facts it can be ex-
pected (normatively) that these facts will be treated as legal resp. illegal. Fi-
nally, this applies for everyone: the law selects and stabilizes a certain behavior 
as (normatively) expectable behavior for everyone (Luhmann 1987a, 1993). 
Thus, it provides legal security with regard to certain expectations throughout 
society. Hence, the law chooses certain social expectations as to be resistant 
against deviant behavior, which will be legally sanctioned. In so doing, legal 
security in the temporal, the factual, and in the social dimension is achieved 
throughout society, leading to certainty, or, more precisely, legal security. 
Risk’s Structure 
It is this societal function of the law that impedes the structure of risk. Schol-
arly assessments in the field of risk provide two differing concepts of risks, an 
information-based understanding and a decision-based understanding. The first 
considers ‘risk’ as a problem of lack of information that therefore should be 
possible to resolve by more information.13 Although this concept of risk is the 
basis for legal risk management, the decision-based understanding of risk pro-
vides a more general approach to its very structure. This concept has been de-
veloped in the domain of modern systems theory and shows that every decision 
is afflicted with the problem of uncertainty and insufficient knowledge. In this 
perspective, the problem of risk cannot be resolved by more information since 
decisions have to be based on knowledge that is available at the time of the 
decision. Therefore, “(r)isk [...] is understood as the tension between the tem-
poral dimension and the social dimension of decision making.” (Bora 2001: 
8482)  
This concept of risk hence refers to the temporal as well as to the social 
dimension. Within the temporal dimension, risk refers to possible damages, 
which might arise in the future and are therefore uncertain (Luhmann 1993a). 
But while such damages formerly have been conceived of as natural phenom-
ena, in contemporary societies these damages are attributed to decisions. This 
observation distinguishes the concept of risk from the concept of danger. Thus, 
risk refers to a potential future damage that can be attributed to one’s own or 
somebody else’s decision whereas danger refers to a possible damage that can-
not be attributed to one’s own or somebody else’s decision (ibid.). The attribu-
                                                     
13  Within this concept ‘risk’ “was defined as the probability of the occurrence of some event 
causing damage, multiplied by the degree of the damage anticipated” (Bora 2001: 8480). 
1 Genetically Modified Food: Law in Conflict 
 
16
tion of decisions and with this the distribution of accountability relates to the 
social dimension in which the difference between the decision maker(s) and 
those affected by the decision becomes increasingly relevant. Those affected 
by possible harmful consequences of a decision will perceive these as danger, 
whereas the decision makers will perceive these as a risk they chose to take. 
Moreover, the more the potential damages are expected to be irreversible – as 
often is claimed in relation with genetic engineering – the more critical be-
comes the difference between the decision maker and those affected by the 
decision. In such cases, this difference can trigger social conflicts. In sum, this 
concept of risk points to imperfect knowledge which underlies every decision 
and thus to a fundamental uncertainty.  
Against the background of the outlined structures of the law itself on the 
one side and of risk on the other, their divergence has been emphasized. Risk 
refers to the need for decision-making and at the same time to an imperfect 
knowledge base, which underlies each decision. This relates to possible dam-
ages that might follow this decision in the future, but which are therefore un-
certain in the present. In addition, this uncertainty impedes the societal function 
of the law: to provide certainty with regard to certain behavioral expectations, 
thus legal security. 
In cases where cognitive uncertainty can be resolved by established 
knowledge, the imperfect knowledge base does not question the legal decision. 
However, the growing awareness of non-knowledge in contemporary society 
intensifies the regulatory dilemma since the law increasingly is confronted with 
decisions that cannot be resolved by established scientific knowledge. Finally, 
their unconcealed uncertainty threatens law’s legitimacy. 
1.1.1 Legal Developments  
In threatening law’s legitimacy, the regulatory dilemma also affects the reach 
of law. Law’s ability to manage risk with traditional legal instruments has al-
ready been questioned by several scholarly assessments, which in the majority 
come to a skeptical conclusion (e.g. Jasanoff 1995a, 1999; Bora 1999a). As 
society becomes aware of the ubiquity of uncertainty, the law is increasingly 
confronted with the risks of other social subsystems. Conflicts, which are cen-
tered on risky decisions within the subsystems, are ‘exported’ to the legal sys-
tem, where they are turned into legal conflicts that can only be resolved by 
risky decisions for the law. This impedes the societal expectation that the law 
can regulate risk, e.g. prevent even the most hypothetical dangers. Under con-
ditions of cognitive uncertainty, law therefore cannot or only to a certain extent 
fulfill its societal function. Moreover, this also affects its performance – as 
mentioned, law’s ability to solve a conflict that is triggered by a ‘risky deci-
sion’ has been proven limited. The same holds true for the prevention of risk – 
1 Genetically Modified Food: Law in Conflict 
 
17
even if food safety is a normative expectation it does not protect the consumers 
against salmonella, BSE or dioxin-eggs. Finally, this also points to the regula-
tion of conduct: in cases where a legal rule is based upon insufficient knowl-
edge, those affected by the rule may not obey it since they prefer to rely on 
their own knowledge – and not on scientific knowledge that is provided by the 
rule: “A legal norm can be obeyed or not obeyed as it provides information for 
instance regarding hazards […] in environmental law and then be not obeyed, 
because the rule’s addressee has more trust in its own knowledge instead of 
knowledge, which has been provided by the rule” (Luhmann 1993: 134). 
Scientific knowledge increasingly loses its legitimizing function and so 
do the legal rules and decisions that rely on it. Within knowledge society le-
gitimating through expertise no longer accounts as a guarantor that a legal rule 
will be obeyed. Consequently, the law increasingly is confronted with its own 
failure14: beside unintended side effects, denial or avoidance of regulations and 
the breach of the aimed effect of the regulation, the law itself is likely to trigger 
a new conflict.15 Thus, instead of avoiding or resolving a conflict, the law itself 
often becomes the source of conflict (e.g. Bora 1998, 1999, 1999a; Bora & Epp 
2000). Hence it not only fails in the guidance of social behavior and thus in its 
conflict-solving task but also introduces another socially disruptive issue into 
an already tense field – itself! 
In order to overcome these difficulties, law has tried to adjust to these 
changing societal conditions. As a reaction to a growing societal demand for 
the regulation of risk on the one side, and the law’s limited capability of man-
aging risk on the other, a dense network of regulatory mechanisms has evolved 
that embraces traditional legal instruments such as proscription and sanction as 
well as new forms of cooperative law and voluntary agreements. These devel-
opments are not unique to the context of risk-regulation but must rather be seen 
as part of a broader trend. Instead of going into the details of a debate that be-
came well known under buzzwords such as cooperative state (Voigt 1995) or 
negotiating state (Scharpf 1991) only recent developments in the area of envi-
ronmental regulation shall be mentioned. In this context, especially deregula-
tion and substitution play a central role. While deregulation aims to reduce 
prescriptive [ordnungsrechtliche] instruments on the legislative level, substitu-
tion strives for a replacement of elements of the environmental law (Knopp 
2001). As these forms of ‘soft’ law comprise temporal and social openings of 
the law, they also lead to a factual opening in some respect.  
                                                     
14  The term failure here is invoked to refer to the circumstance that law does not penetrate as 
it intends to or as society expects it to and must not be misunderstood in a normative sense. 
15  These difficulties have been the subject of research on implementation. In view of the great 
number of studies, the reader is merely directed to the classical study on implementation by 
Pressman & Wildavsky (1973). 
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Temporal openings of the law can be observed in temporary limitations 
of legal rules, i.e., rules that contain their own ‘expiry date’. In this way, the 
law tries to react to the ongoing scientific progress and to base its decisions on 
the most recent available scientific knowledge. Temporary limitations can take 
different shapes. Especially in the context of technology and environmental 
law, vague legal terms [unbestimmte Rechtsbegriffe] such as ‘state of the art’ 
[Stand der Technik] and ‘state of the scientific and technical knowledge’ 
[Stand von Wissenschaft und Technik] function as the interface between law 
and science. These terms make way for a periodical revision of a legal rule or 
decision whereby the exact date depends upon the development of the scien-
tific progress. The rule is thus valid ‘until further notice’. This feature is not 
new but is characteristic to the classical (technocratic) model of expertise, in 
which the law has reverted to scientific knowledge.16 A second, and more re-
cent development, can be seen in the aforementioned ‘expiry date’. In this case, 
a legal rule is enforced for a defined period where after it has to be revised or 
replaced by a new rule. 
A social opening of the law can be observed in various forms of institu-
tionalized public consultation procedures as well as in more or less informal 
negotiations between the original regulator and the regulatee that might lead to 
voluntary agreements between both these parties. The outstanding characteris-
tic of social openings of law is to be seen in the inclusion of actors that do not 
explicitly belong to the legal system, but either stem from those spheres to 
which the particular rule is addressed to or that are affected (or define them-
selves as being so) by the subject matter of the legal regulation in a more indi-
rect way. This development has been described as a critical reaction to the 
technocratic model of expertise, drawing on the limits of expertise and the in-
appropriateness of scientific knowledge in dissolving problems that affect soci-
ety as a whole. 
Both developments that have an impact on the very structure of law can 
be described in sum as a process of adaptation to changing societal conditions 
and expectations. Nevertheless, this process of adaptation has become a ‘risk’ 
for the law itself in a double sense. Firstly, at the same time as the law strives 
for the ability to learn in order to adjust to the temporal horizon of risk, it runs 
the risk to lose its stabilizing function (e.g. Hiller 1993). In addition, as it is a 
constituting characteristic of law to stabilize expectations over time the adjust-
ment to a temporally limited horizon threatens the law’s very function. 
Secondly, in both these cases legal decisions are based not only upon le-
gal knowledge but also upon knowledge that is generated in the law’s societal 
                                                     
16  This construction is also well known as the legal concept ‘legitimating through expertise’ 
[Legitimation durch Sachverstand] (Nicklisch 1988). 
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environment. Consequently, also a factual opening of the law can be observed. 
With regard to the developments within knowledge society and the increasing 
relevance of non-scientific knowledge, one can also assume that knowledge, 
which is generated in those societal fields that later become the addressees of a 
legal rule, is likely to become part of the basis for decisions within the legal 
system. This again points to an increasing de-legitimization of science; the 
more science loses its dominant role in the production of knowledge within 
society, the more the law seems to depend upon knowledge that is generated 
within the particular societal fields it was originally designed to regulate.  
1.1.2 Regulation ‘Beyond’ the Law 
Given this analysis, the question arises not only how the regulatory process 
under conditions of uncertainty can be performed but also how the process of 
‘regulation’ itself can be described in an adequate manner. The above outlined 
developments are embedded in a considerable intellectual debate over the effi-
cacy of alternative approaches to state regulation. These approaches shall for 
the time being referred to as regulation ‘beyond’ the law since they are charac-
terized by a reduction of prescriptive instruments on the legislative level, thus 
by deregulation.  
It is the guiding assumption of this debate that a desired behavior of those 
to be regulated can be achieved if regulatory instruments are applied, which 
correspond to the prevailing rules of the given context. This approach is espe-
cially in the anglophone context known as ‘responsive regulation’ (Ayres & 
Braithwaite 1992), a regulation that is “responsive to industry structure in that 
different structures will be conducive to different degrees and forms of regula-
tion” (Ayres & Braithwate 1992: 4). Consequently, “(g)overnment should also 
be attuned to the differing motivations of regulated actors” (ibid.). 
Even though this approach offers a perspective in that the official law of 
the state is no longer conceived as an uncontested means for guiding social 
behavior, it can at the same time be easily misread as overemphasizing law’s 
“historical extraordinary responsiveness to the economic system” (Teubner 
1992: 1461). In so doing, this approach insinuates that the law in being respon-
sive merely responds to economy’s demands. The underlying connotation of 
this interpretation can thus be put in a nutshell by the (radical) formula that the 
market will replace the state. 
In the present study instead, the idea of legal ‘responsiveness’ is under-
stood as corresponding to that concept of ‘legal pluralism’ within which the 
relation between law and society is characterized by operative couplings to the 
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multiplicity of all social discourses (Merry 1988; Teubner 1992).17 These cou-
plings are qualified as productive misreadings, in that “the legal discourse is 
not only perturbated by processes of self-production, but law productively mis-
reads other social discourses as ‘sources’ of norm production” (Teubner 1992: 
1447). 
Against the background of these assumptions, it has to be argued that the 
law (and the regulatory process) is accompanied, if not penetrated, by power 
and increasingly by knowledge. With regard to power, this statement sounds 
neither new nor very surprising, but rather old-fashioned. At first sight the no-
tion of law as a political instrument seems to become revived. Nevertheless, 
although it is this notion of the connection between law and politics, which will 
be challenged in this study, it is not to deny that there is a strong connection 
between law and politics. The law has to be enforced by politics ever since and 
is thus relying on political power by definition. In this respect, power evolves 
as a resource by which means certain behavioral expectations become distin-
guished from others as normative expectable. By so doing, power absorbs un-
certainty as it leads to an elimination of possible behavioral expectations. 
As with power, also the connection between law and knowledge is not 
new, even though it has so far referred to law and scientific knowledge in the 
first place (see above). However, against the outlined understanding between 
law and its societal environment it appears reasonable to assume that the law 
                                                     
17  As with many other concepts, there is no unanimous agreement as to exactly what legal 
pluralism refers to. That the concept often is used in an entirely different sense becomes 
apparent by phrases such as “classical and new” legal pluralism (Merry 1988) or “rethink-
ing legal pluralism” (Teubner 1992), for instance. As applied in the present study it follows 
Griffiths’ broad but basic assumptions (1986) in that it defines legal pluralism in opposition 
to a legal centralism that understands law as “an exclusive, systematic and unified hierar-
chical ordering of normative propositions” (3). Legal pluralism instead shall “refer to the 
whole aggregate of governmental and non-governmental norms of social control, without 
any distinction drawn as to their source” (Moore 2001: 11).  
Despite these distinctions Moore (2001) has identified at least five different applications of 
this concept, wherein ‘pluralism’ refers to “(1) the way the state acknowledges diverse so-
cial fields and within society and represents itself in relation to them; (2) the internal diver-
sity of state administration (…); (3) the ways in which the state itself competes with other 
states in larger arena (the EU, for instance); (4) the ways in which the state is interdigitated 
(…) with non-governmental, semi-autonomous social fields (…); (5) the ways in which law 
may depend on the collaboration of non-state social fields for its implementation.” (10-11). 
Moore itself dissociates her own approach from that applied in the present study as “(t)o 
deny that the state can and should be distinguished from other rule-making entities for 
many practical purposes is to turn away from the obvious.”  
Given that there is no space to discuss this objection against the above outlined concept of 
legal pluralism intensely, this statement nevertheless has to be questioned since it seems to 
be based upon a misunderstanding of ‘legal pluralism’ as denying social phenomena such 
as power, pressure, and coercion. That this is not the case will become apparent also 
throughout the present study. 
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draws not only upon scientific knowledge but also increasingly upon knowl-
edge that has been generated within the social fields the law was originally 
designed to regulate. Thus, norms that stem from other social realms than the 
legal one are likely to become part of the law, resulting in what is called ‘plural 
norm-setting’. In more abstract, ‘societal’ knowledge appears as a new tool in 
the law’s efforts to absorb uncertainty.  
Consequently, as the law in knowledge society increasingly is confronted 
with non-knowledge, thus cognitive uncertainty, that cannot be solved by tradi-
tional legal instruments, its fundamental legitimacy will be challenged. But – 
and this is one hypothesis of the present study – this challenges can be over-
come if the law applies instruments that acknowledge the autonomy of its ad-
dressees in that it does not try to subject them to deterrence based, prescriptive 
regulations but instead encourages the development of in-context solving 
strategies, that may prove helpful for the law. In that context, the state is ex-
pected to retreat from its active role in the planning of certain societal arenas as 
well as in the solution of conflicts and rather functions as guarantor of protec-
tive services in the background. This idea about the state’s role is discussed as 
the ‘shadow of leviathan’ [Schatten des Leviathan] (e.g. Treiber 1998) in Ger-
man-speaking contexts while its anglophone equivalent can be found in the 
‘benign big gun’ (e.g. Ayres & Braithwaite 1992), representing severe sanc-
tions in the arsenal of regulatory and state officials (Shover et al. 2001). In the 
shadow of a state that merely exists in the back, new modes of regulation are 
expected to evolve, which in their total can be subsumed under the label of 
regulated self-regulation (e.g. Schneider et al. 2001). These new modes of 
regulation are considered to improve the implementation of policies, as they 
are more likely to correspond to the context of the rules’ application.  
Thus, in becoming aware of the various forms of ‘societal’ knowledge, 
solutions for problems that tend to overtax the law are likely to be designed, 
such as the problems that arise with the development and implementation of 
new technologies. Given that power as well as knowledge both serve as media 
by which means uncertainty can be absorbed, their distribution “is orchestrated 
by the definition of the problem that has to be resolved.” (Willke 2001: 23). 
The degree to which law will be accompanied by either knowledge or power 
will therefore depend upon the given issue that has to be regulated. However, 
as modern society increasingly is faced with uncertainty in unexpected places 
so far, law will increasingly (have to) draw upon societal knowledge resources, 
in order to restore resp. gain its legitimacy. In sum, against the background of 
the outlined theoretical considerations the phrase ‘beyond the law’ has now to 
be corrected to ‘beyond’ the official law of the state while other social norms 
and knowledge resources, thus non-governmental sources for law, appear as 
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promising means for dealing adequately with the endeavor of regulating in 
knowledge society. 
1.2 Globalization of Uncertainty 
The complexity of problems that comes along with the implementation of new 
technologies is rooted in the fact that a variety of societal spheres is affected by 
it. Furthermore, these technologies (and their problems) can no longer ade-
quately be described as territorially limited, as knowledge society is fulfilled 
within an increasing globalized context. This also challenges prevailing under-
standings of legal regulation in that field.  
In order to point out what this means in detail, first a clear-cut under-
standing of what globalization is about has to be achieved. Within the mush-
rooming literature on globalization, several understandings of what this issue is 
about can be distinguished. The majority conceives globalization as a devel-
opment, which primarily is marked by an increasing spatial expansion (delo-
calization) of events that formerly have been limited to local contexts (e.g. 
Robertson 1992). Here, the underlying premise is the existence of several, dif-
ferent societies.  
This is contrasted with a conception of globalization that considers the 
worldwide relevance of social events within a simultaneously evolving context 
of a world-societal unity as its key feature (e.g. Kuhm 2001). This concept is 
common to all world-systems theories, which assume a single social system 
that is termed world-system (e.g. Wallerstein 1974), world-polity (e.g. Meyer 
1980) or world society (e.g. Luhmann 1971), depending on the theoretical con-
text. Their shared assumption is that all social events occur within a horizon 
that is determined by the existence of a single, global world society. 
In addition to this line of difference and to a certain extent transversal, 
different understandings as to the question whether world society has to be 
described in terms of polycentricity or in terms of uniformity are to be found.18 
While representatives of the latter case stress fundamental differences between 
various countries (e.g. Friedman 1994; Wallerstein 1974), representatives of 
the first emphasize the increasing similarities that are to be found among vari-
ous countries (e.g. Robertson 1992; Lechner 2000). That these conceptions are 
not exclusive but both hold true to a certain extent comes into sight if one sub-
scribes to an understanding of world society as it has been developed within 
the domain of modern systems theory (e.g. Luhmann 1971; Stichweh 2001). In 
this understanding, globalization is defined with respect to the single social 
                                                     
18  Within the present study the terms polycentricity and uniformity are used interchangeably 
with the concepts of homogeneity/heterogeneity and isomorphism/variation. 
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subsystems such as the law, economy, or politics, to name but a few. Each so-
cial subsystem employs a specifically codified form of communication, for 
example, legal decisions, collectively binding decisions and payments. En-
closed in this communications is world society, since the possibilities to com-
municate as well as the employed symbolic media are not limited to national 
boundaries. Thus, ‘globalization’ can be understood as the mechanism by 
which world society is established within each social subsystem not only on 
the local, regional, national and transnational level (e.g. Bora 1998a; Stichweh 
2001) but also on the organizational level (e.g. Albert & Hilkermeier 2001). In 
this context, national boundaries can no longer be seen as constitutive for soci-
ety, but merely form lines of its internal differentiation (ibid.). In sum, global-
ization is characterized by the worldwide perceptibility of communication and 
the worldwide relevance of events, which implies that a plurality of observers 
refers to the same world in different ways (e.g. Bora 1998a). Due to this plural-
ity of worldviews, one can assume that world society to a greater extent is 
marked by polycentricity than by uniformity. With regard to the aforemen-
tioned distinction between homogenization and heterogenization as alternative 
trends within the process of globalization, now a somewhat different assump-
tion can be made: homogenization as well as heterogenization can both be con-
sidered as trends that are observable in the development of world society.  
Such an understanding of globalization has implications for the regula-
tion of issues whose insufficient knowledge base cannot easily be resolved by 
invoking established, scientific knowledge. In fact, these complex cases are 
likely to challenge the law’s capacities to establish ‘consented’ rules for these 
issues’ handling. The problems that probably come along with such an en-
deavor are the following ones. 
Firstly, problems that once had been perceived mainly within the borders 
of an individual country develop worldwide relevance. In taking the above-
mentioned notion of globalization seriously, this is not due to the border-
crossing movement of for instance poisoned goods, air and water pollution or 
radioactivity but to the worldwide diffusion of communication. In this perspec-
tive, not a material medium contains a risk, but risk is the result of meaningful 
observation. As risk passes national boundaries within the medium of commu-
nication (Tacke 2001), the ‘dissolving’ of cognitive uncertainty can cut (at 
least) two ways, because communication is not unique throughout the world 
but dependent upon the context. If any globalization of uncertainty requires its 
local appropriation (ibid.), an ‘uncertain’ issue not necessarily will be observed 
and communicated in terms of risk. Dependent upon the observer, it can also 
be communicated as unproblematic as in that given perspective an established 
knowledge base seems available. Therefore, it can be assumed that the risks 
attributed to a specific issue and thus its underlying cognitive uncertainty will 
1 Genetically Modified Food: Law in Conflict 
 
24
be constructed differently within the varying contexts. As world society is for 
the abovementioned reasons characterized by a plurality of perspectives one 
can therefore assume that it will embrace a plurality of interpretations, i.e., 
communicative constructions of a given issue, which are at least competitive if 
not mutually exclusive. 
Secondly, due to this worldwide variety of interpretations that root in a 
globalization of cognitive uncertainty19, the need for a regulatory framework, 
which reaches beyond the level of the classical nation-state becomes pressing. 
In certain fields this need has already resulted in the establishment of legal 
norms and other regulatory instruments on a transnational level, thus suggest-
ing an emerging ‘global’ (e.g. Teubner 1997; Voigt 1999/2000) or ‘transna-
tional’ law (e.g. Albert & Lehmkuhl 2002). 
This again draws the attention to law’s ability to deliver adequate solu-
tions to complex problems. With respect to the ‘globalization of uncertainty’, 
several obstacles for global regulatory frameworks can be identified that fall 
into line with the already outlined difficulties on the ‘national’ level. 
Firstly, transnational organizations like the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) or the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC) establish legal norms 
and regulatory instruments that urge national legislation to adapt to their re-
quirements [Harmonisierungsdruck]. Nevertheless, as with EU-Law, these 
transnational norms are likely to collide with national legislation (e.g. Merkle 
1994). Similar to the problems within one country, these collisions root in dif-
ferent definitions of what the regulated issue and its problems are about. Con-
sequently, these regulations can be expected to become a new source of con-
flict instead of providing solutions for existing conflicts. Thus, the problems 
the ‘regulation of uncertainty’ already faces on the national level are likely to 
become repeated on the international level. 
Secondly, the instruments of risk regulation, which have been available 
to the classic nation-state, do not seem to meet the requirements of a globalized 
risk regulation, since for instance the possibilities of legal sanction still are 
limited for transnational organizations (e.g. Shelton 2000). Therefore, non-
legal forms of regulation or ‘soft law’ that focus on cooperation and learning 
may arise as probably more suitable in that context. But then again the conse-
quences for the law itself that have been outlined further below have to be 
taken into account. 
This leads to the fourth and last point, since another possible obstacle for 
a global regulation of risk presumably can be found within the differences that 
can be observed in the various regulatory approaches of different countries. 
                                                     
19  With regard to BSE Tacke speaks of a “globalization of risk” (Tacke 2001: 294). 
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Even though these differences can be traced back to probably varying defini-
tions of the regulated issue this last point will be investigated more thoroughly 
as this statement touches the one central question of the present study: why 
does an apparently identical problem become differently regulated within vary-
ing national contexts? 
1.2.1 National Styles of Regulation 
The observation of different regulatory approaches is nothing new and has 
been subject to a variety of scholarly assessments, although they differ in their 
overall interest. Firstly, one branch of comparative studies is bound to look for 
common ground in a certain field. Here the literature in the context of the abo-
vementioned world polity can be seen as one example. It aims to explain an 
increasing conformity between different countries with regard to, for instance, 
the expansion of the nation-state model around the world (Meyer et al. 1997). 
But although the establishment of the nation-state as a formal structure around 
the world is an undeniable fact that could be interpreted as a proof for an over-
all tendency towards homogenization and equalization, one has to take into 
account that formal models and rules are not constant throughout various con-
texts (may they be regional, local, or organizational, to name but a few). In 
fact, their appropriation will differ contingent on the given context, thus con-
firming a fundamentally given ‘heterogenization’.  
Therefore, another branch of comparative studies has to be taken into ac-
count that seems to do more justice to identifiable differences between various 
countries in certain fields. This approach has been one of the dominating ac-
cesses in the assessment of regulatory approaches in the field of environmental 
risks. In this field especially the control of chemicals (e.g. Brickman et al. 
1985), the management of hazardous waste (e.g. O’Riordan & Wynne 1987) 
and the regulation of nuclear power (e.g. Hellström 2000) have been thor-
oughly investigated. The field of biotechnology has also been the subject of 
several comparative studies that aim to explain why this technology is treated 
differently among various countries (e.g. Baark & Jamison 1990; Linneroth-
Bayer 1995; Behrens et al. 2000; Lynch & Vogel 2000). The shared assump-
tion of these studies is the existence of ‘national styles of regulation’20, which 
serve as the explanatory variable for the observable differences. As this con-
cept is central to a majority of the assessments in the field of comparative re-
search on regulation, its capacity to provide an adequate understanding of the 
differences will be explored. 
                                                     
20  This term has been coined by Vogel (1986) and is used interchangeably with terms like 
regulatory style (Linneroth-Bayer 1995), governing style (O’Riordan & Wynne 1987), 
regulatory context (Krücken 1997) and policy culture (Hellström 2000), which all refer to a 
state’s overall approach to regulation. 
1 Genetically Modified Food: Law in Conflict 
 
26
The concept of ‘national styles of regulation’ is usually applied to de-
scribe a state’s overall treatment of a particular issue. The underlying assump-
tion of this concept is that various countries have cultivated certain styles in 
their regulatory approaches. These regulatory styles are conceived of as the 
result of the interplay of different political, legal, and scientific cultures. In the 
scope of this approach different countries have been characterized as corpora-
tist (e.g. Germany), adversarial (e.g. United States), consensual (e.g. Great 
Britain), or authoritative (e.g. France).  
As the subject matter of the present study contains a comparison of the 
American and the German approach towards the legal regulation of GM Food, 
the key features of their particular approaches to regulation as described in the 
context of ‘national styles’ will be outlined. The American approach to regula-
tion is usually described as adversarial or as confrontational which is one 
characterization of an often-stated American Exceptionalism (e.g. Vogel 1986; 
Jasanoff 1990). This statement of an American Exceptionalism in the realm of 
risk regulation refers to special features in the political, legal and scientific 
sphere. The interplay of these spheres often is described as adversarial. 
Jasanoff (1990) argues that the political environment for risk regulation 
can be characterized by competition, which refers to competition among inter-
est groups, between Washington and the states, and among the branches of 
federal government. This competitive environment has led to some major 
changes in the American legal realm, regarding the legal recognition of public 
concerns. Public concerns are seen as receiving attention, firstly under the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA 1966) as this law gives American citizens 
the right to access the records and proceedings of federal agencies (e.g. Bruch 
2000). In addition to this broad right to know, public concerns are also consid-
ered as represented in the policy-process by institutions subsumed under the 
term ‘public interest litigation’, such as the citizen suit and class action suit. 
These institutions refer to standing [Prozessführungsbefugnis], i.e., to the ques-
tion of who has “standing to sue” (e.g. Orren 1976). Relevant for standing is 
the so-called injury in fact and the so-called zone of interest, which refer to the 
injured interests of the plaintiff and the interests, the rule is originally supposed 
to protect (e.g. Wegener 1998: 154-155). Consequently, public interest litiga-
tion has become an established instrument in the sphere of environmental pol-
icy. 
This broad legal access has also strengthened the role of the courts in 
policymaking. The effects of this influential role of the courts on administrative 
decision-making are the following: Firstly, a review by the courts delays deci-
sions related to risk as these would be thoroughly reinvestigated. Secondly, the 
character of decision-making itself will be influenced by the anticipation of 
judicial review since the administration has taken steps to satisfy demands for 
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‘reasoned decision-making’ and a ‘hard look’ (Jasanoff 1995: 75-78) at the 
evidence. This also, has led to a way of decision-making that is often estimated 
as more transparent and open to the public than in Europe. Finally, even the 
scientific sphere is described as differing from those in other countries by 
showing a pluralism of participants. This stresses primarily the point of the 
emergence of ‘public interest science’ and its influence on the policy process. 
Both, the Clean Water Act (CAA, amended 1977) and the Clean Air Act (CAA, 
amended 1990) bear witness to this growing public influence on legislation. 
Public interest groups mobilize science as a resource in political debates since 
for instance they cite critical expertise, which opposes the ‘official’ scientific 
opinion. In so doing, critical expertise increasingly has undermined the position 
of the established academia and provided support in lawsuits and, more funda-
mental, in the process of legislation.  
Even though those developments took place in the late 1960s and the 
early 70s and since there have been two major waves in the criticism of regula-
tions21, arguing for deregulation, Jasanoff (1990) claims that “some of the fac-
tors that prompted the earlier ‘exceptionalism’ of the United States remained 
very much alive“ (72). 
In contrast, the common characterization of the German approach to 
regulation is as corporatist or neo-corporatist (e.g. von Alemann 1981; Streeck 
1994). Corporatism is found where powerful groups have mutual advantage in 
acting collectively. Regarding the realms of politics, law, and science, the cer-
tain common features are linked with corporatism. 
The political sphere here is described as marked by the close cooperation 
of influential associations and state agencies, which makes it difficult for inter-
est groups to influence political decisions and, consequently, legislation. In this 
description it seems reasonable to trace back the, at least asserted, little ‘legal’ 
visibility of public interest groups to the more static structures of a corporatist 
state. Regarding the legal sphere, it is stated that there is less legal access in 
Germany for public interest groups than in the US. Until recently, class action 
suits were merely to be found in thirteen out of sixteen federal states, while it 
had not been implemented on the level of federal legislation. With the en-
forcement of the amended German Nature Conservation Act [Bundesnatur-
schutzgesetz – BnatSchG] in April 2002, class action suits have been adopted 
as a legal institution at the federal level (e.g. Calliess 2003). To what extent 
                                                     
21  The first wave of criticism on regulation became popular as ‘Drug-Lag’-discussion and 
focused on the drug approval process, which - due to its requirements and length - was held 
responsible for the death of more than 1200 people (see the study by Wardell 1973). The 
second wave of criticism is linked with the Aids crisis. Here interest groups claim less pre-
caution and a more ‘lean’ approval process (Kessler & Feiden 1995). 
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this instrument will have an impact on environmental policy making has to be 
proven in future. 
Another aspect, which might be interpreted as an incident that public 
concerns in Germany are not taken as seriously by the law as they are in the 
United States, is the lack of a functional equivalent to the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act. Even though the Umweltinformationsgesetz (UIG), which is effective 
since 1994, does not go that far, but is seen as an important step towards a 
more open administration (e.g. König 2000). In addition, a planned Consumer 
Information Act [Verbraucherinformations-Gesetz – VIG] could not be estab-
lished but was rejected by the German Bundesrat in 2002 (e.g. Lebensmittel 
Praxis 2002). 
These features of the legal sphere can be regarded as having their roots in 
the influence of the industry on the jurisdiction through their strong ties to state 
agencies. Concerning science in a corporatist context, according to O’Riordan 
and Wynne (1987) this “is established in a strongly hierarchical way which 
consolidates almost a monopoly role for experts in science and technology de-
cision making” (404). Therefore, the conclusion is drawn that science is less 
contested and that critical expertise is less influential than in a more adversarial 
context.  
Although these descriptions are quite sketchy, they point to the differ-
ences that have been stated between the two countries in the context of national 
styles of regulation. 
1.2.2 Some Problems with National Styles of Regulation 
At first glance, these characterizations sound quite reasonable, as they seem to 
explain the observable differences between Germany and the United States. 
However, once they are considered more carefully, several problems that are 
associated with these assessments come into view.  
For example, though there seems to be agreement that there are obvious 
differences in the regulatory styles of different countries, there is little agree-
ment on what those differences are. These difficulties in grasping the differ-
ences point to problems, which are to be found at the theoretical as well as at 
the empirical level. 
At the empirical level, it is noticeable that there is no unanimity among 
the descriptions of the various styles. On the contrary, the presented scholarly 
assessments are to some extent contradictory, or at least incoherent, as has also 
been stated by Meidinger (1987), who points out that “scholars and analysts 
picking up on the idea [of regulatory cultures, AE] tend to use it in diffuse, 
inconsistent, and often simplistic ways” (355). This incoherence comes into 
sight if one compares the literature on national styles of regulation; what 
seemed to be quite uncontested – like the statement of an American Exception-
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alism, for example – becomes blurred more and more. Specifically, as will be 
outlined, scientific pluralism and the policy debates surrounding biotechnology 
contend the generalizations made about national styles of regulation. 
The scientific realm in the United States has been characterized by plu-
ralism among participants, while science in Germany has been described to be 
organized in a strong hierarchical way. This apparent contrast loses credibility 
if one considers another description whereupon „(t)he adversarial approach to 
expert enactment (typically found in the German context) shows an open fo-
rum where different players compete for political and social influence in re-
spective policy arenas.“ (Hellström 2000: 508, emphasis added, AE). Not only 
is the scientific pluralism as an outstanding feature of the American Exception-
alism but also the description of the German approach as corporatist ques-
tioned by this assessment. 
Recently also one of the most popular scholars in the field of compara-
tive research on regulation, David Vogel (2001), questioned the prevailing por-
trait of an American exceptionalism as “[i]n a number of important respects the 
‘American Style of Regulation’ is no longer confined to the United States: it 
has also emerged in Europe, though with respect to different issues.” (21). This 
conclusion falls into line with Behrens’ et al. (2000), who distinguish between 
different sectors like the public health system and the educational system. 
These systems are described as corporatist, in contrast to policy concerning 
biotechnology: “In comparison to sectors like the health and the educational 
system the biotechnology-policy is not marked by corporatist structures, 
whereby the interest groups who are involved in the conflict over genetic engi-
neering would have had influenced the administrative decision-making proc-
esses” (166). To differ between the objects of regulation seems to be a step in 
the right direction but still cannot explain why different objects of regulation 
are characterized by different styles. 
Against the background of these inconsistent findings, it requires many 
additional assumptions to substantiate these characterizations. Here the notion 
of the ideal type is quite popular: policy cultures “are by necessity ideal types, 
that is, they represent useful analytical categories rather than ‘natural’ kinds, 
and they may appear as intermingled with other unstated forms of policymak-
ing (...)“ (Hellström 2000: 507). O’Riordan & Wynne (1987) claim “that these 
four comparative typologies [adversarial, consensual, authorative, corporatist, 
AE] should be regarded as ideal types, none of which exists in pure form in any 
system” (404).  
Even though this might hold true, within the present study the claim is 
made that these inconsistencies have their source in a methodological problem, 
pointing to a deeper rooted, conceptual problem, which is underlying the con-
cept of national styles of regulation as such. The methodological problem re-
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fers to difficulties that arise if one compares national styles of regulation since 
here the comparative framework remains unclear. As even O’Riordan & 
Wynne (1987) state “that in many cases it is very difficult to compare regula-
tions in a meaningful way” (406), it will be the aim of the next section to inves-
tigate the conceptual problem of the presented approach. As a reaction to this 
problem, an approach for the comparison of regulatory frameworks will be 
outlined by which means a more fully and adequate understanding of the ob-
servable differences can be achieved. 
1.2.3 Beyond ‘National’ Styles 
Within the domain of the ‘national style of regulation’ approach, terminologi-
cal inconsistencies with regard to the characterizations of the various countries 
became apparent. Instead of considering this merely a dispute over names, it 
has been claimed that these difficulties in grasping the differences between the 
regulatory approaches of the various countries point to a deeper problem that 
underlies the notion of ‘national styles of regulation’. 
This problem appears to be related with the level of analysis employed in 
the given context. The level of analysis remains somewhat unclear, since na-
tional styles refer to nation-states, but the notion of the ‘state’ is not further 
defined. This vagueness at the core of the concept has consequences for an 
appropriate understanding of the regulatory process, and, consequently, for the 
reach of statements made within the context of national styles of regulation. 
One central reason for the conceptual fuzziness that can be detected 
within the literature on national styles of regulation appears to be related with 
the term of the ‘nation-state’. Since national styles are taken as characteriza-
tions of the (nation-)state’s overall treatment of a particular issue, ‘state’ and 
‘society’ seem to be used interchangeably – the state’s overall approach is 
(mis)taken as the all-societal approach. Nevertheless, this viewpoint under-
mines the important distinction between state and society that has been empha-
sized within the domain of modern systems theory (e.g. Luhmann 1987). In-
voking this distinction means calling attention to the fact that with the increas-
ing differentiation of modern societies the state has become merely one part of 
the political system, which is confronted with various political parties and as-
sociations (Luhmann 1998). Hence, the state has to be understood as an organi-
zation of the political system that equips the system with the ability to commu-
nicate. As the state is primarily associated with politics, the state’s overall 
treatment now emerges as the political treatment of a particular issue. Against 
this background, using the rhetoric of nation-state, national style, or national 
culture means applying a specific political term to an all-societal treatment of a 
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particular issue, thus reflecting an inadequate politicization.22 Statements made 
within the national styles-approach therefore can be marked as incomplete 
since they reflect the political approach of a country but leave out the many 
other forces that partake in the regulation of a specific issue. Consequently, the 
concept of national styles seems to conceal more than it explains. 
In sum, national styles of regulation tell us something about the political 
treatment of a particular issue, but they leave out the fact that political organi-
zations have to be considered as just one part of the regulatory process besides 
others. Especially with regard to the regulation of risk such a limited under-
standing of the regulatory process seems inadequate. In the domain of risk 
regulation classical legal instruments seem to have become obsolete, and an 
increasing development towards new forms of ‘soft’ law and non-legal instru-
ments can be observed, which question the ‘classical’ understanding of regula-
tion in terms of ‘command and control’ (e.g. Baldwin 1997). Within the proc-
esses of law’s adjustment to the regulation of risk a temporal as well as social 
opening has been claimed which gives reason to consider the regulation of risk 
as a complex social act and not as a limited legal one. It gives also reason to 
assume that those involved in the regulatory process will differ dependent upon 
the issue that has to be regulated.  
Thus revealing the limitations of the concept of national styles of regula-
tion, the conclusion can be drawn that this concept does not have the capacity 
to explain the differences that occur in the regulation of risk in an adequate 
manner. Since it cannot fully explain the differences among various countries, 
it also cannot explain the differences that occur within the global regulation of 
risk. As it considers the regulatory process to be a limited legal and political 
act, it cannot observe the various dynamics that unfold between the legal regu-
lation on the one side and the plurality of those affected by the legal rule on the 
other (see above chapter 1.1). Additionally, national styles do not provide an 
instrument by which changing constellations within the regulatory process can 
be observed (and explained) that are contingent on the issue that has to be regu-
lated. As will be outlined further below, it is not at least the perception of this 
issue that structures the regulatory process. Therefore, the subject matter of 
regulation and its specific characteristics – or those that are attributed to it – 
have to be taken into account if one aims to explain why seemingly identical 
phenomena are regulated differently in various countries. This research interest 
obviously demands for an approach that takes not only political and legal ac-
tors but also all social actors into account, which partake in the regulatory 
process. 
                                                     
22  Luhmann (1997: 1088, n. 356) criticized this instance as “die Aufblähung politischer Beg-
riffe zu einem die Gesamtgesellschaft übergreifenden Format.” 
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1.3 Outlook: Turning to Organizations 
The present chapter was dedicated to the outline of the problems that are re-
lated with the legal regulation of GM Food. The regulation of GM Food can be 
taken as an example for the law’s dilemma to provide certainty under condi-
tions of cognitive uncertainty. In trying to do so, the insuperable contrast be-
tween the desire for absolute certainty as an anthropological constant on the 
one side and the in part unmasked uncertainty that underlies decisions made in 
this context on the other becomes obvious. 
This contrast has been circumscribed as a regulatory dilemma thus point-
ing to law’s limitations. It could be shown that law’s ability to cope with cogni-
tive uncertainty in an adequate manner has to be questioned, with respect to its 
function as well as to its performance. Obviously the law’s capacity to stabilize 
normative expectations is limited if the object of a legal rule is afflicted with an 
open and complex cognitive uncertainty. Consequently, this also has a negative 
effect on law’s ability to regulate conduct as well as on its conflict-solving ca-
pacities. Additionally, the law not only is increasingly confronted with the 
breach of its rules, but also becomes itself the source of conflict. 
Given that there may be considerable conflict about the very existence of 
a problem, the law cannot solve this conflict by means of traditional legal in-
struments. These traditional legal instruments often rely on scientific knowl-
edge, but the more science and, concurrently, scientific knowledge becomes 
delegitimized within contemporary society, so do these instruments. Thus, the 
law has to adjust to changing societal conditions that can be characterized by 
an increasing focus on knowledge as well as on non-knowledge, thus revealing 
a fundamental cognitive uncertainty. By so doing, a temporal as well as a so-
cial opening of the law can be observed, which in turn affects the law itself. 
Here the question arises, in how far the temporal and social opening also leads 
to a factual opening of the law and what this means for the very structure of the 
law. At first sight, law’s function and thus its performance seems to be threat-
ened by these openings. If the law can no longer provide certainty over an open 
period, it becomes unable to stabilize normative expectations that are but one 
precondition for the resolution of conflicts. Further, if the law increasingly 
bases its decisions upon knowledge that is generated within its societal envi-
ronment, does it not run the risk of loosing its ‘identity’? Alternatively, to turn 
the question around, what becomes the very notion of law if is not (or no 
longer) the distinction between legal and illegal? What happens to the law if 
the meaning of this distinction increasingly is defined by recourse not only to 
scientific but also to ‘societal’ knowledge? And again: which role will and can 
the law play in the regulation of a technology that is foremost marked by cog-
nitive uncertainty as is the case with GM Food? 
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In order to answer these questions, a theoretical approach was invoked 
that calls attention not only to law’s autonomy but also to its addressee's auton-
omy. Therefore, “(i)f private law’s reliance on social autonomy and structural 
coupling is applied not only to the economic system but also to the multiplicity 
of social discourses, it may become a model for new ways in which law, in-
stead of relying solely on its political legitimation and its economic efficacy, 
opens up to the dynamics of ‘civil society’” (Teubner 1992: 1462), or one 
might add, to the dynamics of knowledge society. 
As world society increasingly becomes established, the search for a so-
cially acceptable way of dealing with complex and to varying extents contested 
issues like GM Food can no longer be described as the unique problem of a 
single country. These issues traverse territorial borders in a double sense, as 
material as well as in the medium of communication, thus demanding for regu-
latory solutions beyond the single national regulatory frameworks. However, as 
the legal regulation of these complex issues also faces difficulties on the na-
tional level, it can be expected that these difficulties will become repeated on a 
transnational level. The limits of such a transnational regulatory framework are 
– beside other factors – to be found within the different regulatory approaches 
that have evolved in the various countries. For the time being, the conclusion 
can be drawn that one has firstly to derive an adequate explanation of these 
observable differences among national regulatory approaches in order to 
fathom not only the possibility of transnational regulations as such, but rather 
the overall design of such regulations. 
In order to grasp these differences, the concept of national styles of regu-
lation has been introduced as a – at first sight – promising approach. Neverthe-
less, at second sight, this approach seems to conceal more than it reveals; na-
tional styles have moreover to be considered as black boxes as they do not tell 
us anything about what the differences between the various countries are about. 
Moreover, these explanatory problems of this approach seem closely related to 
the somehow undefined level of analysis. These shortcomings of a prevailing 
concept for the explanation of differences in regulation have led to the conclu-
sion that an approach is needed that does not focus on nation-states as desig-
nated level of analysis. Moreover, the claim was made that, under the circum-
scribed conditions of knowledge society, an understanding of the regulatory 
process is needed that does not merely focus on legal and political actors but 
that invokes all actors, which are concerned with the regulated issue. Within 
the present study, it will therefore be argued that it is more fruitful to shift the 
attention away from national styles to organizations. In so doing, this study 
aims to show that explanations for the observable differences between the 
regulatory approaches of various countries can be found on the level of organi-
zations. They are considered as the essential part of a regulatory approach and 
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therefore as being responsible for differences between various national ap-
proaches. Thus, not differences between countries will then evolve as relevant 
differences, but differences among the involved organizations, their composi-
tion and their interplay will occur. 
This shift in perspective has to be understood as a double movement: 
firstly, the attention is shifted from the societal to the organizational level and 
hereby simultaneously from the political to other, equally important social 
realms like law, economy, and science, which partake in the regulatory proc-
ess. Therefore, an understanding of the regulatory process that limits this to the 
political realm can no longer be upheld against the distinction between the state 
and the society, since by emphasizing this distinction the central components of 
the regulatory process are taken into account: not just political ones but also 
organizations of other social realms gain attention as the central units of analy-
sis.  
With regard to the subject of the present study, GM Food, an organiza-
tional-based approach to regulatory processes seems to provide an understand-
ing for the (different) ways, in which organizations communicatively construct 
the given issue and, therefore shape the respective legal regulation. It thus re-
veals how organizations set the context for the construction of GM Food for 
instance as certain, uncertain, risky or dangerous. This again points to the ad-
vantages of an organizational-based approach, since within a nation-state cen-
tered understanding of what regulation is about, the construction of ‘risk’ is 
subordinated to one national culture (e.g. Wynne & Dressel 2001). If instead 
organizations are taken into consideration, “the irreducible heterogeneity of 
social constructions of risk within society” (Tacke 2001: 297) comes into sight. 
Moreover, one might add, not only of risk in the first place, but also of the is-
sue itself. These heterogeneous constructions will not only have an impact on 
the development of the legal regulation but foremost on the process of its im-
plementation. This process of implementation is then likely to develop differ-
ent regulatory structures as the implementation of a legal rule always is accom-
panied by either power or knowledge while their distribution depends upon the 
definition of the problem that has to be resolved. 
In sum, this approach makes way for a more appropriate understanding 
of national differences in the way of dealing with a seemingly identical issue, 
as can be observed in the regulation of GM Food in Germany and in the United 
States. These differences seem to root within different definitions of what the 
issue, its scope and its problems, are about. As this definition has to be consid-
ered as the outcome of the occurring dynamics among those concerned with the 
issue, it is this definition that at the same time determines how the regulatory 
process will be fulfilled, i.e., how the interplay between law, knowledge and 
power will be fulfilled by the organizations of a given field. 
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“Regulation occurs  
in many locations, in many fora:  
there is ‘regulation in many rooms’.” 
(Julia Black, 2002) 
 
2 Regulation within an Interorganizational Network 
In order to overcome the shortcomings of prevailing concepts of regulation, the 
organizational dimension was invoked as central for an appropriate understand-
ing of the regulatory process. It will be the aim of this chapter to outline a theo-
retical conception of how this process is performed by organizations and what 
kind of regulatory structures occur throughout this process. In so doing, a per-
spective will be taken that tries to disclose the processes at the shop floor level 
of regulation, where a legal rule meets with its addressees, the organizations of 
a given field. 
As each legal regulation provides a solution to a conflict, or, more mod-
erately, to a dispute, it aims to guide social relations by establishing and secur-
ing stabile normative expectations. The previous chapter was dedicated to what 
– from a certain perspective – could be described as law’s ‘failure’ in its at-
tempt to secure expectations under conditions of cognitive uncertainty. Even 
under ‘normal’ conditions the regulation of organizational behavior – under-
stood as the attempt to achieve a desired, favored behavior by means of legal 
rules – seems to produce unintended side-effects and the like, contradictory 
effects at worst. Quite often this is seen as a token for law’s inability to fulfill 
its task: the stabilization of normative expectations and, consequently, the 
guidance of social behavior. These difficulties are sharpened if normative ex-
pectations are to provide security regarding an issue that is ridden with cogni-
tive uncertainty. In these cases, the solution provided by the law increasingly is 
perceived as only one among other, at best competing, at worst mutually exclu-
sive solutions to a particular problem.  
The legal solution depends upon the initial definition of the problem to 
which it reacts to and it can be observed that this definition is increasingly con-
tested among those involved in the dispute, the less scientific knowledge is 
capable of solving the cognitive uncertainty of the matter. The legal solution to 
a problem can therefore only be considered as one part of the regulation 
whereas its implementation that comprises its interpretation, concretization and 
thus mobilization has to be considered as the other, equally important part. Le-
gal rules hence are only one part of the regulatory process since “the content 
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and the meaning of law is determined within the social field that it is designed 
to regulate” (Edelman et al. 1999: 407). In this perspective, organizations come 
into sight not only as objects of regulation, but also as regulators themselves 
since they are the ones, who interpret, concretize and, in so doing, mobilize the 
law. In this context, the ‘regulation’ of a certain problem must be understood as 
a social process in which a broad range of actors from various social realms are 
involved and not as a limited legal act.  
Thus, regulation can so far be described as ‘more than law’. In its at-
tempts to guide social behavior, the law therefore does not stand alone. In the 
previous chapter, the claim was made that in the process of regulation the law 
is accompanied by power as well as by knowledge. Whereas power has been 
law’s longtime companion, the more recent characterization of contemporary 
society as knowledge society has seen knowledge increasingly as another in-
fluential resource in the guidance of social behavior. However, the degree to 
which both power or knowledge will accompany and by so doing shape the 
implementation of a legal rule, depends upon the definition of the problem that 
has to be resolved. Furthermore, as organizations have been invoked as central 
parts of the regulatory process, they perform this complex interplay of law, 
knowledge and power into which a legal rule becomes interwoven as soon as it 
is introduced into its field. 
In order to grasp this process most adequately, a concept of organizations 
will be applied that does not focus on content but rather provides an under-
standing of the organizations’ functioning which holds true for all types of or-
ganizations. By so doing, the organizations’ embeddedness will also come into 
view, calling attention to the fact “that the behavior and the institutions to be 
analyzed are so constrained by ongoing social relations that to construe them as 
independent is a grievous misunderstanding.” (Granovetter 1985: 482) Thus, 
not only organizations but also their relations to other types of social systems 
that are perceived as relevant by the individual organizations – their environ-
ments – are taken into account. These interrelations among organizations and 
their environments will be described as an interorganizational network that 
develops specific patterns because of the organizations’ interplay among ‘their’ 
legal rules, knowledge and power. In sum, this chapter aims to present an out-
line of the regulatory process that does justice to the occurring processes be-
tween a given legal rule and its original ‘addressees’. 
2.1 On Organizations 
Organizations have been assigned an outstanding role not only in society but 
also, more specifically, in the regulatory process, thus affirming Scharpf’s 
question “Does Organization Matter?” (1977). The reasons for this invocation 
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of the organizational dimension have been manifold. For instance, Perrow 
(1989) claimed that organizations have replaced society, since society has been 
incorporated by organizations. Laumann and Knoke (1988) invoked “The In-
creasingly Organizational State”, indicating the, in their opinion, growing in-
fluence that organizations have in the political life, in stark contrast to the in-
crease in state autonomy. In addition, as a representative of the jurisprudence, 
Schmidt-Preuß (2001) recently argued that organization has to be considered as 
a dimension that could enrich and further the debate over regulation. As one 
aspect of regulation requires that it has to be understood as a reaction to a con-
flict, or more moderately, to a dispute, organizations are considered as playing 
a central role since they “help shape what constitutes a dispute and what the 
nature of the dispute is” (Edelman & Suchman 1999: 977). They have the abil-
ity to do so since they are expected to gain control over the construction, im-
plementation and the impact of law, not only within their boundaries but also 
throughout their social field. Legal regulations in this perspective can be under-
stood as the outcome of a construction by the legal system about the nature of 
the conflict that has to be settled. This construction after all is influenced by the 
organizations involved. Therefore, the organizational dimension overall has 
been considered central for the production as well as for the resolution of so-
cietal conflicts (Gergs et al. 2000). 
However, even though all these considerations might hold true, they do 
not provide a stable, theoretically derived argument for the relevance of or-
ganizations. Even if a societal increase in organizations can empirically be ob-
served, this ‘fact’ on its own does not serve as a sufficient reason for taking 
organizations as decisive social actors into consideration. Moreover, to focus 
on particular organizations such as political, legal, economic and the like in the 
first place, distracts from the basic modi operandi that are to be found at the 
core of each organization. Therefore, an approach is needed that provides a 
more systematic argument for establishing organizations as a decisive constant 
in research on regulation as well as providing an understanding of organiza-
tions that does not focus exclusively on content. Both these tasks can be solved 
if the categorical assumptions of modern systems theory are taken into account.  
Organizations as Social Systems 
Even if modern systems theory is not (yet) conceived of as an ‘organizational 
sociology’ it provides a rich understanding of organizations, that makes this 
theoretical approach increasingly attractive for organizational studies.1 Instead 
of focusing on a specific type of organization, the basic modi operandi which 
                                                     
1  This is indicated by several recent publications that are based upon a systems theoretical 
approach to organizations (e.g. Kämper 1999; Albert & Hilkermeier 2001, 2001a; Tacke 
2000, 2001, to mention but a few). 
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are to be found at the core of each organization are investigated, i.e., how do 
organizations constitute and reproduce themselves and how do they operate? 
Such an approach towards organizations makes way for an understanding that 
does not focus on content. Thus, it does not conceptualize organizations as be-
ing political, legal or economic organizations in the first place. On the contrary, 
by defining organizations as organized social systems (Luhmann 1988a) an 
understanding of organizations is achieved which holds true for all organiza-
tions throughout different societal realms. 
As organized social systems, organizations emerge within function sys-
tems through the process of an increasing differentiation.2 This differentiation 
is backed by the principle of membership that underlies the formation of or-
ganizations as social systems. By linking membership to specific conditions, 
which make entrance and exit dependent upon such conditions, organizations 
define their boundaries towards their environment (Luhmann 1982: 75). The 
rules of membership specify roles and regulate the recruitment of personnel. 
Inscribed into these roles are the organization’s behavioral expectations that 
have to be fulfilled by the holder of a role. If these expectations become re-
peatedly disappointed the membership becomes invalid. Thus, rules of mem-
bership can be considered as endogenous normative expectations of an organi-
zation that are upheld even in the case of non-fulfillment. By so doing, organi-
zations secure their boundaries and thus, their identity. 
Another feature that is responsible for the emergence of organizations is 
the function that each organization fulfills within ‘its’ function system. Tenta-
tively formulated, organizations fulfill the function systems’ operations and 
implement their functional primacies (Luhmann 1997: 841) as they are due to 
their ‘organization’ capable of processing external information internally. Con-
sequently, they are the only social systems that have the ability to communicate 
with systems in their environment (Luhmann 1997). Hence, they facilitate 
function systems with the ability to communicate and enable structural cou-
plings between the systems. Even though structural coupling cannot be under-
stood as a function of organizations, organizations are a sine qua non for this 
sort of connection between the function systems. Given that structural coupling 
occurs where one function system takes for granted special services provided 
by its environment, organizations are responsible to ‘communicate’ this service 
from one system to another – otherwise the scientific system would not even 
                                                     
2  This is not to say that organizations necessarily ‘belong’ to function systems. For the diffi-
culties regarding the degree to that organizations can on a theoretical level be described as 
‘belonging’ to function systems see Tacke 2001a. The present study follows Luhmann 
(1990: 678), in that it is assumed that while the majority of organizations can be classified 
as aligned to specific function systems, also organizations can be observed, which cannot 
be clearly assigned to one specific function system.  
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‘know’ that money has been transferred - and would thus function differently 
(Luhmann 1993). 
However, to avoid misunderstandings it is necessary to call attention to 
the fact that organizations do not ‘implement’ the function systems’ decisions 
in the classical sense – in fact, organizations decide because of their internal 
construction of their environment and its demands and expectations. Here, the 
organizations functioning and mode of action comes into sight: organizations 
can be described as social systems that are constituted by decisions (e.g. 
Luhmann 2000). An outstanding characteristic of social systems is their self-
referentiality: each organization’s decision refers to a former decision of the 
organization. Thus, every present decision becomes the premise for future de-
cisions. By so doing, organizations, like all autopoietically-closed systems, 
reproduce themselves by their own constitutive elements, decisions. These de-
cisions are programmed through the code of the function system wherein the 
organizations emerge. Thus, on the level of organizations the code of the func-
tion system ‘reappears’ as decision premises, which also cover the decision 
program (ibid.). This decision-program defines the conditions for the factual 
correctness of a decision (ibid.: 257). Therefore, every decision is foremost 
based upon information that is perceived as relevant for the fulfillment of the 
decision-program. More broadly, only such information is perceived as rele-
vant that ‘fits’ with the functional primacy of the function system. Organiza-
tions can thus be considered as normatively closed. 
Multireferentiality 
However, although the majority of organizations emerge within one function 
system and thus implement its functional primacy one must not overlook the 
fact that the concept of functional primacy does not exclude other functional 
relevances. Besides their functional primacy, each organization’s programming 
reflects a mixture of references: here one has to distinguish between a goal-
oriented program [Zweckprogramm], and a conditional program [Konditional-
programm]. The former is used as a rule for selecting causes that can bring 
about a desired goal that is taken as invariant. The latter holds a particular 
cause to be constant, triggering a particular type of action whenever it occurs 
(Luhmann 1982: 110-113, 1993: 165). In conditional programs, the normative 
closure can be (and is!) combined with cognitive openness, which means that 
organizational decisions, which refer to the law in the first place also take ex-
ternal information like financial or political restrictions into account. There-
fore, organizations to a certain extent have to be described as ‘in between’ the 
law, politics, science, economy etc.3 Given that organizations are normatively 
                                                     
3  For instance, public administrations can be seen as organizations which refer to the law as 
well as to politics (Bora 2001a). 
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closed as well as cognitively open, they can further be understood as multi-
referential since they base their decisions on information that refers to more 
than one functional primacy (Wehrsig & Tacke 1992; Bora 2001a). In so do-
ing, they might function as linkage institutions, thus as specific institutions that 
shape the duration, quality and intensity of the relations between the given so-
cial subsystems (Teubner 1992). Thus, the aforementioned interrelatedness of 
organizations that is observed as structural coupling on the level of the function 
system also becomes qualified. 
This status, in combination with the organization’s key features, is reason 
enough to consider organizations as central elements of the regulatory process: 
on the basis of their internal construction they make decisions at the interface 
between the various function systems which they refer to and by so doing pro-
vide a kind of direct impact. 
Organizational Scripts 
Organizational behavior is thus shaped by normative as well as by cognitive 
rules4 that in their totality form the organizational script. A unitary application 
of the concept cannot be observed since the concept script refers to a field of 
research that has to be described as more or less uncoordinated. Instead it is 
used synonymously, to name but a few, with terms like ‘frames’, ‘prototypes’, 
‘schemes’, ‘stereotypes’, ‘cognitive maps’ and ‘implicit theories’ (Luhmann 
1997: 110). Nevertheless, behind this Babel of terms a concept is hidden that 
has been considered helpful for the study of organizational behavior. 
As applied in the present study, it is understood as entailing firstly the 
normative rules of a given organization. Those rules refer to constitutive norms 
that encompass the organization’s goal-oriented program, the rules of member-
ship, statutes and articles of incorporation as well as rules of procedure. In so 
doing, they define which types of organizations come into existence, which 
roles and procedures are provided inside these organizations and what types of 
organizational activity gain formal recognition. Most importantly, they func-
tion as the ‘rules of appropriateness’ (March & Olsen 1989). 
Secondly, the script encompasses the organization’s cognitive rules, 
which refer to the interpretation of the normative ones. They define the per-
formance of the organizations, of the roles provided for therein, and the actual 
application of procedures. Cognitive rules also define the application of vague 
terms and concepts, they define what accounts for as legitimate and what in the 
end will be regarded as formal recognition in the context of a given organiza-
tion. As the cognitive frame, they guide the actual ‘fulfillment’ (or adaptation) 
                                                     
4  This distinction between normative and cognitive rules replaces the formerly applied dis-
tinction between explicit and implicit rules (Epp 2002). 
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of the normative rules, for instance, what it means to follow an economic ra-
tionale in a given context. 
In their totality, both these types of rules constitute a complex script, 
wherein linkages are made e.g. between past and future (futurities) or causes 
and actions (Tacke 2001a). An organizational script can thus be described as “a 
combination of meanings that serve society [or, as in the given case: organiza-
tions, AE] in developing a memory, which can forget nearly all its own opera-
tions while recalling some operations as schemes in order to reproduce them” 
(Luhmann 1997: 111). It functions as the foil for the creation and fulfillment of 
organizational practices, routines and coping strategies as well as the memory, 
which saves the organizational knowledge that becomes manifest in these rou-
tines and practices. Thus, scripts contain condensed knowledge that is recalled 
soundlessly. As long as an organization does not perceive normative or cogni-
tive dissonance, the script remains unreflected in its actual application (Tacke 
2001a: 151).5 If an organization perceives dissonance, (organizational) knowl-
edge becomes scrutinized and, as the case may be, revised. The confrontation 
with differing routines and the like therefore may lead to new or revised 
knowledge on part of the organizations, i.e., to learning (Willke 2001; see be-
low chapter 2.2.2.). 
Sensemaking 
Organizational knowledge is at the same time the outcome as well as the basis 
for organizational sensemaking processes. Given that organizations are ex-
posed to an ‘information’ environment that is equivocal insofar as information 
has the potential for multiple interpretations, organizations are forced to 
‘choose’ from this surplus of information in order to maintain their capacity to 
act, thus decide. On the background of its foregoing knowledge, the organiza-
tion makes sense of its environment; equivocal information is turned into cer-
tain, unambiguous information that can further be processed internally by deci-
sion-making. This sensemaking process can be understood as necessary “for 
organizational members to understand and to share understandings about such 
features of the organization as what it is about, what it does well and poorly, 
what the problems it faces are, and how it should resolve them” (Feldman 
1989: 20 cited in Weick 1995: 5). By taken established, institutionalized organ-
izational knowledge into consideration, the organization distinguishes between 
relevant information and noise, thus building a model of itself as well as of its 
environment, which becomes the basis for further action. Moreover, since an 
                                                     
5  For purpose of clarity, scripts cannot be applied and reflected at the same time. In order to 
observe an organizational script, a second order observation is needed. While a first-order 
observation describes what is happening, a second-order observation is a description of a 
system’s own description.  
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organization’s basic mode of action has been described as decision-making 
each decision made by an organization is based upon premises that consist in 
the organization’s taken for granted assumptions about itself and its environ-
ment. In terms of modern systems theory this process is described as absorp-
tion of uncertainty that takes place “if decisions are accepted as decision-
premises, thus becoming the basis of further decisions” (Luhmann 1993a: 299). 
The sensemaking process can therefore also be described as the absorption of 
uncertainty, by which means the organization turns an unknown environment 
into a known environment (ibid.). In sum, sensemaking is the central activity in 
the construction of both the organization and the environments it confronts 
(Weick 1995: 69).  
This underlines the organizations’ embeddedness in an environment: or-
ganizations define themselves in difference towards their environment, they 
reproduce themselves by considering ‘external’ information (regardless how 
this information is processed internally) and they have an impact on their envi-
ronment (regardless how this ‘impact’ is designed). This leads to the conclu-
sion that organizations cannot be understood independently of their environ-
ment, or, to put it more radical, the concept of organizations can apparently 
“only unfold itself in a difference to an environment” (Albert & Hilkermeier 
2001: 11). 
2.1.1 Organizational Environments 
The relevance of organizational environments has been the subject of a variety 
of scholarly assessments. Despite modern systems theory especially the popu-
lation ecology approach (e.g. Hannan & Freeman 1977), the resource depend-
ence approach (e.g. Pfeffer & Salancik 1978) and new institutionalism (e.g. 
Powell & DiMaggio 1991) have highlighted the complex relation between or-
ganizations and their environments, though with quite different premises and 
results regarding the nature of the environment(s). Tentatively, the environ-
ment can be considered as something independently given or as something that 
is dependent upon a particular observer. Both, the resource dependence ap-
proach as well as the population ecology approach tends to conceive ‘the envi-
ronment’ as an independently given fact that surrounds the organization and to 
which the organization is committed. In this perspective, organizations have to 
deal internally with an environment that confronts the organizations with a 
scarcity of resources and a surplus of information. 
However, this conception of environment as an objectively existing fact 
has at least implicitly been challenged already by the abovementioned concept 
of sensemaking that revealed organizations as “knowledge-generating systems 
of interpretation” (Hiller 2001: 19). In this perspective, environment, or more 
precisely, environments necessarily have to be considered as dependent upon a 
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particular observer (the organization) by whom it is rather constructed than 
discovered. This notion of environment is shared by modern systems theory 
and underlies the sociological new institutionalism6. Although sociological 
institutionalism is also applied to fields other than organizations (Jepperson 
2001), it has more recently been described as “the leading perspective among 
organizational scholars in the U.S.” (Mizruchi & Fein 1999: 678), as well as 
being influential in Europe (Hasse & Krücken 1999). Even though it lacks a 
substantial definition of organizations, it provides helpful insights concerning 
the organizations’ embeddedness in their environment, which enable as well as 
constrain organizational behavior. In coping with a plurality of at times contra-
dictory expectations, organizations ‘adjust’ their internal structures to meet 
these expectations (Meyer & Rowan 1977). Hence, the environmental influ-
ence on the internal organizational structure becomes obvious. At the same 
time, an understanding of organizations as rational, independent actors7 is 
called into question, letting them appear as historically developing cultural 
rule-followers (Edelman & Suchman 1997). Thus, not only organizational en-
vironments but also organizations no longer can be understood as independ-
ently given but as constitutive for one another.  
It is this assumption that in addition to their shared turn against volun-
taristic models of explanation as well as against underlying assumptions of 
objective rationality reveals the positive common ground of modern systems 
theory and the sociological new institutionalism (Albert & Hilkermeier 2001).  
Enactment 
In order to understand how organizations construe their environments, and, by 
so doing, cope with these environments, the concept of enactment (Weick 
1969, 1977) that is closely linked with the already introduced process of sen-
semaking will be outlined. In the course of this introduction, an understanding 
of environment has been adopted that firstly and foremost refers to the flow of 
information perceived by the individual organizations, which encompasses 
other organizations, their behavior, rules, expectations and the like. Neverthe-
less, this flow of information is perceived through the distorting lenses of the 
                                                     
6  The sociological new institutionalism can only to a lesser extent be described as a theory 
but must rather be understood as a conglomerate of heterogeneous, theoretical concepts, 
hypotheses and classifications (Tacke 1999; Luhmann 2000). Their outstanding common 
characteristic is a reorientation from the normative dimension of the ‘old’-institutionalism 
towards the cognitive dimension (“cognitive turn”) (e.g. Vollmer 1996). 
7  By so doing, both the systems theoretical and the new institutionalist notion of ‘organiza-
tion’ can be distinguished from a variety of popular understandings of what organization is 
about. Most obvious, organizations are not considered to be rational actors which strive for 
the maximization of profits by means of a minimum of costs. Organizations rather are con-
strued as interwoven into ongoing social relations which at the same time are considered as 
enabling as well as constraining structures. 
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organizations’ own cognitive frames. The cognitive frame is based upon the 
organization’s binary oppositions and it determines what information is per-
ceived as relevant in the organization’s terms. In so doing, organizations con-
strue an image of their environment that is based upon the organization’s ex-
periences and that will become the foil for their further actions. This “enacted 
environment is the output from an episode of sensemaking” (Weick 1977: 
279): organizations enact their environment based on their internally generated 
knowledge. In so doing, they interpret their environments’ expectations and 
demands on the background of their cognitive frame and construe their own 
meaning about what is to be understood as demand and expectation or as le-
gitimate and appropriate behavior in a given situation. As cognitive frames 
guide the organization’s perception and the subsequent action, they also ‘con-
stitute’ the focal issue itself (e.g. Hiller 2001: 19-20 referring to Weick 1985: 
223). By observing other organizations, their way of dealing with the issue 
around which they emerge and their interpretation of the normative rules using 
cognitive rules, the meaning of the issue itself is constituted. The organizations 
adopt these rules – or what they perceive as ‘these rules’ – and this, in turn, 
becomes the object of observation for another organization. Since organiza-
tions have to be considered ‘black boxes’ for one another, they react to a rela-
tively limited and biased perception of the environment that is based upon “a 
frame of mind about frames of mind” (Weick 1995: xii). 
As an enacted environment also consists of other organizations that enact 
their environment because of their cognitive frames, each organization itself is 
part of other organizations’ environment and becomes the subject of these or-
ganizations’ sensemaking and enactment processes. This calls attention to the 
fact that the enactment of an organizational environment not only depends 
upon the organizations’ responsiveness towards their environment but also 
upon the dominance of that environment. There are in fact environments that 
are more dominant than others, e.g. law and politics. In addition, even though 
this is not to say that organizations are hopelessly constrained by legal rules or 
political decisions, the claim is made that the extent to which an organization 
can resist the environment’s expectations and demands depends upon the or-
ganization of power – inside the enacting organizations as well as in the en-
acted environment.8 
In the process of enacting, organizations hence create new features of 
their environments that did not exist before and which will have an impact on 
the organization’s behavior in the future. Nevertheless, even though organiza-
tions may enact their environment, coin new labels and take undefined space, 
                                                     
8  Hiller (2001: 22-24) has criticized Weick for his neglect of these limitations to the enact-
ment process.  
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the relevant question remains in how far they may succeed with their enact-
ment. Organizational knowledge, which becomes manifest in organizational 
practices, routines and problem-solving strategies, is confronted with knowl-
edge generated in the organizations’ environment, i.e., other organizations. 
Therefore, ‘success’ is a question of under which conditions new labels, prac-
tices and routines as well as problem-solving strategies become institutional-
ized, thus becoming part of an environment which subsequently has an impact 
on the organization. If, due to the distribution of power, organizations do not 
have the ability to enact their environment, i.e., do not succeed, they in turn 
become enacted since they are a part of other organizations’ environment, who 
enact their environment and so on. Organizations then to varying degrees will 
be forced to take over other organizations’ interpretations. Most likely, they 
will adapt their actions to the more powerful environment’s expectations and 
routines in one way or the other. Depending upon the organization’s ability to 
adapt to these expectations perceived as pressures and constrains, the organiza-
tion will not only revise its decisions but rather its decision premises, and thus 
learn. In the process of enactment, organizations thus “respond to an environ-
ment that consists of other organizations responding to their environment, 
which consists of organizations responding to an environment of organizations’ 
responses” (DiMaggio & Powell 1983: 149).  
The outcomes of these responses are a variety of organizational environ-
ments that comprise not only different meanings of legitimacy, compliance and 
success but also different meanings of the focal issue itself. Each organiza-
tional environment differs with regard to the relevance of specific demands and 
expectations: since the organization’s cognitive frame functions as a filter, usu-
ally only such demands penetrate that are perceived as relevant against the 
background of this frame. However, given that organizations may also be con-
fronted with opposition to their own routines and interpretations, demands that 
have so far not been perceived as relevant may also penetrate. These demands 
gain attention when they become perceived as a threat for the organization’s 
goal – and these need not concern monetary resources but may also concern 
public legitimacy. Only these processes of sensemaking and enactment should 
not be regarded as intentional processes: organizations do not ‘decide’ what 
they observe and what they leave out. In fact, they cannot observe their own 
cognitive frames. 
Having said this, the conclusion has to be drawn that as each environ-
ment only exists in the eye of the beholder, the environment in turn becomes 
the beholder’s mirror. 
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2.1.2 Organizational Formations 
In the previous section, it has been strongly emphasized that organizations can-
not be understood independently from their environments and vice versa. Or-
ganizations are embedded in their environments and they depend upon their 
environments for reasons outlined above. Organizations are thus interwoven 
into a tight net of interrelations among their environments. They maintain rela-
tions to other organizations because they provide a particular service for a 
given organization or a group of organizations. This type of relation has above 
been described as structural coupling.  
Despite this sort of permanent relation that can also be described in terms 
of service and exchange, another type of relation can be observed among or-
ganizations. Organizations also maintain contacts to other organizations be-
cause of the common perception of a particular event as relevant based on their 
goal-oriented program. Given this overlapping membership of an event (Teub-
ner 1992) the organizations become related to one specific issue9 in one way or 
the other e.g. as producers, retailers, consumers, researchers, regulators to 
name but a few possible ‘relations’. Although not each particular organization 
keeps contact with every other organization that is related to that focal issue, 
they can be described as being part of the same field. Because of the activities 
of a diverse set of organizations, which assemble around a focal issue, a field 
emerges that refers to a sphere beyond the individual organizations. In this 
field, organizations adhere to a common definition of ‘their’ issue, tying them 
together. At the same time, they may differ as to how this issue should be un-
derstood, assessed and, consequently, appropriately treated. Such discrepancies 
are due to the abovementioned fact that each organization creates its own envi-
ronment whereby a plurality of perspectives towards a specific issue comes 
into being. Therefore, struggles, conflicts and discrepancies must not be mis-
understood as (pathological) exceptions that prove the rule but have rather to 
be considered as the rule itself. Such struggles ‘only’ reveal the fundamental 
ambiguity of any given event. 
Organizational Fields 
This notion of ‘field’ as it is introduced here refers in part to the concept of 
field as it was developed by Bourdieu (1988) and successfully adopted by so-
ciological new institutionalists like DiMaggio and Powell (1983). A field en-
compasses “the relations among the totality of relevant individual and organ-
izational actors in functionally differentiated parts of society, such as educa-
tion, health, law, and politics” (Aggestam 2002: 6). This notion of organiza-
                                                     
9  That, according to the theoretical presumptions of the present study, has to be understood as 
a communicative event. 
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tional field has been the conceptual background of a variety of studies in most 
differing contexts such as hospitals (Starr 1980) or schools (Tyack 1974). But 
even if the concept of organizational fields10 has proven to be quite useful for 
the analysis of the interwoven processes among organizations and their envi-
ronments, other labels have also been coined in order to refine this concept 
such as societal sectors (e.g. Scott & Meyer 1991), organizational domains 
(e.g. Tacke 2001) and regulatory field (e.g. Aggestam 2002; Hedmo et al. 
2001). The latter concept has been invoked in order to do more justice to the 
processes of regulation. An analysis in terms of a regulatory field puts “the 
regulations, regulatory actors and regulatory activities to the fore in the analy-
sis” (Hedmo et al. 2001: 8). However, by so doing, the role of state activities is 
likely to become overemphasized. In conceptualizing regulatory activities as 
state activities in the first place, one runs the risk of reviving an understanding 
of the regulatory process that relegates regulation to the political sphere. More-
over, this distracts from an approach towards regulation in which “regulation is 
not just the function of control as performed by the state, but is the function of 
social control performed by others as well” (Black 2002: 18). 
Rather than the – at least asserted – disregard of regulatory activities by 
the field concept, the more pressing question in that context concerns the loca-
tion of an organizational field within society. Under the assumption that society 
comprises function systems, organizations and interactions (e.g. Luhmann 
1975), the question arises where a formation like a ‘field’ can systematically be 
situated. The invoked formation of interrelations among organizations obvi-
ously cannot be described as a new form of a function system since its bounda-
ries remain blurred and it therefore cannot be expected that such formations 
will develop their own codes.11 Something similar holds true for organizations; 
network-like formations cannot be described as organizations since they are not 
regulated by membership. A similar problem can be observed with the location 
of regions (e.g. Kuhm 2001) as is discussed in the debate over globalization 
and a global society. Like fields, regions are conceived of as formations that 
traverse the function systems and, like fields, they cannot be described as sys-
tems themselves but have to be clearly distinguished from systems. It seems 
that the term region is used to describe interrelations whose unity cannot be 
clearly grasped thus pointing to another commonness with fields: an unitary 
application of the term ‘field’ cannot be observed throughout the broad re-
search on such formations which gives reason to assume a conceptual unease 
and dissonance. Within the case of regions, it was attempted to solve these 
                                                     
10  This concept has also been applied in an earlier stage of the present study (Epp 2001, 2002, 
2002a). 
11  Only if a network defines clear cut boundaries and a story that is useable in recursion, it can 
become a social system (Luhmann 2000: 408). 
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problems by defining regions as “a formation of unstable, secondary order” 
(Kuhm 2001: 17) on the level of global function systems. Transferring this 
definition to organizational fields those can be described as an unstable forma-
tion on the level of organizations. By so doing, a definition is invoked that usu-
ally accounts for networks, which gives reason to assume that not only regions 
but also fields can more adequately be described as interorganizational net-
works (e.g. Powell 1990).  
Interorganizational Networks 
The concept of interorganizational networks has originally been developed 
within the field of economics where it was applied to describe relations be-
tween individual companies. Powell (1990) identified a shared common focus 
among the literature on organizational practices and arrangements that are net-
work-like in the “lateral or horizontal patterns of exchange, interdependent 
flows of resources, and reciprocal lines of communication” (296). This notion 
of networks was considered to do more justice to observable interrelations 
among economic organizations than the traditional market-hierarchy contin-
uum (ibid.).  
But as not only economic organizations but also organizations from all 
societal realms maintain relations to other organizations like the ones described 
by Powell, the emergence of network-like forms cannot necessarily be re-
stricted to a specific system of society. Moreover, the emergence of interor-
ganizational networks can be expected not only between organizations of one 
system but also between organizations of different systems. By invoking a con-
cept of organizations that does not focus on content but that stresses specific 
features which are common to organizations as such, it becomes possible to 
create a similar concept in describing interorganizational relations. In so doing, 
a more abstract, formal concept of networks is attained. In following Kappel-
hoff (2000), social networks can be described as a set of actors and the interre-
lations among them. If these actors are organizations, the network can be de-
scribed as an interorganizational network.  
This formal definition makes way for an analysis of interrelations among 
organizations that falls into line with the aforementioned research on organiza-
tional fields. In addition, recalling the notion of organizations applied in the 
present study, an interorganizational network emerges unintentionally as a net 
of organizations and their particular environments around a focal issue. This 
focal issue serves as the decisive criteria by which one interorganizational net-
work can be distinguished from another as well as its thematic boundary (Bora 
1999b: 656). Since an interorganizational network’s boundaries are not regu-
lated by membership (even though the organizations’ are!) it has to be consid-
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ered as always incomplete and constantly changing. Therefore, it cannot be 
described exhaustively.  
In this context, an interorganizational network is not to be understood as 
pursuing any goals or serving a specific purpose. In contrast, the individual 
organizations are pursuing goals and purpose in the network. The binding tie 
among the organizations is to be found in their shared common definition of a 
focal issue. However, due to the plurality of organizational perspectives a plu-
rality of perspectives concerning the focal issue may arise throughout the field, 
which at worst are mutually exclusive. Taking further into account that an in-
terorganizational network consists in more dominating organizations in central 
positions as well as in more peripheral organizations it can be expected that the 
latter will seek more influence and challenge the more central organizations 
and their perspectives. Therefore, it can be expected that organizations will 
(strategically) strive for more influential positions and, by so doing, try do 
dominate their network. On the other hand, they will also unintentionally try to 
dominate their network. That is, because organizations interpret the focal issue 
through their distorting lenses and, consequently, decide based on this interpre-
tation what accounts as an appropriate way of dealing with the issue. In so do-
ing, they even push forward their interpretation in their everyday proceedings 
without striving consciously for a dominant position. 
For the development of an interorganizational network, this means that 
organizations do not consciously decide to form such a network. By observing 
a specific issue as a part of their relevant environment, they join instead more 
or less by chance. 
2.1.3 Interorganizational Network Configurations 
The previous section has conceptualized interorganizational networks as con-
sisting of various types of organizations (and their environments) that gather 
around a focal issue. The present section is dedicated to the more abstract but 
most important and momentous characterization of the network and the organi-
zations involved, regarding their uniformity as well as their polycentricity. Both 
these features refer to the normative as well as to the cognitive orientation of an 
organization that affect its perceptions – of its environment, thus of the given 
network and, in so doing, its formal and its informal structures as well as its 
concepts of legitimacy. 
Many scholarly assessments claim that organizations within a given net-
work tend to become similar, thus arguing for an inescapable isomorphism 
among the involved organizations. For example, DiMaggio & Powell start their 
classical paper The Iron Cage Revisited (1983) with the question “What makes 
organizations so similar?” and state “(o)nce a field becomes well established, 
however, there is an inexorable push towards homogenization” (148). Al-
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though this might hold true to a certain extent, a second, probably even more 
important feature of networks, known as polycentricity12 among the organiza-
tions within a particular field, has to be taken into account. Hence, instead of 
voting for one or the other as the decisive feature, the claim is made that an 
interorganizational network by definition shows both features. 
As interorganizational networks are formed by organizations that operate 
based on their own cognitive frames, every organization describes its environ-
ment differently and therefore has its own perception regarding its relevant 
environment. Consequently, a plurality of differing perceptions of a given net-
work comes into existence that encompass not only the question as to which 
other organizations are at all perceived as part of the network but also as to 
what their ‘common’ focal issue is about; if and what problems are associated 
with it and how they should be resolved. This falls into line with Meyer and 
Rowan’s (1977) observation, who state that “(i)nstitutional environments are 
often pluralistic and societies promulgate sharply inconsistent myths” (356). 
These institutional environments appear as pluralistic first because organiza-
tions construe them as being so. They do so since they make sense of their en-
vironment on the background of their own institutionalized organizational 
knowledge. In addition, it is the outcome of these sensemaking processes that 
becomes the basis for the organization’s enactment of its environment. Organi-
zations are not only enacted by their environment, i.e., regulated, guided, 
forced into something, put under pressure etc., but also enact their environment 
as well (Weick 1969). Thus, organizations might differ in their sensitivity and 
their responsiveness to their environments (Edelman 1990, 1992) as well as 
their environments might differ with regard to their dominance. 
Against this background, it seems reasonable to assume that the proc-
esses, which predominantly are made responsible for isomorphism also have to 
be made responsible for variation. These processes have been assembled in the 
influential trichotomy of coercive, mimetic and normative processes (Di-
Maggio & Powell 1983: 150).  
Coercive isomorphism results from pressures that are put on organiza-
tions by other organizations upon which they are dependent and by cultural 
expectations within society. Powerful, dominating actors such as regulatory 
agencies might have the ability to impose sanctions for noncompliance, which 
can be expressed by, for instance, a penalty or the denial of further monetary 
                                                     
12  Here D’Aunno, Sutton & Price (1991) can be mentioned who propose that in response to 
conflicting demands organizational units will adopt “apparently conflicting practices” (636) 
and hence also focus on variation. But since they follow up a population ecology approach 
and thereby underestimate the active role of organizations, their research can only in part 
serve as an example. 
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support.13 However, given that an organization usually depends upon more than 
one organization and that the various organizations formulate different and 
possibly opposing agendas, the extent to which powerful organizations will 
succeed by employing pressure will vary. The same holds true for cultural ex-
pectations; organizations see themselves as being confronted by a plurality of 
societal expectations that, at worst, can be mutually exclusive. Nevertheless, 
organizations do not perceive all these organizations, their demands and expec-
tations as relevant – if they perceive them at all. Against the background of 
each organization's cognitive frame, only particular demands and expectations 
will receive attention. 
The normative process by which isomorphic change is caused roots pri-
marily in a professionalization that implies two aspects: firstly, the existence of 
a cognitive base, which incorporates norms about formal education and legiti-
mation produced by university specialists and secondly, the existence and 
growth of professional networks that span organizations and by which new 
models are transferred. By these mechanisms, organizations overtake and, to 
various extents, internalize the ethics and outlooks of other organizations. 
Again, given that organizations generate different scripts that function as the 
foil for what counts as value or as norm, not all values and norms are perceived 
as such or are considered necessary. Even more importantly, although there 
may exist mechanisms by which models and ethics are transferred from one 
organization to another, these models and ethics will become locally applied in 
the given organization. It is thus likely that they will become redefined in this 
process of their application. 
Finally, mimetic isomorphism can be understood as an organizational re-
action to uncertainty: in the case of uncertainty, organizations tend to model, 
unintentionally or intentionally, themselves on other organizations. This form 
of isomorphism arises for example when there are clear-cut goals, but uncer-
tainty about the achievement of these goals. In such case, organizations will 
copy the practices of other organizations. Organizations serving as a role model 
in a field are those that are perceived as legitimate or successful by the other 
organizations. But as each organization has generated its own concept of le-
gitimacy and has based its operations on an internally generated benchmark for 
success, quite different organizations may be perceived as legitimate or suc-
cessful and gain the status of a role model – but only in certain aspects and 
only for a part of their network. Thus, which organizations are to be considered 
as legitimate or successful depends upon the cognitive frame that each organi-
                                                     
13  The expectation that organizations do not produce their products by child labor might serve 
as an example for a cultural expectation which asserts pressure on organizations; if they do 
so and it becomes public they would have to assume that they will be boycotted by their 
buyership. 
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zation has developed and whereby the perception of the environment is filtered. 
Furthermore, even if organizations model themselves on other organizations, 
they can only do this because of their own – and therefore limited – perception 
of the behavior of the other organization. 
Having said this, the conclusion has to be drawn that as coercive, norma-
tive and mimetic processes always are fulfilled by cognitively biased organiza-
tions, these processes first of all lead to variation and only in a derived sense – 
but not to a lesser extent – to homogenization. Therefore, homogenization as 
well as variation will be reflected by the organizations’ cognitive structures as 
well as by their normative structures, and last but not least, by the focal issue 
around which they emerge. Different meanings concerning this issue will arise 
throughout the network, which may lead to considerable debate – if not conflict 
– about the leading interpretation of the given issue. In observing, describing 
and thus dealing with the focal issue, the organizations of a network shape the 
meaning of the issue itself: how it is treated and what rules will be considered 
as appropriate in its handling – these questions are subject to an ongoing and 
probably conflict-laden process among the organizations of a given network. 
However, how this process will be fulfilled in detail depends upon several, 
concomitant factors one of which is the network’s shape that is the individual 
organizations’ relations among each other. An interorganizational network’s 
shape that can range from a non-hierarchical, lateral to a hierarchical shape 
(Scharpf 1993), results from the focal issue, the composition of the individual 
organizations and the distribution of power among them. It is the shape of the 
network, which will have an impact on the process in which not only the issue 
but also the network itself will be defined, that will sooner or later lead to a 
dominant interpretation: at least over a transitory period this interpretation will 
govern the cognitive and with this the normative rules. This can lead to a 
‘hegemonic characterization’ of a network, which then itself becomes con-
tested again and replaced by another ‘tale’.14 Nevertheless, if, when and to what 
extent this happens and how this new tale will be told depends upon the com-
position of the organizations and, consequently, upon the dynamics in the par-
ticular network. Therefore, this process of interpretation and re-interpretation 
has to be described as an ongoing process that is never complete. 
                                                     
14  This characterization refers to the dominating self-description of the field. For the notion of 
‘hegemonic tales’ see Ewick & Silbey (1995) who understand hegemonic tales as 
“(n)arratives that are likely to bear the marks of existing social inequities, disparities of 
power, and ideological effects” (222) but which as particular and personal – or organiza-
tional – narratives “partake of and reproduce collective narratives” (ibid.) and by this “pro-
vide openings for creativity and invention in reshaping the social world” (ibid). But, domi-
nating characterizations can also be imposed by an external observer, as Hiller (2001) has 
demonstrated in the case of East-German administration.  
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The introduction of a legal rule into ‘its’ network will now be examined 
closer against the background of these processes occurring among the organi-
zations of the given network. As organizations have been conceptualized as 
knowledge-generating systems that enact their environments based on this 
knowledge, this also holds true for legal regulations as a decisive part of that 
environment. Transferring Weick’s (1977) statement that “organizations often 
impose that which subsequently imposes on them” (267) to the legal environ-
ment means that organizations are not only shaped by the law but also shape 
the law themselves.  
2.2 On Law and Organizations 
A common understanding of the relation between law and organizations as its 
addressees is based upon the assumption that the legal rule guides the behavior 
of its addressees and, by so doing, shapes social relations. However, this under-
standing can no longer be upheld against the outlined concept of an interor-
ganizational network that has to be considered as the scene of the regulatory 
process. Thus, it is the place where the interplay between law and those to 
whom it is addressed to can be observed, i.e., the interplay between a legal rule 
and the organizations it was designed to regulate. In this interplay law appears 
as something organizations are confronted with, that is designed to guide their 
behavior but which, in order to do so, runs the risk of becoming shaped by the 
organizations in return. When it enters the network it was designed to regulate, 
a legal rule, its meaning of the social conflict and, consequently, its problem-
solving strategies, are likely to meet with a plurality of interpretations, prac-
tices, and thus probably with competing problem-solving strategies that have 
been developed within the particular organizations of the network. Therefore, it 
can be expected that the legal solution often will not be adapted as the law-
maker originally intended it. Instead, the process of norm setting will be re-
opened, in which the legal rule becomes interpreted and mobilized by its origi-
nal addressees. Throughout this process of mobilization undefined space, time, 
and action is taken, lines are drawn, categories are established and labels are 
coined that create new features of the environment that did not exist before 
(Weick 1995). Nevertheless, these categories and labels do not necessarily 
have to be those provided by the legal rule but can also stem from the organiza-
tions of the given network. 
By invoking organizations as the central parts of the regulatory process, 
law is conceptualized as part of their environment, i.e., as legal environment of 
organizations. This perspective calls attention to the fact that organizations do 
not deal with the ‘things’ of the world but rather with ‘information’ about these 
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things.15 It is this perspective that not only has consequences for the notion of 
law but also for the very understanding of the relation between law and 
organizations. 
Given that law refers to the organization’s environment, it is not ‘the law’ 
that affects organizational behavior but the ‘information’ about the law. As this 
‘information’ depends upon the cognitive frame of the particular organization, 
one can assume that each organization will have a very biased understanding of 
what ‘law’ is about. This understanding of the relation between organizations 
and law renders an instrumentalist understanding of law obsolete – as organiza-
tional environment, and thus as equivocal environment that has to be turned 
into an unambiguous environment by means of organizational sensemaking 
processes, it must fail if it is expected to steer organizational behavior. Organi-
zations can only react to what they perceive as legal obligation and not to the 
legal obligation as it was originally intended by the lawmaker. Recalling fur-
ther what has been said about the relation between organizations and their envi-
ronment leads to the conclusion that organizations not only observe the law, 
but also produce it. And vice versa: since organizational environments and 
organizations are constitutive for one another, the legal environment also con-
stitutes as well as constraints organizational behavior (Scott 1994a).  
In order to avoid the misunderstanding that ‘law’ is used synonymously 
with ‘social control’ and thus answering Merry’s (1988) question “(w)ere do 
we stop speaking of law and find ourselves simply describing social life?” 
(878), the claim is made that law has to be conceived of as all social communi-
cation that is formulated with reference to the law (Luhmann 1982, 1993). This 
understanding of a ‘legal’ action (in contrast to a mere ‘social’ action) brings 
clarity into the concept of legal pluralism, which “is then defined no longer as 
a set of conflicting social norms in a given social field but as a multiplicity of 
diverse communicative processes that observe social action under the binary 
code of legal/illegal” (Teubner 1992: 1451). Law is thus not restricted to the 
legal and/or political realm but is to be found all over society while it remains 
observable as itself. 
For the time being, the relation between law and organizations shall be 
described as an “endogeneity of both organizations and their legal environ-
ments, arguing that organizations construct and configure legal regimes even as 
they respond to them” (Edelman & Suchman 1997: 484). They do so by sen-
semaking and enactment processes, as will be outlined in the following. 
                                                     
15  The citation by Weick (1977, referring to Thayer 1967) that “(i)t is not the ‘things’ of the 
world – material or nonmaterial – with which we deal” (284) but rather “with ‘information’ 
about these things” (ibid.) reveals another parallel with Luhmann’s understanding of com-
munication not as a single act but as a trichotomy of information, message, and understand-
ing (e.g. Luhmann 1984, chapter 4). 
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Making Sense of Law 
As it is a central characteristic not only of legal but of organizational environ-
ments as such, that they are not discovered but rather constructed by their be-
holder, organizations produce and reproduce the law in responding to it. They 
do so unintentionally because of sensemaking and enactment processes as well 
as trying to do so intentionally based on the outcome of such processes. 
As organizational environment, law has in the first place to be under-
stood as an equivocal environment. Regardless of organizations want to obey 
or avoid the law, of they want to use it strategically or challenge the categories 
provided by it – at first they have to create an interpretation of law that be-
comes the basis for their further action. Thus, because the law does not contain 
any information regarding its interpretation, organizations are forced to make 
sense of law. Therefore, sensemaking is necessary not only because “most 
forms of law regulating organizations often use broad language” (Edelman et 
al. 1999: 407) that leads to uncertainty on part of the organizations. It becomes 
necessary because each legal rule is charged with a fundamental uncertainty 
that can be traced back to an ambiguity that is inherent in language. 
By making sense, this fundamental uncertainty is turned into a (relative) 
certainty. In this process, organizations interpret legal obligations, categories 
and problem-solving strategies against the foil of their organizational script – 
and the knowledge saved therein. This organizational knowledge determines 
what is seen as information and thus as meaningful in the context of the given 
organization. As it is organizational knowledge that becomes the basis for the 
organization’s (intentional) enactment processes of a legal rule, this knowledge 
will guide how the organization deals with regulatory demands and (legally) 
provided paradigms. 
2.2.1 Enacting the Legal Environment 
Conceptualizing law in terms of environment(s), this appears in a threefold 
manner as facilitative, regulative, and constitutive (Edelman & Suchman 
1997). Organizations therefore come to face the law as a set of instruments, as 
a constraint of their behavior and as a set of rules that determines, which 
classes of organizations come into existence, for instance.  
However, as constitutive environment, law also provides a set of catego-
ries and definitions that establish and structure social relations (e.g. the concept 
of marriage). As it is to be expected that these categories and definitions are 
not uncontested among those who are concerned with them, law in so doing 
provides “paradigms for arguments” (Powell 1996: 963). Organizations are 
likely to have generated their own ‘meaning’ of what a given social relation is 
about and they will interpret the legal definition on this background. Dependent 
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upon the ‘gap’ between such definitions, one or the other definition will be-
come challenged, among others by a set of routines that are also provided for 
by the law (Edelman & Suchman 1997). 
These routines such as lawsuits become strategically used by organiza-
tions in order to push forward their interpretation and interests. Thus, in its 
facilitative aspect, law is conceived as an organizational tool.16 In mobilizing 
law as a means to their ends, organizational actors shape the law directly by 
lobbying, drafting legislation or virtually dictating the laws that govern practice 
in their arenas (Scott 1994a). They have an impact on the scope of the law, on 
the definitions provided by it and consequently on the dynamics that occur in 
the process of its implementation. By challenging dominating paradigms and 
thus coining new labels and categories, social relations become (re-)structured 
and new issues are likely to come into being. Even though it is still expected 
that these strategies will be carried out most successfully by organizations 
more influential17, the strategic use of law can also be observed by less domi-
nating organizations. In these cases, law becomes mobilized as a means of 
challenging the more dominant organizations and their interpretation of a given 
issue, in order to make a less popular interpretation more audible. 
As regulative environment, law confronts organizations with demands in 
order to guide their behavior. In this case, organizations may obey the law – or 
what they perceive as such – or they may avoid it. These alternatives, compli-
ance and deviance, become manifest in different shapes that depend upon the 
nature of the regulation and upon the organization, its will and possibilities, 
and thus its responsiveness in adapting to legal demands. Nevertheless, both 
these alternatives will be fulfilled on the organizational interpretation of what 
the legal demand is about. Thus, in trying to obey the law the organization may 
fail as its understanding of compliance differs from the ‘original’ legal under-
standing. The same may happen, if the organization tries to avoid the law. 
Whether in order to obey or to avoid the law, organizations model themselves 
on what they perceive as legal constraint, thus creating law-like rules and pro-
cedures – to effect control, to protect rights, to delay settlements, to enhance 
legitimacy, and for many other reasons (ibid.). Consequently, they tend to be-
come legalistic in that their mode of governance is infused “with the aspira-
tions and constraints of the legal order” (Selznick 1969: 8). It is these legalistic 
                                                     
16  For an early approach that takes law as an organizational tool into account see Borosage et 
al. (1970), especially 1087-1088, where the role of lawsuits filed by organizations in the 
process of legal and social change is addressed. 
17  For the mechanisms that lead to the ‘success’ of (already) ‘successful’ organizations in 
legal contexts see also Galanter (1974) and a reappraisal of the subject in a special issue of 
the Law & Society Review (Do the “Haves“ Still Come Out Ahead? 1999). 
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features that can be (mis-)read under the code legal/illegal, making organiza-
tional practices and actions a ‘new’ source of law. 
Recalling one of the central questions of this study the following assump-
tions can made: when a legal rule enters the field it was designed to regulate, it 
becomes the object of the organizations’ sensemaking and enactment proc-
esses, thus productive misreadings (see also 1.1.2). In the course of these proc-
esses, those to whom the rule is addressed fill its categories and definitions, its 
obligations and demands with meaning. The rule therefore meets to differing 
degrees with open and hidden opposition and a process is re-opened in which 
either one or another of the interpretations becomes the dominating one. To 
what degree this is going to happen and how conflict-ridden this process will 
be, depends upon the issue that functions as the regulatory trigger.18 As each 
issue will produce its own interorganizational network, the composition of or-
ganizations will differ and so will the dynamics occurring among them. The 
legal definition of the respective issue, the definition of its scope and its prob-
lems, prepares part of the ground for what is going to happen when the rule 
enters this network. Due to this definition, different organizational problem-
solving strategies will become employed thus shaping the interorganizational 
network and the initial problem. However, as definitions and categories are 
charged with a fundamental ambiguity that makes a plurality of interpretations 
possible, this ambiguity – and thus uncertainty! – has to be resolved. 
This ambiguity regarding the identity/nature of the regulated issue can be 
solved by two, already invoked media that is power and knowledge. Both these 
media have to be considered as means of shaping social relations even though 
they do so differently. In short, while power absorbs uncertainty by reducing 
the scope not only for the interpretation of the given rule but also for the inter-
pretation of its regulatory trigger, the employment of knowledge broadens this 
scope by generating even more interpretations that are reasonable as well as 
questionable at the same time. 
This leads back to the aforementioned configurations that characterize in-
terorganizational networks. These configurations can now be connected with 
the implementation process of a legal rule into a given network. As organiza-
tions will try – unintentionally as well as intentionally – to dominate their net-
work, i.e., the meaning of its focal issue, they will also try to dominate this 
implementation process. Nevertheless, the degree to which they will succeed 
depends upon the distribution of power and knowledge throughout the network. 
Therefore, ‘success’ in this context refers to the question in how far new labels, 
                                                     
18  The relevance of the empirical matter for the subsequent regulatory processes also is dem-
onstrated by the observation that the process of implementation in the majority is fulfilled 
uncontested.  
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practices as well as problem-solving strategies that have been generated in the 
respective organizations of the network will become institutionalized, thus in-
filtrating the rule by enacting it. By enactment processes, law is crafted by or-
ganizations operating creatively under certain constraints, which calls attention 
to the fact that the enactment of an organizational environment not only de-
pends upon the organizations’ responsiveness towards their environment but 
also upon the dominance of that environment. That is to say that the distribu-
tion of power and knowledge among an interorganizational network affects the 
individual organizations’ ability to enact their environment – by delimiting as 
well as by supporting. Which organization is thus likely to ‘succeed’ in this 
sense of the term depends upon the question which of both these media will 
dominate the implementation process of the given rule.  
A legal rule can define its regulatory trigger as a normative or as a cogni-
tive problem. In the first case, this is meant in the very literal sense of the term 
‘normative’ and refers to the question, which norms have to be established as 
the applicable law in a given case. If the regulatory trigger is defined from the 
outset as a cognitive problem, its insufficient knowledge base is put in the fore 
by the regulation. In this latter case, knowledge and organizational knowledge-
based strategies will become employed in the process of the law’s mobiliza-
tion, whereas in the first case power and organizational power-based strategies 
will dominate the mobilization process. Thus, a legal rule will become accom-
panied by either power or knowledge when it is introduced into its network. 
The organizational employment of either power or knowledge will shape the 
network since “changes in environmental conditions reconstruct individual 
organizations, changes in organizational behavior reciprocally reconstruct 
fields” (Edelman & Suchman 1999: 945). Consequently, the interplay among 
those to whom the rule is addressed to, the rule itself, as well as the focal issue 
in their total will lead to different regulatory structures throughout a network. 
2.2.2 Regulatory Structures  
Since power and knowledge have been invoked as media that accompany the 
implementation process of a legal rule, these concepts will shortly be intro-
duced. As a generalized medium of communication (Luhmann 1988) power 
can no longer be solely assigned to the political sphere but figurates in various 
shapes throughout society. This means that power cannot only be understood as 
political power but becomes converted: options to control or exert influence on 
the condition of one medium are used to gain control on the condition of an-
other medium (e.g. monetary influence) (ibid.: 101-102). In so doing, power 
has to be considered as fragmented and dispersed among social actors (Black 
2002), i.e., organizations that employ power in more or less ‘disguised’ modes.  
2 Regulation within an Interoganizational Network 
 
59
Within organizations, power evolves as a “simplified mode of observing 
future, the fixation of uncertainty” (Luhmann 2000: 112) that becomes mani-
fest in the instruments of hierarchical order such as instruction and control. By 
employing these instruments, organizations reduce uncertainty as to what they 
are about, what their goals are about and how internal problems are to be re-
solved. These instruments distinguish certain practices and routines (or, in 
terms of modern systems theory, decisions) as conform to the dominating self-
description of the organization whereas others become abolished as deviant. In 
so doing, organizations also eliminate the various, possible interpretations that 
are contained in the flow of information organizations are charged with by their 
environment(s).  
Among the organizations of a network, power becomes relevant as it 
serves as a means for pushing forward the individual organization’s interest. 
Therefore, power has to be understood as a means to restrict other organiza-
tions’ scope – as well as their scope might become constrained by other or-
ganizations’ employment of power. That is, because organizations are concep-
tualized as part of other organizations’ environments and thus as objects of 
their enactment processes. This again indicates that enactment processes can 
become constrained by hierarchical authority (Hiller 2001). In sum, power ab-
sorbs uncertainty by reducing and thus narrowing the scope not only for the 
interpretation of the given rule, but also for the interpretation of its regulatory 
trigger. 
However, the implementation of a legal rule can (and often is) also be 
accompanied by knowledge. As the present approach focuses on organizations 
as social actors, knowledge is defined as a communicatively constituted and 
confirmed organizational practice that is based upon the experience of the vari-
ous organizations (Willke 2001). In so doing, organizational practices and rou-
tines that have been developed not only by scientific but by legal, economic, 
political, thus by organizations of any given societal field are taken into ac-
count. Considering organizational knowledge as a resource in the guidance of 
social behavior leads to its revaluation and ‘desecrates’ the notion of ‘knowl-
edge’ as something sacred that has been reserved for scientific knowledge so 
far. The hegemonic position of scientific knowledge has led to the neglect of 
knowledge stocks19 that have been build up in the various societal realms, 
without being further noticed. Nevertheless, as scientific knowledge becomes 
increasingly delegitimized, these knowledge stocks evolve as equally valuable. 
In this perspective, an epistemological authority of scientific knowledge can no 
longer be claimed. Instead, every organizational practice is considered as 
                                                     
19  These knowledge stocks can be considered as part of a reservoir, in which the various or-
ganizational knowledge stocks pour in. 
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knowledge-production. As the outcome of organizational practices, like the 
result of an organization’s way of dealing with its environment, knowledge 
also is described as the result of sensemaking processes (see 2.1.2). 
Organizational knowledge has been conceptualized as responding to an 
environment that consists of organizations responding to an environment of 
organizations’ responses. However, due to the plurality of organizations, also a 
plurality of contradictory meanings of the focal issue will arise within the net-
work and so a plurality of organizational practices will be developed. These 
differing interpretations and the subsequent differing practices and routines in 
the way of dealing with the focal issue will meet within the network. Depend-
ent upon the respective definition of the issue’s meaning, they will interact or 
collide. If these definitions converge, they are more likely to interact, whereas 
if they diverge, they are more likely to collide and thus to compete with each 
other. As the case may be, these practices will have to prove their capability of 
providing an adequate way of dealing with the issue. If they prove to be suit-
able, they may succeed in that they may become the dominant interpretation 
and practice throughout the network. In this case, inferior organizations will be 
forced into learning. Nevertheless, this accounts only for ‘simple’ cases in 
which one individual organization is capable of designing an adequate solution 
for a problem. In cases more complex, an individual organization is incapable 
of generating an adequate solution for a network that is constituted by a variety 
of differing organizations. In this case, the organizations of a given network 
will – eventually – depend upon cooperation. However, until this happens, the 
network will be characterized by friction if not conflict, as the involved organi-
zations will push forward their own interpretations. The absorption of uncer-
tainty by means of knowledge therefore is fulfilled by multiplying possible 
interpretations (and so meanings) of the focal issue and its related problems 
that will be reduced in a probably conflict-ridden trial-and-error process. Thus, 
instead of eliminating possible interpretations and narrowing the scope as 
power does, knowledge broadens the scope for interpretations and subsequent 
actions. 
Power-based Structures 
If a legal rule defines its trigger primarily as a normative problem and thus 
aims to subsume a given case under existing norms, power will become em-
ployed in the mobilization of this rule. This is the common problem of legal 
practice and as each law has to be enforced by political power, this power re-
appears as legal power in the disguise of legal instruments such as sanction and 
control. In so doing, the legal rule acquires a seemingly outstanding position as 
political and legal power (still) are surrounded by the aura of superiority. Nev-
ertheless, as the political system in modern societies no longer can be described 
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as society’s center (e.g. Luhmann 2000a), political power and, consequently, 
legal power come to face other forms of influence. Power therefore may not be 
reduced to political power but has to be understood as a medium that takes on 
varying shapes. Moreover “while recognizing the importance of legal environ-
ments in constituting and constraining organizations, it is important that we 
also recognize the power of actors to shape institutional rules” (Scott 1994a: 
13). Thus, even though in a hierarchical-shaped network law is likely to be-
come enacted by other organizations – that are also powerful – it cannot be 
taken for granted that law will be on top of the hierarchy.  
These enactment processes will be fulfilled intentionally as well as unin-
tentionally. Intentionally control quite often happens in the early stages of the 
development process of a legal rule through the self-interested lobbying efforts 
of organizations (Edelman & Suchman 1997). This process becomes influ-
enced by powerful organizations who maintain well-established relations with 
political organizations. In so doing, they may have coined new labels and prac-
tices in the process of the development that reappear as legal definitions when 
the rule is introduced into the network. Having participated in their creation, 
they are thus able to comply with legal obligations before these are issued. 
Even if they have not partaken in the development process, due to their infor-
mal contacts with the competent authorities they may be informed sooner or 
better than less powerful organizations. Therefore, they may gain an advantage 
with regard to compliance as well as to non-compliance. 
Although powerful organizations might become role models without 
striving for this position, they are also more capable of establishing themselves 
as role models throughout the network if they want to. As they have means 
such as control and subordination, they can put less powerful, probably de-
pendent organizations under pressure. In so doing, less influential organiza-
tions will be forced to take over other organizations’ interpretations as the basis 
of their own actions, and thus implement practices, routines, problem-solving 
strategies that are generated within the more dominant, powerful organiza-
tion(s). Instead of enacting their environment, these inferior organizations in 
turn become enacted as part of the environment of more powerful organiza-
tions. 
But even if they fail in their efforts to control the law, powerful organiza-
tions also often come to shape the law ‘merely’ through their collective sense-
making activities (Weick 1995), thus unintentionally. Powerful organizations 
often have well-established relations not only with politics but also with the 
media, which provides them with access to a more prominent position within 
their network. By ‘just’ dealing with the regulation, a powerful organization 
therefore is capable of coining an interpretation of the regulation and the defi-
nitions contained therein, that sets a precedent for other, probably less powerful 
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organizations. In so doing, they are likely to become a role model for other 
organizations without even striving for this position. Less powerful organiza-
tions will model themselves on the more visible and audible organizations be-
cause they might perceive them as leading ones in their network – and proba-
bly as better informed ones (even if they are not!). These sensemaking proc-
esses also affect the legal regulation because they add the missing link: by mak-
ing sense, the organizations generate an instruction manual for the application 
of the rule. Thus, the more powerful organizations may ‘succeed’ in that their 
interpretation of the legal rule becomes the applicable interpretation throughout 
their network.  
Against the background of this outline, one can now assume that the 
aforementioned coercive, mimetic and normative processes lead to homogeni-
zation among the organizations of a given network if this network is dominated 
by power. Given that one interpretation of the focal issue becomes the center of 
reference for the legal regulation, deviant perceptions, interpretations and rou-
tines will be sanctioned. Thus, alternative interpretations do not fully vanish 
but for at least a period are ‘condemned’ to lead a shadowy existence in the 
niches20 of the network or inside a few individual organizations. As the case 
may be, these inferior meanings bear the potential of flaring up whereby the 
hegemonic interpretation is likely to become challenged. In sum, the employ-
ment of power in the mobilization process of a given rule is likely to conceal at 
least the irreducible plurality of interpretations of a given issue – but it may not 
extinguish these alternative interpretations completely. 
Knowledge-based Structures 
If a legal rule defines its trigger as a cognitive problem in the first place and 
thus emphasizes its insufficient knowledge base, knowledge is likely to be in-
voked in the mobilization of this rule. This is, because by referring to an appli-
cable, already established knowledge base the legal rule does not claim superi-
ority in the solution of its regulatory trigger. Instead, it admits more or less 
implicitly its incapability of resolving the problem as there is no experience-
based knowledge available the regulation could fall back on. In so doing, it – 
whether intended or not – encourages the organizations of the given network to 
‘fill’ this cognitive gap by contributing their experiences with the given focal 
issue.21 This ‘point of departure’ for the introduction of a legal rule will affect 
the subsequent processes quite differently if the rule invokes power.  
                                                     
20  This notion of niches roots in the population ecology approach of organizations (e.g. Han-
nan & Freeman 1977; Aldrich 1979).  
21  This is not to say that the insufficient knowledge base of the focal issue can be resolved but 
rather that the underlying cognitive uncertainty of the issue can be adequately handled. 
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As the rule may not at all or only in a much reduced sense introduce a 
substantial definition of the focal issue, one can assume that instead of reduc-
ing the irreducible plurality of definitions, such definitions will instead exist 
equally side by side. Each organization will try to make its own interpretation 
the ruling one, which is likely to result in competition, debate and probably 
conflict throughout the network. This competition cannot be easily ‘decided’ 
by any superior authority as the insufficient knowledge base and the complex-
ity of the focal issue is evident. Under these conditions, no individual organiza-
tion can hope to gain an outstanding position, as it is also evident that no indi-
vidual organization will be capable of resolving this problem on its own. In this 
case, each organization within a given network may succeed irrespective of 
whether this organization would commonly be defined as powerful or less 
powerful: if the network is ridden with cognitive uncertainty that cannot be 
resolved by either science or any other ‘traditional’ authority, organizations 
who have been perceived as less powerful or successful so far, are now likely 
to also contribute their experience to the solution of the cognitive conflict.   
In so introducing internally generated knowledge into the network, this 
knowledge will be confronted with competing interpretations and, conse-
quently, competing problem-solving strategies. This ‘confrontation’ is likely to 
induce the revision of established knowledge or the generation of new knowl-
edge on part of the individual organizations.  
In comparing, adjusting, and revising, organizations come to learn in an 
environment of learning organizations (Levitt & March 1988). As the complex-
ity of the problems this study has in mind will overtax an individual organiza-
tion’s problem-solving capacity, organizations are increasingly forced to coop-
erate with each other in order to cope with the focal issue. In this process of 
cooperation, the various perspectives will be measured and tested, leading to 
revisions, re-interpretations and so to new perspectives.  
In this process of reciprocal learning, organizations are more likely to 
succeed which can adapt to the ever-changing character of an issue that is rid-
den with cognitive uncertainty. As the issue will permanently be shaped and re-
shaped – at least for a period – the individual organizations of a given network 
will have to adapt to these changes. These adaptation processes can be de-
scribed as learning. However, here one has to distinguish between the adaptive 
and the self-organizational type of learning.22 While the latter is characterized 
by the system’s ability “to question the appropriateness of behavior” (Grabher 
1993: 266), the learning abilities of the former are limited “as the system can 
maintain only the course of action determined by the operating norms and 
                                                     
22  This distinction falls into line with the one between single-loop and double-loop types of 
learning (Argyris & Schön 1978). 
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standards guiding it” (ibid.: 265). It is however not able to question these guid-
ing norms, and thus to consider them reflectively. Therefore, these types of 
learning can also be distinguished by referring to the system’s ability to reflect 
not only on its own operations but also on the underlying assumptions and, if 
needed, revise them. For these reasons, it seems more appropriate to speak of 
learning processes if the system’s cognitive structure is rebuild whereas ‘unre-
flected’ changes in organizational behavior have to be described as adaptation. 
With regard to the outlined situation, organizations thus may adapt to this in-
terpretation. By so doing, they will change their actions according to this inter-
pretation without changing the assumptions, or more precisely the decision 
premises, that guide their behavior. In this case, they may become unable to 
correct their direction even if they are confronted with negative outcomes. This 
might happen since the organization may have misinterpreted the changes in its 
environment. Lacking flexibility to adjust to environmental demands may in 
the end lead to the ‘death’ of an organization or at least threaten the organiza-
tion’s survival.  
The flexibility of an organization depends upon its internal structure. Re-
search in this field has shown that organizations, which are described as loosely 
coupled are more flexible whereas tied coupled organizations more easily run 
the risk of being ‘crushed’ between contradictory demands and expectations 
(Kämper 1999). While the latter are less capable of decoupling their active 
parts from their less active parts, the first tend to pretend that they have 
learned. This pattern of behavior also has been described by referring to the 
distinction between talk and action (Brunsson 1989). Dependent upon its flexi-
bility, an organization is thus more likely to adjust to external demands by de-
coupling its loosely coupled talk and action segments (ibid.). Although it may 
be confronted with negative outcomes of its responses to environmental de-
mands, it is able to react to these ‘failures’ by questioning repeatedly the under-
lying assumptions that led to these failures. In so doing, it continuously moni-
tors its behavior and its effects thus becoming able to adjust constantly to a 
changing environment without being forced into a revision of its decision 
premises. 
‘Success’ in this context means that an individual organization’s inter-
nally generated knowledge becomes one part of the network-wide accepted 
interpretation and routine. In so doing, it will infiltrate the law – and the legal 
rule itself has activated the generation of a knowledge base among its original 
addressees. The legal rule will therefore build upon a knowledge base that re-
fers not to an individual organization’s knowledge but to a variety of interpre-
tations that have been coined in the organizations of ‘its’ network. 
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2.2.3 Outcome of Enactment Processes 
Dependent upon the dominance of one or the other medium throughout the 
network, the interplay among the given legal rule and the organizations will 
lead to quite different regulatory structures throughout the given interorganiza-
tional network. 
Outcome of a power-shaped mobilization process 
At the surface of a network that is predominantly shaped by power-based or-
ganizational strategies, a homogeneous picture of the focal issue will be pre-
sented. This is, because alternative interpretations have been abolished not only 
as deviant, but also as unlawful or simply ‘wrong’. Therefore, the characteristic 
homogeneity also extends to practices and routines in the way of dealing with 
this issue, which have been singled out as the applicable routines throughout 
the network. 
This shape of the network can now be considered as the outcome of a 
power-based mobilization process of the legal rule. In this process, law has 
been infiltrated with meanings of the focal issue that have been generated 
within the powerful organizations of the given network. In so doing, the legal 
rule became the ‘cue ball’ of these powerful organizations, a means to their 
ends, in order to push forward their interests. Law thus became mobilized as an 
instrument of control and influence [Herrschaftsinstrument] that distinguished 
one meaning of the focal issue as the only valid and correct meaning. 
However, this is not to say that other, equally possible meanings have 
vanished or been completely extinguished. As organizations have various op-
tions to cope with a dominant environment, not all organizations will abolish 
their meaning of the focal issue. Moreover, even though these alternative inter-
pretations have been ‘sorted out’, they still are likely to linger on inside indi-
vidual organizations or niches of the given network. In these hidden places, the 
potential for conflict and opposition thus smoulders and is likely to flare up as 
soon as a window of opportunity23 opens up. In this case, the dominant interpre-
tation will become challenged and the process of competing, defining and abol-
ishing will be re-opened. This sketch of a power-shaped network leads back to 
the aforementioned network configurations. Even though a hierarchically or-
ganized network seems at first sight to be homogeneous, this picture increas-
ingly turns into an illusion if it is examined closer.  
                                                     
23  A window of opportunity or policy window occurs “when actors in the political arena man-
age to bring together (perceived) problems and (perceived) solutions and force these 
through a decision-making process (…). During such phases, regulatory regimes are con-
structed or altered, after which it typically takes some time before they reappear on the 
agenda of political institutions again” (Halffman 2003: 9). 
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By employing power, various contradictory interpretations of a certain 
issue have been abolished as deviant whereas only one interpretation was insti-
tutionalized as the dominant one. In so doing, the plurality of perspectives that 
are inherent to an interorganizational network have been ‘merged’ into one 
perspective or at least it seems so. Competing interpretations have increasingly 
been made invisible and unheard, thus reducing opportunities for opposition, 
friction and conflict. Therefore, the conclusion can be drawn that the estab-
lishment of a legal rule, which has been accompanied by power and powerful 
accessories, is likely to pacify an interorganizational network – in the short run.  
Nevertheless, at the same time as a powerful rule and its definition be-
comes established, countervailing power is likely to be produced. This is, be-
cause the plurality of perspectives has not been solved but rather cut off. Thus, 
they still linger on, even though at the periphery of the network. But even 
though their possibilities to become more vocal and visible are restricted by the 
more dominating organizations who have already taken the influential posi-
tions, they must be considered as a potential for conflict and opposition. Infe-
rior perspectives also might try to mobilize the law for their interests as well as 
using various types of influence (e.g. consumer boycotts). Therefore, the ex-
pense of a tight coupled, homogeneous network wherein opposition has been 
muzzled to the greatest possible extent is to be found within the risk that these 
contradictory and deviant voices will try to challenge the hegemonic interpreta-
tion. In so doing, a seemingly pacified network may in the end be turned into a 
conflict-ridden network. The peaceful and homogeneous picture that is pre-
sented as the outcome of a power-shaped mobilization process therefore has to 
be understood as a delusion, which hides the network’s original polycentricity 
and unrest. 
Outcome of a knowledge-shaped mobilization process 
A network that is predominantly shaped by knowledge-based organizational 
strategies is likely to present a more heterogeneous picture. While in a power-
shaped network the plurality of perspectives has been concealed by mecha-
nisms such as control and sanction, a knowledge-shaped network is character-
ized by the parallelism of various, differing interpretations of the focal issue. 
Thus, dependent upon the range of these interpretations, first of all conflict is 
likely to occur within the network. Even though this is not to say that the net-
work will only and unchangeable be ridden with conflict, the plurality of inter-
pretations will not lie quiet but lead a more or less tense coexistence. 
This shape of the network can be considered as resulting from the knowl-
edge-shaped mobilization process of a legal rule. Instead of binding the loose 
ties of an interorganizational network together, and thus establishing one inter-
pretation of the focal issue as well as applicable routines, the rule moreover 
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encouraged its addressees to generate varying interpretations of the issue. In so 
admitting its own incapability of producing a solid knowledge base that norma-
tive expectations could refer to, the rule rather ‘decided’ to rely on knowledge 
that is generated within the network it was designed to regulate. Thus, the cog-
nitive uncertainty is not resolved by abolishing alternative interpretations but 
rather by widening the scope for possible interpretations. This re-opening of 
the norm-setting process will at first lead to a generation of interpretations that 
are likely to compete in order to become institutionalized, thus to become the 
guiding interpretation throughout the network. But as the complexity of the 
problem will ask too much of an individual organization they are likely to turn 
to cooperation, thus ‘exchanging’ their own experiences with the focal issue in 
order to generate a knowledge base that lies beyond that of each single organi-
zation. 
In this process, the legal rule is only one of a variety of ‘drafts’ in the 
network, and, like any other draft, will be tested and probably become abol-
ished – in its ‘original’ sense. Moreover, as the organizations of the given net-
work will have to learn so will the legal rule. Instead of being mobilized as an 
instrument of control and influence, it can rather be described as an incentive 
for the in-context production of knowledge regarding an appropriate way of 
dealing with the issue in question. Consequently and with regard to the ‘origi-
nal’ function of a legal rule – that is, to secure expectations – a weak rule in the 
sense described above will not be able to establish one interpretation to be the 
dominant one throughout the network. Therefore, it will not provide security 
for those affected by the rule but will rather leave them to their own devices. 
On the side of the addressees, it has to be argued, that even if they ‘de-
scend’ to cooperation, these organizations will not adopt the specific definition 
of the focal issue that has been coined in their environment in a one to one rela-
tion. They will rather subscribe to a productive misreading in that they design a 
mode of handling for the given issue, that can be described as the least com-
mon denominator but which at the same time acknowledges the autonomy of 
the parties involved. Therefore, the expense of a heterogeneous network 
wherein contradictory interpretations coexist is to be seen not only in a more 
conflict-ridden interaction but also in a loss or a lack of certainty. In sum, the 
heterogeneous picture that is presented as the outcome of a knowledge-shaped 
mobilization process has to be understood as less comfortable but at the same 
as probably more appropriate regarding the fundamental ambiguity of the issue 
in question.  
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2.3 Conclusion: Revisiting the Regulatory Process 
As this chapter was dedicated to the outline of an organizational-based concept 
of the regulatory process, an understanding the regulatory process was invoked 
in which neither the law nor the organizations as its addressees were conceptu-
alized as dependent or as independent. Instead, the endogeneity of law was 
emphasized, thus calling attention to the fact that the law not only has an im-
pact on organizational behavior but also is impacted on by the organizations 
itself. When a legal rule is introduced in ‘its’ network it is not applied as it was 
originally intended to, but becomes mobilized by its addressees, the organiza-
tions that constitute an interorganizational network around a focal issue. 
In so invoking organizations as the central parts of the regulatory process 
an understanding of this process was abolished that mistook law as an instru-
ment in modifying organizational behavior. Instead, organizations were intro-
duced as actively partaking in the regulatory process by making sense and en-
acting the legal rule. Consequently, they reproduced the law by interpreting it. 
This happens unintentionally as well as intentionally. In their relation to the 
law, organizations tend to become legalistic, even though this depends upon 
the single organization’s responsiveness to its environment as well as upon the 
environment’s dominance. In responding to their legal environment, organiza-
tions overtake to varying degrees legalistic features such as an increased use of 
formal, standardized policies and procedures that reflects the legal emphasis on 
due process and formalization. Organizations also internalize litigious models 
of conflict resolution and overtake law-like decision criteria. Finally, organiza-
tions may also increasingly use legal rhetoric that can be considered as both a 
manifestation as well as an intensification of the other aspects of organizational 
legalization (Sitkin & Bies 1994: 22-26). But in so doing, organizational ac-
tions can be observed under the binary code legal/illegal, making them ‘mean-
ingful’ from the law’s perspective. Therefore, at the same time as the law tries 
to modify organizational behavior, it will therefore become modified itself by 
its original addressees.  
How can these observations regarding regulatory processes now be 
brought in line with the everyday observation that ‘regulation’ takes place 
since organizational behavior does become modified and legal rules are ap-
plied? What is needed here and what this chapter has developed is an under-
standing of the regulatory process that, by embracing and so recognizing or-
ganizational enactment processes, makes way for an understanding of regula-
tion as a dense, social act in which a plurality of social actors partake in. By 
doing so, the idea of ‘regulation’ itself does not become completely abolished 
but redefined. As organizations have been introduced not as isolated, closed 
entities but as strongly interwoven with their environments, they can now be 
considered as linkage institutions “that bind law to a multitude of functional 
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subsystems” (Teubner 1992: 1448). They open up the possibility for an in-
creased responsiveness of the law as they “bind law to diverse social discourses 
much more closely than politics or social sciences suggest a ‘resonance’ of law 
with civil society” (ibid.: 1444). This is not to say that law overtakes norms and 
routines, which have been developed in its societal environment on a one to 
one basis. As the law, or more precisely, legal organizations are conceived as 
cognitively limited as any other organization, they also depend upon sensemak-
ing processes. Thus, they filter the ‘noise’ their environment(s) charges them 
with through their distorting lenses. Moreover, as organizations tend to become 
legalistic, they develop norms and routines that seem to ‘fit’ with legal com-
munication. Thus, the law more or less “productively misreads other social 
discourses as ‘sources’ of norm production” (ibid.: 1447), resulting to varying 
degrees in a ‘societal infiltration’ of the law. In this process the law incorpo-
rates rules, norms etc. that stem from other social realms and which in turn 
impose as legal norms the realms from which they originally stem from. The 
degree to which this is going to happen depends upon several factors one of 
which is the design of the legal rule itself.  
Contingent on that design, and thus on the definition of the initial regula-
tory trigger and the (legal) instruments provided for an adequate way of dealing 
with this ‘trigger’, the implementation process into the network that is to be 
regulated will result in different regulatory structures. In introducing a specific 
definition of the issue that is considered as its regulatory trigger, the rule pre-
pares part of the ground for what is going to happen in its mobilization process. 
Consequently, with regard to the subject of the present study, the next chapter 
is dedicated to the introduction of the respective legal regulation of GM Food 
in the United States and in Germany. 
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“Different cultures and attitudes 
 influence the legal determination 
 of when there is a food safety risk 
and how to respond to such a risk” 
(Marsha Echols, 1998) 
 
3 Securing Food Safety: The Legal Framework  
Each regulation is triggered by a problem to which the regulation proposes a 
solution. This solution will depend upon the law’s perception of the problem 
and, consequently, on law’s conception of what will account as an adequate 
way of dealing with the particular issue in the future.1 Within the given context, 
this issue is the introduction of GM Food into the market in a most socially 
acceptable way. How this aim can be achieved depends upon the problems that 
are attributed to GM Food, its causes and its scope. As mentioned in chapter 1, 
GM Food can be depicted as a mixture of biotechnology and food, which 
makes way for differing interpretations of the issue. GM Food thus can be de-
fined as food or as a genetically modified organism in the first place and it is 
this definition that makes a difference with regard to the chances and problems, 
which are attributed to it. Therefore, one can assume that a variety of defini-
tions exist throughout the network, which has emerged around this issue. De-
pending upon the respective definition, different understandings of the prob-
lems related with GM Food and, consequently, different understandings of the 
applicable problem-solving strategies will occur within the network. Those 
definitions are likely to compete with each other in order to become the domi-
nating one throughout the network. 
In order to establish ‘secured’ expectations the legal rule aims to estab-
lish one definition as the prevailing one. By so doing, a consistent body of 
rules, practices and routines is brought into being that will be distinguished as 
henceforth applicable from other, deviant definitions and routines. Neverthe-
less, as has been mentioned above, it is likely that these definitions will linger 
on and affect the implementation of the legal rule in one way or another. In 
order to understand the dynamics that unfold when a legal rule becomes im-
                                                     
1  This conception itself has to be considered as the result of a preceding negotiation process 
between a plurality of actors. But, for purpose of this study, the current legal regulations are 
taken as the starting points of analysis. By so doing, they are (tentatively) discussed as sta-
ble. For a comprehensive report on the development of the NFR see Behrens et al. 1997: 
105-134; Rücker 2000. 
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plemented, the first step is to investigate the definition of the problem as it is 
provided by the rule. This definition determines the distribution of power and 
knowledge within an interorganizational network. According to the definition 
of the problem thus either power-based or knowledge-based solving strategies 
will dominate the network. As each regulation has to be understood as a reac-
tion to a problem, the rule itself is based upon its definition of this problem. 
Consequently, the rule prepares part of the ground for what is going to happen 
when it will be introduced. 
That the legal regulation of any given issue does make a difference can 
be clearly observed in the regulation of GM Food in Germany and in the 
United States. The introduction of GM Food has caused differing amounts of 
resistance in both these countries; while in Germany the introduction has been 
accompanied by expressions of public resistance such as consumer boycotts, it 
had not caused a comparable broad public debate in the United States. Schol-
arly assessments of these apparent differences in the overall attitude to GM 
Food have concluded, “that there is no one cause of the transatlantic divide” 
(Gaskell et al. 2001b: 113, emphasis added AE). Instead, a complex interplay 
of mutually interrelated aspects of the public spheres in the US and in Europe 
has been made responsible for the observable differences (ibid.). However, 
although this might hold true to a certain extent, the present study claims that 
the significant locus of difference is to be found within the (legal) regulation of 
biotechnology, and specifically of GM Food.  
The differences in the regulation of biotechnology which can be observed 
between the United States and Germany usually are explained as an expression 
of different regulatory styles, namely a product-based (US) and a program-
based (Germany) approach (Jasanoff 1995a). These characterizations aim to 
grasp the differences by focusing on the fact that in the United States ‘only’ the 
modified product is subjected to legal regulation whereas in Germany the 
overall relation between technology and society became the center of attention. 
Although these descriptions hold true, they do not fully grasp the differences 
and must therefore be considered as only one part of the explanation. As the 
deficiencies of the national styles of regulation approach have already been 
addressed in chapter 2, they will not be repeated here. Nevertheless, the claim 
is made that the explanation for these observable differences between both 
these countries is to be found within the interplay of the legal regulation(s) on 
the one side and those to whom it is addressed to – the organizations – on the 
other. As the legal rule shapes this interplay – as well as it will be shaped in 
return – the respective regulations have to be examined more thoroughly in 
order to unpack the first part of what the black box ‘national style’ is about. 
Further insights may be gained that are helpful for the understanding of 
transnational processes. Even though these processes are not the focal topic of 
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the present study, they cannot remain unmentioned as GM Food must be un-
derstood as an example for the globalization of risk and thus as an issue that 
demands for a regulatory frame beyond individual countries. GM Food can be 
considered as an example for the ‘globalization of risk’ since firstly, worldwide 
communication over GM Food in terms of risk and danger can be observed2; 
secondly, several events that occurred in the realm of GM Food developed 
worldwide relevance3; and thirdly, the plurality of perspectives under which 
GM Food is observed as well as constructed and that explains part of the con-
troversies surrounding the issue, is no longer limited to national boundaries. 
Similar to many other fields, attempts can be observed to put GM Food under a 
transnational regulatory framework even though the global regulation of ‘risk’ 
faces similar problems like risk regulation within national boundaries.4 More-
over, law’s difficulties to regulate a so-called risk-technology become repeated 
and to a certain extent radicalized on the international level. For instance, the 
‘clash of perspectives’ is repeated on a worldwide level, as an anticipated 
‘transatlantic trade war’ over GM Food indicates (e.g. Krenzler & MacGregor 
2000; Gillis & Bluestein 2003). The existence of a plurality of transnational 
agreements like those of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission (CAC) thus pay witness to the need for regulation.5 
                                                     
2  This can be observed not only in the existence of international agreements as the ones cited 
further below (note 5) but also in the border-crossing organization of critical groups such as 
Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth, to name but a few. 
3  The probably most popular ‘scandal’ related with GM Food was triggered by Arpad Pusz-
tai, at that time a researcher at the Rowett Research Institute (Aberdeen/UK) who con-
ducted a study on genetically modified potatoes. In August 1998 he reported in an ITN 
‘World In Action’ documentary that genetically altered potatoes fed to rats resulted in re-
tarded growth and reduced immunity. Not only did Pusztai hurt a fundamental rule in sci-
ence – he presented results to the public before discussing them within the scientific com-
munity – but he also presented a result that up to the present remains controversial. In the 
aftermath of Pusztai’s contested statement several studies were launched in order to prove 
or disprove his findings. But beside the scientific discussion a cross national debate set off 
that led for instance in Great Britain to a turnaround in the public opinion to GM Food: 
while Great Britain had been the European spearhead in the introduction of genetically 
modified products in the mid 1990’s, it was now confronted with outbreaks of public resis-
tance such as demonstrations in front of grocery stores and front page headlines on “Frank-
enstein Food Faces Supermarket Ban” (Sunday Telegraph January 26, 1999). See also for a 
detailed chronology on the case www.transgen.de (last visited January 15, 2003). 
4  See only the OECD GM Food Safety Conference (officially known as “GM Food Safety: 
Facts, Uncertainties, And Assessment. The OECD Edinburgh Conference on the Scientific 
and Health Aspects of Genetically Modified Foods”) that was hosted by the U.K. govern-
ment in Edinburgh on 28 February – 1 March 2000. It was one aim of the conference to 
fathom the possibilities for the achievement of cross national consistent standards and crite-
ria for assessing food safety. For further details see: www1.oecd.org/media/release/nw00-
16a.htm (last visited January 15, 2003). 
5  Agreements over food safety measures are laid down in the WTO-Agreements on the Ap-
plication of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) and on Technical Barriers to 
Trade (TBT). Within the scope of the SPS-Agreement the CAC has been officially recog-
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These agreements have been established in order to prevent or settle conflicts 
that are due to the differing perceptions of the issue GM Food. Again, as these 
agreements may collide with different national regulations, they themselves are 
more likely to become the source of a new conflict rather than to settle an ex-
isting one (e.g. Spranger 2000; Burchardi 2001). Therefore, one major reason 
for the difficulties that unfold in the domain of a transnational regulation of 
risk is to be found within different, contrasting regulatory approaches of the 
various countries. As will be pointed out in the following, each transnational 
agreement has to be applied in a local context that is marked by dynamics that 
unfold in the interplay of the specific regulatory framework, those to whom 
this framework is addressed to and last but not least the regulated issue itself.  
Within the given context, Germany as well as the United States has to 
deal with a seemingly identical problem: to establish the expectation that GM 
Food is safe to eat, even though the issue is ridden with cognitive uncertainty. 
By providing a legal framework for behavioral expectations concerning GM 
Food both these countries try to resolve the problem of cognitive uncertainty 
that can be considered as the fundamental characteristic of the issue. However, 
as will be outlined in the following sections, even though both these frame-
works aim to establish the expectation that GM Food is safe to eat, they mobi-
lize different means to this end. By so doing they introduce different meanings 
of the issue into the field, thus communicating the cognitive uncertainty 
whether in terms of risk or in terms of certainty. 
Methodological Remarks 
In the present study, the claim is made that the observable relations among the 
involved organizations are to a certain extent determined by the legal regula-
tion of the issue GM Food. In addition, even though the regulatory frameworks 
concerning GM Food will differ in both countries, any regulatory framework 
concerning GM has to be considered as one type whereas any particular na-
tional legislation concerning GM Food has to be considered as a token of that 
type.6 Each of the both national legislation thus reacts to an identical problem: 
the regulation of a phenomenon that is characterized by cognitive uncertainty. 
For purpose of clarity, this does not contain any information about what fol-
lows from this uncertainty yet, but this problem has to be taken as the shared 
initial point for the development of even differing regulatory frameworks. 
As will be outlined further below, the legal regulations concerning GM 
Food in Germany and in the United States show striking differences with re-
gard to form and content. Since they have been developed within different le-
                                                                                                                                            
nized as the authoritative body with regard to international standards, directives and rec-
ommendations in connection to food safety measures (Fuchs & Herrmann 2001).  
6  A type is a category, while a token is an individual instance or exemplar of some category. 
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gal systems – common law resp. civil law – this is not surprising and has to be 
seen as a problem only in the comparison of legal institutions. But the present 
comparison must not be misunderstood as a comparison of laws – the legal 
regulations are considered as only one part of the comparison. This calls atten-
tion to the theoretical background in which the regulatory process has been 
defined as a complex social act and not as a limited legal one. Instead, within 
the present study the differences between the respective regulatory frameworks 
are treated as remarkable as they have been established in order to fulfill the 
same societal function: the stabilization of the normative expectation that GM 
Food is safe to eat. By doing so, – or better, by trying to do so – societal con-
flicts that may be triggered by GM Food shall be prevented or be resolved. 
Therefore, both these regulatory frameworks can be described as functional 
equivalents and can thus be compared with regard to the question of how they 
cope with an initially identical problem in different ways.  
In the following section both these regulatory frameworks will be intro-
duced whereby special attention is called to their respective definitions of the 
initial problem that is to be regulated. Given that at least three ways of reading 
legal texts have been identified – a jurisprudential, a naive and a hermeneutic 
way (Bora 1999: 126) – the description of the legal framework has followed 
the last way.  
3.1 Germany: “Novel-Food-Verordnung schafft mehr Verwirrung als 
Klarheit“∗ 
In the beginning, the claim was made that GM Food has to be considered as a 
mixture of two, already tense issues, biotechnology and food. Although several 
food scares have led to public distrust in the mechanisms of food safety regula-
tion in Germany, the implementation of biotechnology has caused broad and 
bitter resistance in the early 90’s that in its radicalism can only be compared to 
the protests against nuclear power. Moreover, similar to the debate over nu-
clear power7, public debate over biotechnology has from its outset been (and to 
a certain extent still is) a debate over the impact of technology on society. In 
this context not only the technology as such but also the legitimacy of deci-
sions had been questioned, which would impose possible, unknown risks on 
society. Thus, the overarching question of the debate was who is supposed to 
decide legitimately over the implementation of a so-called risk technology? 
Consequently, a societal debate was opened up wherein the relation between 
society and technology was broadly negotiated. As a result, in 1984 the Ger-
man Parliament decided to establish a Commission of Inquiry [Enquete Kom-
                                                     
∗  Süddeutsche Zeitung, May 15, 1997. 
7  See for this somewhat hackneyed parallel Radkau 1988. 
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mission] in order to investigate the need for and the possibilities of a biotech-
nology regulation. The Commission issued its report “Opportunities and Risks 
of Genetic Engineering” [Chancen und Risiken der Gentechnik] (Deutscher 
Bundestag 1987) that questioned the safety of biotechnology and recom-
mended a five-year moratorium on environmental release. Although the mora-
torium was subsequently rejected it expressed a cautious approach that became 
manifest in a technology-specific, cross sectoral ‘gene law’. Thus, the Act on 
Genetic Engineering [Gentechnikgesetz – GenTG] came into force in 1990, 
establishing a regulatory system for biotechnology products.8 This approach 
towards biotechnology has been characterized as ‘programmatic’ (see above) 
since not only the technology as such but the more general relation between 
technology and society was in the focus of public discussions. Even though one 
intention of the act was to overcome the vital public controversy (e.g. Gill 
1996), its ability to do so has widely been questioned (e.g. Bora 1998). Bio-
technology in the German context still has to be described as a contested issue 
and it is this conflict-laden history that sets the context for the introduction of 
GM Food. 
When the German debate over the introduction of GM Food started in the 
mid-1990s9, the debate that had accompanied the development of biotechnol-
ogy throughout the 1980’s was repeated to a certain extent. Again, a program-
matic approach dominated the debate: not the product as such was the focus of 
attention; moreover the question was (and still is!) discussed, if such food is 
needed. This was mainly reflected in the (extensive) debate over the societal 
need for GM Food and therewith in the repeated demand for the implementa-
tion of a ‘fourth hurdle’10. Usually the societal need does not account as a rele-
vant criterion for the introduction of food, instead food safety, taste and nutri-
tion of the product are essential (e.g. Meyer 1998a). However, in cases where a 
product may be harmful to public health or environment, the hazards of a prod-
uct have to be weighed up against its possible benefits. With regard to genetic 
engineering in general the implementation of a needs-demands analysis [Be-
darfsprüfung] has been widely rejected by legal scholars. The lawmaker’s de-
cision to accept the general legitimacy of the technology leaves no room for an 
assessment of the question as to whether or not there is a societal need for ge-
netic engineering (Hirsch & Schmidt-Didczuhn 1991). Although this interpre-
                                                     
8  The Act on Genetic Engineering (Gentechnikgesetz – GenTG) came into force on 1 July 
1990 and was amended in 1993 (published in its present amended version in the Federal 
Gazette on 21 December 1993). 
9  The debate was triggered to great parts by shipments of  not segregated mixtures of conven-
tional and genetically modified soy and corn in late 1996 (e.g. GID 1996). 
10  The ‘fourth hurdle’ is a legal concept that is discussed not only in the domain of food but in 
all cases where possible risks of a product have to be weighed against the possible benefits 
for society.  
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tation is not uncontested (e.g. Winter 1992), the demand for the implementa-
tion of a fourth hurdle in the case of GM Food has been rejected so far. 
Between 1996 and 1999 several genetically modified products like spin-
ach burger, which contained genetically modified soy, or the ‘popular’ candy 
bar Butterfinger11 were introduced into the German food supply. The introduc-
tion of these products was accompanied by the resistance of a broad coalition 
of consumer groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs hereafter) 
(Behrens et al. 1997). Therefore, this resistance can be considered as responsi-
ble for the withdrawal of labeled, genetically modified products from the Ger-
man market throughout 1999.12 As this was only the beginning of a low point 
in the debate over GM Food, in the following years recipes were changed and 
food producers distanced themselves from GM Food.13 Nowadays, one will 
hardly find any labeled, genetically modified products at the ‘point of sale’ in 
Germany. This is not to say that genetically modified products disappeared 
from the market; until recently customers had to presume that the majority of 
soy products were manufactured with soy that to a certain extent has been ge-
netically modified since it stems from mixtures of modified and non-modified 
commodities. Based on a study by Stiftung Warentest (Stiftung Warentest 
2002) the public was informed that the majority of foodstuffs available in the 
German food supply are no longer intermingled with genetically modified soy 
or corn.14 
Finally, this tense situation set the background for the development and 
the implementation of a regulatory framework for GM Food not only within 
Germany but also throughout all Member States of the European Community. 
Even though due to different events and on different reasons the resistance to 
                                                     
11  Butterfinger®, a peanut butter candy bar, was the first and most prominent product in Ger-
many that was labeled for containing genetically modified corn. The candy bar was im-
ported from the United States and became a symbol in the resistance against GM Food.  
12  For illustrative purposes see only the following headlines: “Aus für Butterfinger” (July 14, 
1999, www.transgen.de); “Aus für den Genfood-Riegel ‘Butterfinger’ – Greenpeace ist zu-
frieden” (July 14, 1999, Berliner Zeitung); “Handelsketten setzen zunehmend auf gentech-
nikfreie Lebensmittel” (July 21, 1999, www.lifescience.de). 
13  See only „Ein Kniefall vor seiner Majestät, dem Kunden. Der Markt funktioniert gegen die 
Intention der Industrie: Genveränderte Produkte verschwinden aus den Regalen.“ Frank-
furter Rundschau, August 20, 1999. 
14  A study that was conducted by Stiftung Warentest in 2000 (Stiftung Warentest 2000) lead 
to the conclusion that more than one third of the tested (unlabeled) food contained up to 
20% genetically modified corn or soy. This study was repeated in 2002, concluding that 
these contaminations nearly completely disappeared from the human food supply (Stiftung 
Warentest 2002). But this development together with the prohibition of meat and bone meal 
has lead to an increased amount of soy in animal feed. And since no labeling requirements 
for animal feed exist so far in Europe, one can only assume that this soy is genetically 
modified to a certain extent (Burger 2002).  
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GM Food spread throughout the whole of Europe.15 For instance, even Great 
Britain, which once had been the European spearhead16 in the introduction of 
GM Food, was confronted with a growing public resistance that was even am-
plified by the BSE-crisis in 1996 and reached its climax in 1998, because of the 
Pusztai-Scandal (see note 3 in this chapter). Similar tendencies could also be 
observed in several Member States and underlined the need for a pan-European 
regulatory framework. 
Despite public unease with GM Food, also the increasing penetration of 
the food production chain and the establishment of the internal market made a 
legislation concerning these new products seem necessary for the following 
reasons. Firstly, the existing different national laws relating to novel foods or 
food ingredients were observed as potentially affecting the frictionless func-
tioning of the internal market. Secondly, in order to protect the public health, it 
was seen as inevitable to create a single safety assessment for novel foods and 
novel food ingredients through a Community procedure before they were 
placed on the market. 
However, in the realm of food law it had to be considered that national 
food law is determined by national traditions and eating habits. Thus, efforts to 
harmonize food law within the European Union have often been perceived as 
an offense towards national eating culture. In 1985 the European Commission 
therefore decided that European legislation should provide only the following, 
general services: the protection of public health, consumer's information, the 
unhindered cross-border trade within the community and a system of public 
control [System öffentlicher Kontrollen]. By so doing, a unitary legislative 
framework should be made possible that did not constrain the culinary plurality 
of the single member states (EC 1985). Moreover, the various community’s 
forms of action like regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations, and 
opinions equip the European lawmaker with a host of instruments that provides 
for a mixture of European and national legislation.17 Consequently, European 
requirements on the one side and national claims on the other can be measured. 
Until the enforcement of the European framework, GM Food was in 
principle subjected only to the national legislation on the deliberate release of 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs hereafter) into the environment (EP 
1990, 2001).18 The current legal framework under which GM Food is regulated 
                                                     
15  For a comprehensive review of the European situation see Gaskell & Bauer 2001. 
16  The UK was one of the first European countries to introduce GM food products to the mar-
ket between the early 1990s and 1996, e.g. ‘vegetarian cheese’ (made of chymosin derived 
from GM yeasts) and ‘GM tomato paste’. 
17  These forms of action are laid down in Article 249 (189) of the EC Treaty (ECT). 
18  Different from regulations, directives have to be put into national legislation whereby na-
tional law is adapted to the objectives laid down in the particular directive. Despite this dif-
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in Germany comprises European statutes as well as national legislation. Con-
cerning the European level, the lawmaker voted for a regulation. While ‘com-
munity laws’ regulations must be complied with fully by those to whom they 
are addressed (e.g. organizations, individuals), regulations do not have to be 
put into national legislation but apply directly in all the Member States. Thus, 
they serve to ensure a uniform application of Community law throughout the 
Member States. Even though the dominant part of the legislation concerning 
GM Food comprises community law, the interpretation and implementation of 
European regulation still varies a lot, dependent upon the national environment 
under which it is applied (e.g. Kamann & Tegel 2001). This is due to national 
regulations and administrative provisions that are provided for in the particular 
regulation. Additionally and even more importantly, national idiosyncrasies 
(e.g. the administrative structure) are likely to shape the application of commu-
nity law.  
The regulation of GM Food therefore can only be described to a certain 
degree as a pan-European regulation – its concrete application is to a great de-
gree fulfilled within the local contexts of each Member State.19  
3.1.1 GM Food as ‘Novel Food’ 
The key document for the regulation of GM Food in Germany, the Regulation 
(EC) 258/97 on Novel Foods and Novel Food Ingredients (hereafter NFR) (EP 
1997) subsumes GM Food under the term ‘novel food’. This is a term of art 
that has been newly created but which lacks a substantial definition: “Neither 
exists a legal definition of ‘novel food’ nor a concept in practice or in literature 
that could be referred to” (Huber 1996: 277). Therefore, ample room is left for 
a plurality of interpretations and thus several implicit assumptions. The appli-
cation of the term as it is introduced by the NFR has to be considered as only 
one possibility among others. 
As GM Food is referred to as ‘novel’ it is defined as being “of a kind not 
previously known” (Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current English 
on ‘novel’), or as “not resembling something formerly known or used” (Mer-
riam-Webster on ‘novel’). Thus, the implicit claim is made that there is no ex-
perience-based knowledge available that could be mobilized to assess the 
safety of GM Food. The legal regulation therefore cannot assure the safety of 
GM Food by referring to already established scientific knowledge. Further-
more, new knowledge – scientific as well as every other available knowledge – 
                                                                                                                                            
ference, directives are binding since they must be transposed in the form of binding na-
tional legislation. 
19  This is not to say that the local context is the only important level of implementation; the 
mobilization of transnational law like the pan-European Regulations can also be (and has 
been!) investigated on the level of transnational institutions (e.g. Schlacke 1998). 
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has to be generated to achieve an appropriate handling that will have to stand 
the ‘test of practice’. 
Secondly, by emphasizing the insufficient knowledge base of its object, 
the legal rule defines the regulation of GM Food as a cognitive problem in the 
first place. As the lawmaker has opted for a definition of GM Food that moves 
this near the realm of GMOs, the cognitive uncertainty that underlies GMOs is 
(communicatively) extended also to the application of modern biotechnology 
in the realm of food production. This can also be observed as an example for a 
‘remembrance of the context’. As the lawmaker had to categorize a so far un-
defined concept, he mobilized an already familiar concept that – in his perspec-
tive – appeared ‘suitable’. In so doing, the lawmaker also implicitly admitted 
that there is a considerable lack of knowledge that demands for a cautious ap-
proach to these new products.  
As with GMOs, the establishment of a new legal sphere thus seems to be 
unavoidable since GM Food as novelty could at least not be subsumed under 
existing food law. Consequently, an in-context production of knowledge is 
encouraged in order to develop a reliable foundation for future decision-
making within the context of GM Food. This categorization of GM Food as a 
cognitive problem in the first place thus pervades its succeeding regulation. 
3.1.2 Establishing a New Legal Sphere 
The NFR as unitary European framework for the commercial distribution of 
novel foods was enforced in May 1997.20 In its present form, the NFR is ap-
plied to six categories of foods whereof only two categories (Art. 1.2 a & b) 
refer to foods that contain, consist of or are produced from GMOs.21 Thus, in 
combination with additional European Legislation22 the regulatory framework 
                                                     
20  The development of this regulatory framework has been quite contested among the various 
Member States as well as within the Member States, mainly with regard to its application 
area and to the question of labeling (Droz in Behrens et al. 1997). While the German Fed-
eration of Food Law and Food Science (BLL) and Martin Bangemann (European Commis-
sioner at that time) voted against a general labeling of GM Food, not only Consumer and 
Environmental groups demanded extensive labeling but also did the relevant union Nah-
rung Genuß Gaststätten (NGG) and the German Government (ibid.).  
21  The remaining four categories refer to foods and food ingredients with a modified primary 
molecular structure (Art. 1.2 c); to foods and food ingredients consisting of or isolated from 
micro-organisms, fungi or algae (Art. 1.2. d); to foods and food ingredients consisting of or 
isolated from plants and food ingredients isolated from animals (Art. 1.2 e) and to foods 
and food ingredients to which has been applied a production process not currently used 
(Art. 1.2 f). 
22  In addition to Regulation (EC) No 258/97, the Commission Regulations (EC) No 49/2000 
and No 50/2000 refer to the implementation of labeling which is provided by No 258/97. 
For a detailed listing of the relevant legislation see Appendices Section B.  
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provides procedural rules on the approval of GM products and substantive 
rules, e.g. on labeling, that are valid throughout whole Europe.23  
Although the NFR does not have to be put into national legislation, addi-
tional national regulation was issued since the NFR did not contain any infor-
mation regarding its implementation at the Federal level. The “Novel Foods 
and Food Ingredients Order” [Neuartige Lebensmittel- und Lebensmittelzu-
taten-Verordnung – NLV hereafter] (BMG 1998) closes this gap by substantiat-
ing the NFR in several sections. It firstly nominates two novel food assessment 
authorities that oversee the marketing of novel foods in Germany. The Robert 
Koch Institute (RKI)24 acts as the competent authority for the official approval 
of the deliberate release of GMOs into the environment as it is required by Di-
rective 90/220/EEC in Germany. Therefore, it is responsible for the assessment 
of all products that consist of or contain GMOs. The second assessment body 
for the safety evaluation of novel food until recently25 has been the Federal In-
stitute for Health Protection of Consumers and Veterinary Medicine (BgVV) 
[Bundesinstitut für gesundheitlichen Verbraucherschutz und Veterinär-
medizin]26. It was responsible for assessing foods, which are produced from 
GMOs but do not contain GMOs. For the final assessment of GM Foods both 
these bodies have to include reciprocal consultations [sich ins Benehmen set-
zen]. Since January 2001 the newly created Federal Ministry for Consumer 
Protection, Food and Agriculture – BMVEL [Bundesministerium für Ver-
braucherschutz, Ernährung und Landwirtschaft]27 is competent for legislation 
                                                     
23  Even though some products were already approved in certain Member States (e.g. paste 
made from one variety of tomato in Great Britain), no labeling provisions were required. 
24  The RKI is the sectoral planning agency [Fachbehörde] that is responsible to the Federal 
Ministry of Health – BMG [Bundesministerium für Gesundheit]. 
25  With effect from November 1, 2002, the BgVV has merged in the Federal Institute for Risk 
Assessment – BfR [Bundesinstitut für Risikobewertung], the Federal Institute for Consumer 
Protection and Food Safety – BVL [Bundesinstitut für Verbraucherschutz und Lebensmit-
telsicherheit] and the Federal Research Centre for Virus Diseases of Animals – BFVA 
[Bundesforschungsanstalt für Viruskrankheiten der Tiere]. But as those changes have taken 
place after the empirical fieldwork was completed, they shall only be mentioned here on a 
purely informative basis. 
26  The BgVV is finally directly responsible to the Federal Ministry for Consumer Protection, 
Food and Agriculture – BMVEL [Bundesministerium für Verbraucherschutz, Ernährung 
und Landwirtschaft]. 
27  Until January 2001, the competence was with the Federal Ministry of Health – BMG [Bun-
desministerium für Gesundheit]. But then the BSE scandal has led to the resignation of the 
Minister of Health, Andrea Fischer (Green Party) and a new division among the tasks of the 
Ministry of Health. All consumer and food related issues have been moved to the newly 
named BMVEL whereas the competence in the area of releases of GMOs in the environ-
ment (Directive 90/220/EEC, now Directive 2001/18/EC) remained with the BMG. The 
BMVEL is the result of a merge between the former Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture 
and Forestry – BML [Bundesministerium für Ernährung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten], one 
division of the Federal Ministry of Health – BMG [Bundesministerium für Gesundheit] and 
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and for the authorization for marketing GM Foods. The final decision for or 
against the marketing of a GM Food is based on the scientific opinions of the 
two novel food assessment bodies.  
The NLV also provides additional labeling provisions and regulates the 
use of the term ‘without gene technology’ [ohne Gentechnik] which is the only 
authorized wording in Germany for products produced without the use of ge-
netic engineering.28 Finally, it links the infringements of the different areas of 
the NLV (e.g. wrong labeling, misuse of ‘without gene technology’ claims) to 
prosecution measures described in the basic German Law on Foods and Com-
modities – LMBG [Lebensmittel- und Bedarfsgegenständegesetz] of 1974.  
The two most important features of the legal framework under which GM 
Food is regulated are, firstly, the requirement for an official approval before it 
can be placed on the market and, secondly, the mandatory labeling of GM 
Food. Thus, the regulation of novel food follows the regulation of GMOs and 
not the regulation of traditional food even though both possibilities have been 
discussed (e.g. Huber 1996). The German gene law acts on the assumption of 
the necessity of a preventive prohibition system [präventives Verbotsprinzip] 
that serves as a means of averting a danger whereas the German food law is 
based upon the principle of the freedom of the market. With the requirement 
for an official approval for the marketing of certain kinds of food, the NFR 
established a novelty in legislation on food. Usually, food is regulated under an 
abuse control system [Mißbrauchsprinzip] (Spelsberg et al. 2000: 15). This 
system allows for the manufacturing and the introduction of food into the mar-
ket without any official approval. The manufacturers alone are responsible for 
the fulfillment of the provisions of the food law. Thus, they have to secure the 
safety of the food they produce.  
In the case of foodstuff that is subsumed under the term ‘novel food’ in-
stead, the lawmaker has opted for the prohibition system in order to prevent 
against possible risks that have been insinuated by the legal definition to the 
introduction of GM Food into the market. Although the lawmakers could have 
opted for an abuse control system as it is applied in the realm of food law, they 
voted for a system that is usually applied to GMOs (see above). By so doing, 
the initial definition of the (cognitive) problem as a risk is reconfirmed since 
GMOs already had been defined as potentially dangerous. Furthermore, not 
only GM Food is thus defined as potentially dangerous but so became food that 
                                                                                                                                            
some services of the Federal Ministry of Economy and Technology – BMWi [Bundesminis-
terium für Wirtschaft und Technologie] dealing with consumer and market research. 
28  The conditions that products must fulfill to use such a term in the label include that no 
GMO-derived product is used during production and that no GM-derived feed, additives or 
drugs are used in animal products seeking the label. EU legislation on the use of ‘GMO-
free’ type of claims in food labels is to be drafted. 
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not until the enforcement of the NFR would have been defined as related with a 
risk, like imported, exotic fruits or nuts, for instance.29  
By establishing a preventive prohibition system, GM Food can only be 
introduced into the market if it is formally permitted. A formal permit for the 
commercial distribution of food that is subsumed under the term ‘novel food’ is 
granted if the food does not  
“present a danger for the consumer, mislead the consumer and differ from food or 
food ingredients which they are intended to replace to such an extent that their normal 
consumption would be nutritionally disadvantageous for the consumer” (NFR, Art. 3, 
para. 1).  
To ensure that these requirements are met before a novel food enters the mar-
ket, two procedures are provided by the NFR, a ‘light’ notification procedure 
(NFR Art. 5) and a ‘heavy’ authorization procedure (NFR Art. 6).  
In order to decide whether one or the other procedure is applied, the con-
cept of ‘substantial equivalence’ is invoked.30 It has been developed by the 
WHO and the OECD (WHO 1995; OECD 1993) in order to cope with particu-
lar, scientific difficulties31 in the safety assessment of new food.32 The concept 
is based on the idea that traditional foods can serve as a basis for comparison 
when assessing the safety and the nutritional value of food or food ingredients 
that have been modified by modern biotechnology. Thus, a novel food is con-
sidered substantially equivalent to its traditional counterpart 
“if the genetic modification has not resulted in intended or unintended alterations in 
the composition of relevant nutrients and inherent toxicants of the organism, and that 
the new genes and proteins have no adverse impact on the dietary value of the food 
and do not therefore pose any harm to the consumer or the environment” (Schauzu 
2000: 2) 
                                                     
29  As a consequence, several exotic products were not approved for consumption (e.g. EC 
2000c). Another illustrative example is the often heard opinion that, according to the provi-
sions of the NFR, nowadays kiwi fruits would not be approved for marketing, due to their 
well-known potential to induce allergic responses. 
30  The European Commission has based its Commission Recommendation of 29 July 1997 
concerning the scientific aspects and the presentation of information necessary to support 
applications for the placing on the market of novel foods and novel food ingredients and 
the preparation of initial assessment reports under Regulation (EC) No 258/97 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the principle of ‘substantial equivalence’ 
(Spelsberg et al. 2000: 37) 
31  For instance, traditional, toxicological testing as in the case of food additives can only be 
applied to a certain extent since whole food is consumed in larger amounts than are food 
additives. 
32  Originally both, the term and the concept are borrowed from the US Food and Drug Ad-
ministration’s (FDA) definition of a class of new medical devices that do not differ materi-
ally from their predecessors (Miller 1999). 
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Even though the concept is not uncontested (Millstone et al. 1999; Schenke-
laars 2002) it is internationally accepted as a useful tool for food producers and 
government regulators. 
Application Procedures 
According to the NFR, a novel food that is substantial equivalent to its tradi-
tional counterpart can be placed on the market by the notification procedure. 
With regard to GM Food, the procedure applies to foods or food ingredients 
that are produced from but do not contain GMOs (e.g. refined oil derived from 
herbicide tolerant rapeseed lines). The notification procedure requires that the 
applicant informs the Commission of the placing on the market of a novel food 
when he does so. This notification has to be accompanied by a scientific opin-
ion delivered by the competent authority of the Member State, which in Ger-
many has been the abovementioned BgVV33. A copy of the notification will be 
forwarded to all Member States within 60 days and, upon request, a copy of the 
statement of the substantial equivalence. If one Member States objects to the 
notification, the food will be introduced into the authorization process. 
The outlined notification procedure does not apply to foods that contain 
or consist of GMOs (e.g. genetically modified tomatoes). Even if their substan-
tial equivalence has been proven by scientific evidence provided by the pro-
ducer or by the competent authority, the authorization procedure is mandatory 
in these cases. It requires that the applicant submits a request34 to the Member 
State in which the product is to be placed on the market for the first time. This 
request will be forwarded to the Commission and, within 60 days, to all Mem-
ber States. The competent authority of the first Member State then has to pre-
pare an initial assessment report. This has to happen within a period of three 
months and aims to decide whether the food or food ingredient requires addi-
tional assessment. The concerned Member State forwards the final report to the 
Commission, which forwards it to the other Member States. In the case of 
foods and food ingredients that are a GMO or are produced from a GMO, they 
can only be authorized by the council (Schauzu et al. 1998). The council, under 
assistance of the Standing Committee for Foodstuffs, will finally decide about 
an authorization for the food or food ingredient. If no comments or objections 
                                                     
33  To carry out the pre-marketing assessment of GM Foods the BgVV had formed a 13-
member advisory committee. The members of this committee stem from the fields of food 
chemistry, toxicology, microbiology, veterinary medicine, medicine and nutrition. The 
committee meets at least four times a year but members may be consulted when needed. 
34  “This request shall contain the necessary information, including a copy of the studies which 
have been carried out and any other material which is available to demonstrate that the food 
or food ingredient complies with the criteria laid down in Article 3 (1), as well as an appro-
priate proposal for the presentation and labeling, in accordance with the requirements of 
Article 8, of the food or food ingredient. In addition, the request shall be accompanied by a 
summary of the dossier.” (NFR Art. 6 (1)) 
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are made, the concerned Member State has to inform the applicant that he may 
place the food or the ingredient on the market. This application accounts for the 
entire internal market. 
Labeling 
The definition of GM Food that contains or is made of GMOs as (in principle) 
not substantial equivalent also has consequences for the labeling policy. The 
NFR requires special, mandatory labeling for novel foods that are deemed not 
equivalent to their traditional counterparts:  
“In this case, the labeling must indicate the characteristics or properties modified, 
together with the method by which that characteristic or property was obtained; (b) 
the presence in the novel food or food ingredient of material which is not present in an 
existing equivalent foodstuff and which may have implications for the health of certain 
sections of the population; (c) […] of material which is not present in an existing 
equivalent foodstuff and which gives rise to ethical concerns; (d) […] of an organism 
genetically modified by techniques of genetic modification, the non-exhaustive list of 
which is laid down in Annex I A, Part 1 of Directive 90/220/EEC.” (NFR Art. 8, 1).  
These requirements have been specified by at least two regulations that were 
issued in 2000 and which contain the detailed information about the embodi-
ment of this requirement (e.g. the wording of the label) (EC 2000a, EC 2000b). 
Those regulations provide for the labeling of foodstuffs and ingredients con-
taining additives or flavorings derived from GMOs and entail the labeling re-
quirements of foodstuffs derived from two GMOs35, which were approved in 
the European Community prior to the enforcement of the NFR. At present, all 
products have to be labeled that contain more than one percent of a genetically 
modified ingredient. The basis for the labeling requirement is the quality of the 
particular product and not the process by which it was produced. Therefore, a 
product label is applied, instead of a widely demanded production methods 
label (PPM), as it is common in the realm of organic agriculture, for instance. 
3.1.3 Mobilizing Knowledge 
The outlined regulatory framework assigns GM Food a special status in con-
trast to traditional food by communicating its insufficient knowledge base as a 
source for possible hazards. By so doing, the legal rule defines its trigger as a 
cognitive problem in the first place. The broad legal definition of GM Food as 
something previously unknown consequently implies that there is no experi-
ence-based scientific knowledge available on which the regulation could fall 
back on. Furthermore, to establish stabile, normative expectations, the produc-
tion of (new) knowledge is necessary in order to provide a reliable basis for 
future decision-making.  
                                                     
35  In 1996 and 1997 products from two GM-plants, the ‘Roundup Ready soy’ and the ‘Bt-176 
corn’, were authorized for food EU-wide (EC 1996, 1997). 
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This lack of established scientific knowledge is also reflected in the in-
struments and mechanisms provided for by the outlined regulatory framework. 
The framework comprises a mixture of traditional legal instruments such as 
proscription and sanctions, when it comes to the application procedures. How-
ever, although the rules that constitute the framework have legal status and are 
consequently subject to legal sanction, the key document of the regulatory 
framework, the NFR, can be characterized by its temporal limitation. Instead of 
introducing a reliable, i.e., invariant over time, instruction for the ‘use’ of GM 
Food and, by so doing, establishing normative expectations as to the safety of 
the issue, a rule is introduced that contains its own expiry date and demands for 
a monitoring of its implementation as is indicated by the following citations: 
“1. No later than five years from the date of entry into force of this Regulation and in 
the light of experiences gained, the Commission shall forward to the European Par-
liament and to the Council a report on the implementation of this Regulation accom-
panied, where appropriate, by any suitable proposal. 
2. Not withstanding the review provided for in paragraph 1, the Commission shall 
monitor the application of this Regulation and its impact on health, consumer protec-
tion, consumer information and the functioning of the internal market and, if neces-
sary, will bring forward proposals at the earliest possible date.” (NFR, Art. 14, em-
phases added, AE)  
In doing so, the rule introduces itself into the field as a first draft of how to 
handle GM Food. Further, instead of binding future and thus absorbing uncer-
tainty – whether by the employment of power or knowledge – the rule encour-
ages knowledge-generation among those, to whom it is originally addressed. 
Thus, it admits its own incompleteness and relies on practices and routines, i.e., 
knowledge that is produced in its environment. Consequently, the rule is likely 
to incorporate norms, routines, practices that stem from its societal environ-
ment. Here, a factual opening of the law can be expected. 
As the rule introduces itself as one draft among others it will therefore 
have to prove itself in practice – in its confrontation with practices and prob-
lem-solving strategies that have been developed by the organizations of that 
field. Moreover, it will probably be forced to take over their definitions and 
routines. 
In sum, this rule introduces the regulation of GM Food as a cognitive 
problem into the given network. Instead of absorbing uncertainty, this rule is 
likely to open up a new norm-setting process in which course not only the im-
plementation but also the definition of the issue GM Food, its scope, its prob-
lems and appropriate problem-solving strategies become the object of another 
negotiation process among the organizations involved. In so doing, knowledge 
becomes employed as the medium that accompanies the introduction of this 
rule into its field. One can assume that the German interorganizational network 
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will be dominated by knowledge-based problem solving strategies as the legal 
regulation strongly emphasizes the insufficient knowledge base it is built upon. 
This regulatory framework now can be contrasted with the legal requirements 
that must be met for the introduction of GM Food in the United States. 
3.2 U.S.: “Biotech Food Products Won’t Require Special Rules, FDA 
Decides”∗ 
Different from Europe, the United States have faced lesser resistance towards 
the implementation of biotechnology. The overall resistance towards the new 
technology was by no means comparable to the public uproar in Europe, and 
especially in Germany. Apart from some exceptions like the Union of Con-
cerned Scientists (UCS) and the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), GMOs 
were simply not on the radar screen of most American consumer and environ-
mental organizations throughout the 1980s and the greater parts of the 1990s.36 
While the German debate was marked by the question if there ought to be 
techniques like genetic engineering at all, the focus of the American debate has 
been on the question of how these techniques could be applied in a socially 
acceptable way. The technology itself has thus never been fundamentally ques-
tioned; the overall critique has been less radical than in Germany. 
Simultaneously, the United States opted for a range of sector-specific 
policy-making instead of a cross-sectoral ‘gene-law’. The outline of this policy 
is laid down in the Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology 
(hereafter the 1986 Framework) that was issued by the Office of Science and 
Technology Policy37 in 1986 and remains the key US document on biotechnol-
ogy to date (OSTP 1986). In the scope of this framework, the government laid 
down that on the assumption that “the recently developed methods [genetic 
manipulation technologies, AE] are an extension of traditional manipulations” 
(OSTP 1986: 23302), the safety of products derived through these new tech-
nologies could be ensured under existing statutes: 
“Upon examination of the existing laws available for the regulation of products de-
veloped by traditional genetic manipulation techniques, the working group concluded 
                                                     
∗  The Washington Post, May 26, 1992. 
36  At least two events can be mentioned that often are cited as trigger for a somewhat broader 
public debate over genetically modified crops and, consequently, over GM Food, namely 
the aforementioned communication in Nature over potential lethal effects of GM Crops on 
the larvae of the monarch butterfly (see chapter 2, note 3) and the growing mistrust in 
Europe. 
37  The Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) is part of the Executive Office of the 
White House and serves as a source of scientific and technological analysis and judgment 
for the President with respect to major policies, plans, and programs of the Federal Gov-
ernment. 
3 Securing Food Safety: The Legal Framework 
 
87
that, for the most part, these laws as currently implemented would address regulatory 
needs adequately.” (OSTP 1986: 23303). 
Moreover, it specified the agencies that share responsibility for regulating bio-
technology. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) as the primary federal 
agency responsible for ensuring the safety of food and food additives conse-
quently became responsible for foods produced by new methods, such as re-
combinant DNA techniques. On food safety matters, FDA works closely with 
the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) of the US Depart-
ment of Agriculture (USDA) that regulates meat and poultry products, and with 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that regulates pesticides.38 These 
agencies were requested to submit their proposals about how they would inte-
grate future new products into their existing statutory and regulatory frame-
work. 
Another decisive document for the development of the biotechnology 
policy in the United States was a report submitted by the National Research 
Council (1989) that confirmed the product-based approach to regulation: 
“[T]he product of genetic modification and selection constitutes the primary 
basis for decisions (...) and not the process by which the product was ob-
tained.” Thus, a product-based approach towards biotechnology became the 
basis of the American policy (Jasanoff 1995a; Vogel 2001). 
As with biotechnology in general, for the most parts an unagitated debate 
also accompanied the introduction of the first genetically modified consumer-
ready food to the market in the United States in 1994. The marketing of the 
Flavr Savr™ tomato that was produced by Calgene remained nearly unnoticed 
by the greater public and in the following years, further genetically modified 
products silently entered the food supply.39 Nowadays about 60 to 80 % of the 
American food supply is estimated to be genetically modified or to be pro-
duced by genetic engineering and, one might add, without gaining greater pub-
lic attention. Finally, in September 2000, GM Food became a ‘hot issue’ when 
an article in the Washington Post claimed, that a genetically modified corn 
(‘StarLink’) was found in the food supply (‘Taco Shells’) which had not been 
                                                     
38  APHIS regulates the environmental release of transgenic plants that contain plant pest 
components. The EPA registers pesticides that are produced in transgenic plants and estab-
lishes pesticide tolerances for residues in food. These two agencies together established 
procedures to review and approve field tests. 
39  Calgene’s Flavr Savr™ tomato was the first genetically engineered food product that was 
approved by the competent authority, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). This ap-
proval opened the way for commercial marketing of the Flavr Savr™ tomato. But due to 
the bad quality of the tomato (it bruised easily and was less firm than expected), the com-
mercialization of this tomato failed. In 1997, one year after Monsanto had bought 49.9% 
equity stake in Calgene, the Flavr Savr™ production was stopped and Monsanto started 
moving the technology into ‘premium tomato hybrids’ (Martineau 2001). 
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approved for human consumption but only for animal feed (Kaufman 2000).40 
As a result, in the following months the media coverage on GM Food became 
more extensive and critical groups became more vocal in the public debate.41 
Additionally, although no harm to human health has been reported42, this occa-
sion has led to the first product recall of a genetically modified product ever 
and resulted in several lawsuits filed by consumer groups and farmer associa-
tions. Even though one class-action lawsuit from consumers was settled in 
2002 for 9 million dollar (Pesticide and Toxic Chemical News 2002), this so-
called ‘StarLink-Case’ did not become a turning point in the overall debate. 
Again, as the American ‘nonchalance’ towards modern biotechnology in 
general also is mirrored in the public debate over GM Food a manifest contrast 
in comparison to the German and the European situation at large has to be as-
serted (Gaskell et al. 2001b; Sassatelli & Scott 2001). This contrast is also re-
flected in the legal regulation of GM Food that can be considered as a logical 
continuation of the overall biotechnology policy. 
3.2.1 GM Food as a ‘New Variety’ 
The predominant product-based approach towards biotechnology is repeated in 
the US-regulation of GM Foods, as the following citation indicates:  
“Congress has provided FDA authority under the act and the Public Health Service 
(PHS) Act to regulate products regardless of how they are manufactured” (OSTP 
1986: 23310, emphasis added AE).  
By so doing, the product-based approach already in a very early stage was ex-
tended to the application of modern biotechnology in food production, thus 
deeming a technology-specific regulation like the European NFR as unneces-
sary. Only with the increasing readiness for the market of GM Food, the above-
mentioned 1986 Framework had to be specified for the marketing of GM Food. 
Currently, GM Food is regulated under the following two documents, the 
Statement of Policy: Foods Derived From New Plant Varieties (hereafter 
Plant-Derived Foods Policy), which has been released in 1992 by the FDA 
(FDA 1992) and the Proposed Rule: Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengi-
                                                     
40  For an extensive coverage of this ‘scandal’ see: StarLink: Lessons Learned, a special report 
prepared by the editors of Food Traceability Report (2001) that explores the marketing, le-
gal, ethical, and technological issues raised by StarLink.  
41  This growing of awareness of genetic engineering as a problematic technology is also in-
creasingly reflected in the academic context, which is indicated by a special issue of the 
American Behavioral Scientist (2001) that was dedicated to the social implications of agri-
cultural biotechnology.  
42  Although there had been reports about allergic reactions after eating corn tacos that con-
tained StarLink corn, a study by the federal Center for Disease Control and Prevention 
could not link these reactions to the consumption of the genetically engineered corn (e.g. 
Kaufman 2001).  
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neered Foods (hereafter the Proposed Rule) (FDA 2001) that does not overrule 
but amend the 1992 policy. Both these documents follow the line of the 1986 
Framework in rejecting a substantial novelty of GM Food. Instead, genetic 
engineering has been defined as an extension of traditional breeding methods. 
This momentous decision has had consequences for the definition and the suc-
ceeding regulation of GM Food. By defining genetic modification as “the al-
teration of the genotype of a plant using any techniques, new or traditional” 
(FDA 1992: 22984, N. 3), FDA concludes that “(m)ost, if not all, cultivated 
food crops have been genetically modified” (ibid.). Thus, by issuing the State-
ment of Policy,  
“FDA’s implementing regulations, and current practice, utilizing an approach identi-
cal in principle to that applied to foods developed by traditional plant breeding” 
(FDA 1992: 22984).  
Consequently, already existing established knowledge that was generated in the 
regulation of traditional food becomes mobilized; not only existing practices 
but also scientific facts and established categories can be applied in the regula-
tion of GM Food. Hence, it is the task of the regulation to establish this already 
existing knowledge as the ‘valid’ knowledge base in the realm of a new food 
variety. It is finally this intention that is reflected in the legal framework that 
regulates the introduction of GM Food into the market. 
3.2.2 Extension of Existing Norms 
At first glance, GM Food in the United States seems to be regulated under a 
less dense regulatory network than in Germany.43 This impression is due to the 
fact that it comprises a plurality of administrative regulations that are of a 
lesser binding nature than the community and national laws that are relevant in 
Germany. However, as the United States did not opt for the establishment of a 
new legal sphere but subsumed the new subject under already existing legal 
norms instead, this first impression shall be revised on the background of a 
closer examination.  
The issue GM Food has been defined as not differing from traditional 
food so that the current regulatory framework has to be understood as a speci-
fication by the competent agency about how the existing food law applies spe-
cifically to GM Food. The relevant legal provisions for traditional food are laid 
down in chapter 4 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (hereafter 
FDCA). Similar to Germany, food is regulated under a system of abuse control. 
                                                     
43  This opinion is quite popular and is not limited to GM Food but takes the regulation of 
GMOs at whole into account. It is shared by scholars (Lynch & Vogel 2001) as well as by 
politicians. For instance, a British Labor MEP and European Parliament Rapporteur de-
scribed the revised European Directive 2001/18/EC as “the tightest GM laws in the world” 
(Fletcher 2001). 
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As it is the responsibility of the producers to evaluate the safety of a new food, 
every new food product can be marketed without official approval. Conse-
quently, this system leaves the responsibility for food safety with the manufac-
turers.  
This system is also applied to GM food and the abovementioned adminis-
trative rules clarify how its application is fulfilled. Concerning the legal status 
of these rules, four forms of administrative action44 can be discriminated that 
differ in their binding nature: rulemaking and adjudication, formal and infor-
mal at each case (Brugger 2001). In the given context, the relevant form of 
action is rulemaking that can further be subdivided into substantive rules, 
which have binding force and “interpretive rules, general statements of policy, 
or rules of agency organization, procedure or practice” (ibid.: 234) that can be 
issued without legal authority [rechtliche Ermächtigung] and without a formal 
procedure.  
Both key documents regulating the introduction of GM Food are seen as 
forms of rulemaking but are of different binding nature. As statements of pol-
icy in general have to be considered as declarations of intent that have no bind-
ing force but aim to inform about the future behavior of the particular agency 
(Jarass 1985), the 1992 policy is not binding. It contains information regarding 
FDA’s interpretation of the FDCA and provides guidance for potential produc-
ers of GM Food for conducting safety evaluations. 
Different from that, the Proposed Rule that was issued in early 2001 by 
FDA has to be considered as informal rulemaking. Informal rulemaking is one 
of three procedures45 by which substantive rules are issued that, with regard to 
their binding effect, resembles German statutory orders. However, substantive 
rules are issued by the particular agency and not by government, as is the case 
in Germany (ibid. 1985). The typical elements of informal rulemaking are the 
announcement in the Federal Register46 that a regulation for a certain problem 
is to be issued. This announcement is followed by whether written or oral 
comments by those to whom the rule is addressed.47 The procedure of rulemak-
ing closes with the final, internal decision-making of the agency and the publi-
cation in the Federal Register, which must be accompanied by a precise decla-
ration of the agency regarding the basis for decision-making and the purpose of 
                                                     
44  These forms of action are laid down in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).  
45  Substantive rules have to be issued by a formal procedure which depends upon the subject. 
Apart from informal rulemaking, formal and hybrid rulemaking are provided (Jarass 1985: 
384). 
46  The Federal Register is the official daily publication for Rules, Proposed Rules, and No-
tices of Federal agencies and organizations, as well as Executive Orders and other Presiden-
tial Documents. 
47  For this reason, this form of action also is called notice-and-comment-rulemaking. 
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the rule. In sum, the procedure for informal rulemaking provides a great degree 
of flexibility for the particular agency whereas the addressees of the given rule 
can influence the agency by making comments48 and have to rely on later legal 
protection otherwise (Brugger 2001: 235).  
Different from a comparable setting in Germany, this regulatory scheme 
can only be understood completely as backed by a product liability legislation 
that strongly protects consumers’ interests. Further, the Federal Trade Com-
mission (FTC), an independent federal agency oversees consumer protection 
and issues rules and guidelines in order to support the consumers. The standing 
of the consumer becomes manifest firstly in legal institutions such as class ac-
tions and public interest litigation that enables not only consumer associations 
but also an ad-hoc group of consumers to file a lawsuit (see also 1.2.1). As an 
effect of both, product liability legislation and the aforementioned legal institu-
tions, it is also expressed in the enormous size of compensations that have been 
paid for damages in the United States. On the side not only of manufacturers 
but also of any other party that provides services for customers this has led to a 
widespread fear of being sued – a development that has been captured by the 
handy buzzword ‘litigaphobia’49. The subsequent outline of the regulations that 
are applied to GM Food thus have to be read against the background of these 
‘premises’. 
As GM Food is regulated according to the legal provisions that are ap-
plied to traditional food, a producer does not have to seek legal approval before 
the placing on the market of such food. This follows from FDA’s assumption 
that  
“(t)he established practices that plant breeders employ in selecting and developing 
new varieties of plants (…) have proven to be reliable for ensuring food safety” (FDA 
1992: 22988).  
Thus, “FDA has not found it necessary to conduct, prior to marketing, routine 
safety reviews of whole foods derived from plants” (ibid.). This assumption 
has also been applied to foods derived from new plant varieties because the 
substances that are likely to become a component of a new food, are considered 
to be “substantially similar” to substances commonly found in food, such as 
proteins, fats and oils (FDA 1992: 22985). As this formulation indicates, the 
concept of ‘substantial equivalence’ also underlies FDA’s safety assessment of 
GM food, even though the term is not explicitly mentioned. Regarding the 
                                                     
48  In contrast, the procedure of formal rulemaking is characterized by far reaching participa-
tory rights for those to whom the rule is addressed. These rights are reflected by a proce-
dure that resembles a legal proceeding. Therefore, this form of rulemaking also is called on-
the-record rulemaking (Brugger 2001: 235). 
49  This neologism originally has been coined by Brodsky (1988) in order to describe the wide-
spread fear of being sued among mental health professionals. 
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transferred substances (e.g. nucleic acids) within a new food variety those are 
potentially subjected to food additive regulation since food additives broadly 
encompass any substance that has an intended use in food. Food additives in 
the United States are subsumed under a two-step definition. In a first step, any 
substance that is intended to become a component of a food is considered a 
food additive. In the second step, such substances are excluded from the defini-
tion of food additive that are GRAS (Generally Recognized as Safe)50. Those 
substances can be marketed without passing a mandatory premarket safety re-
view. A substance is accorded GRAS status, if it is generally recognized by 
experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate its safety, as 
having been adequately shown through scientific procedures or experience 
based on common use in food to be safe under the conditions of its intended 
use. And as the 
“transferred genetic material (nucleic acids) are present in the cells of every living 
organism and animal used for food by humans and animals (…) such material is pre-
sumed to be GRAS” (FDA 1992: 22990).  
Thus, GM Foods can be lawfully marketed without requiring premarket ap-
proval by FDA. Nevertheless, as FDA traditionally encouraged producers of 
new food ingredients to consult with FDA, a consultation procedure has also 
been recommended by the 1992 policy. 
Consultation Procedure 
The consultation procedure is intended to assist producers in evaluating the 
safety of a new food variety or a new food ingredient. It is described in Section 
VII of the 1992 policy and has been concretized in the Guidance On Consulta-
tion Procedures. Foods Derived From New Plant Varieties (FDA 1997) that 
was issued in October 1997 upon request from producers of GM Food.  
Even though the consultation procedure can be considered as a more in-
formal procedure, one can distinguish between stable elements of the proce-
dure such as the initial and the final consultations. Initial consultations are 
conducted in the development phase of a product to resolve safety, nutritional, 
and regulatory issues in an early stage of the production process. Final consul-
tations are taken up when the producer has gathered enough information to 
ensure that the product is safe and complies with the legal provisions of the 
FDCA. By then, the producer can conclude an ongoing consultation with FDA. 
                                                     
50  This regulatory category was created for a group of food additives that were exempted from 
the more rigorous regulatory requirements for food additives in the 1958 Food Additives 
Amendment to the Food Drug and Cosmetics Act of 1938. On the basis of the GRAS ex-
ception of the food additive definition it is possible that ‘familiar’ ingredients such as salt, 
pepper, vinegar, vegetable oil and the like can be lawfully marketed without being the sub-
ject of food additive regulation. 
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To inform FDA about GM Foods the producer submits a summary of the safety 
and nutritional assessment to FDA. The information provided in the summary 
are reviewed by the agency scientists and, if necessary, discussed with the de-
veloper. This summary should contain 
“(t)he name of the bioengineered food and the crop from which it is derived […], 
(i)nformation concerning the sources, identities, and functions of introduced genetic 
material […], (a) discussion of the available information that addresses whether the 
potential for the bioengineered food to induce allergic response has been altered by 
the genetic modification, (a)ny other information relevant to the safety and nutritional 
assessment of the bioengineered food” (FDA 1997, chapter II.B). 
By following this consultation procedure, the developer makes sure that he 
complies with the legal provisions laid down in the FDCA. However, as this 
procedure does not conclude with an official approval by FDA it must be char-
acterized as notification. While the 1992 policy merely recommended “produc-
ers can informally consult with FDA prior to marketing new foods to ensure 
that the safety and regulatory status of a new food is properly resolved“ (FDA 
1992: 22985), in its Proposed Rule  
“the agency has tentatively concluded that, prior to initiation of commercial distribu-
tion in the United States of a bioengineered food, FDA must be notified of the intent to 
market such food. […] Therefore, the agency is proposing that the notification pro-
gram […] be mandatory“ (FDA 2001: 4712). 
Although the process of rulemaking is not finished yet51, in future the described 
consultation procedure will be obligatory and FDA will have to be notified at 
least 120 days prior to the commercial distribution of genetically modified food 
in the United States. 
Labeling 
The definition of GM Food as not substantially different from its traditional 
counterparts also has affected the labeling policy. To date the United States 
have no regulation in place that requires special mandatory labeling of food, 
which consists of, or which is made of GMOs. The absence of mandatory la-
beling provisions that are based on the production process is justified by FDA 
that it does not have the legal authority to label because these products do not 
differ from conventional products:  
“For this reason the agency does not believe that the method of development of a new 
plant variety (...) is normally material information within the meaning of 21 U.S.C. 
321(n) and would not usually be required to be disclosed in labeling for food” (FDA 
1992: 22991).  
                                                     
51  That the procedure of rulemaking is not yet finished is due to the change in government in 
2000 (see US biotech policy issues remain in limbo in Nature Biotechnology, Vol. 19, 
2001, 496). 
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Special labeling of GM Foods is only required if these are considered to have a 
significantly different nutritional property or if they include allergens that con-
sumers would not expect to be present based on the name of the food. Other-
wise, no special labeling is required since foods developed by new techniques 
are not considered to present any different or greater safety concerns than foods 
developed by traditional plant breeding. This policy has been confirmed in the 
scope of a lawsuit against FDA, which has been thrown out, arguing that  
“it is doubtful whether the FDA would even have the power under the FDCA to re-
quire labeling in a situation where sole justification for such a requirement is con-
sumer demand” (Alliance for Bio-Integrity et al. v. Shalala et al., Civil Action No. 98-
1300 CKK, D.C. Cir. 2000, 20).  
Nevertheless, even though FDA does not have legal authority to label GM 
Foods and can therefore not demand mandatory labeling, it drafted guidance 
for industry on Voluntary Labeling Indicating Whether Foods Have or Have 
Not Been Developed Using Bioengineering (FDA 2001a). This guidance facili-
tates developers of GM Food to label a food as being genetically modified 
without being misleading. However, to date, none of the developers used this 
opportunity to label their food as genetically modified. In so doing, they resist a 
well-known societal demand for labeling among great parts of the American 
Public.52 But even though no requirements for mandatory labeling of GM Food 
have been established in the United States so far, already in 1998 new guide-
lines for an organic label were set up, that would not allow food to be labeled 
‘organic’ if it was irradiated, grown in soil fertilized with sewage sludge or 
genetically engineered. These new guidelines at least have been interpreted as 
“bowing to the wishes of consumers” (Pear 1998) even though it can be ques-
tioned to what extent those really will be perceived as the answer that the pub-
lic has expected. 
3.2.3 Mobilizing Power 
Against the background of the outlined framework, its regulatory trigger can 
now be reformulated more abstractly: to which problem does this regulatory 
framework propose a solution? Instead of emphasizing an insufficient knowl-
edge base that underlies the issue GM Food, the United States defines the regu-
lation of GM Food as a normative problem in the first place. As genetic engi-
neering is conceived as an extension of traditional breeding methods, foods 
derived by genetic engineering evolve as a new variety of traditional food. The 
underlying cognitive uncertainty is thus turned into certainty by drawing on 
available, traditional scientific knowledge: already existing norms, i.e., institu-
                                                     
52  A Time magazine poll in 1999 reported that 81% of those surveyed supported the manda-
tory labeling of GM foods (Samuel 1999: 46). 
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tionalized, experience-based knowledge becomes the basis for the regulation of 
this issue.  
This is also demonstrated in the instruments and mechanisms that be-
come employed in the regulatory framework: the practices that are applied to 
traditional food also are mobilized in the regulation of GM Food. By so doing, 
also established scientific knowledge is invoked to ensure the safety of a new 
food. The safety assessment carried out within the scope of the described noti-
fication procedure therefore is based upon experiences made with traditional 
food. As a result, the underlying knowledge base does not appear as precarious 
as is the case within the German context.  
Within the US-context, the problem that has to be dealt with is the exten-
sion of these already existing norms to a new food variety. This new case has 
to be subsumed under an already existing, powerful legal framework. These 
existing norms have proven to be capable of securing food safety in the past53 
and now become employed in order to ensure the safety of a new variety of 
food. Possible difficulties could thus be presumed in the act of extending the 
existing norms to the realm of GM Food. However, given that the outlined 
regulatory scheme exists in the shadow of strong, powerful laws such as con-
sumer protection laws as well as product liability legislation, it can rather be 
expected that those involved with the manufacturing of traditional food will 
extend their already well-established routines and strategies to the realm of GM 
Food. 
Therefore, as the introduction of GM Food into the American food sup-
ply will be carried out in the ‘shadow of leviathan’, power-based strategies are 
expected to dominate the network. Against the background of a rule that not 
only provides a clear cut definition of its empirical matter but that also is 
backed by the power of deterrence based laws, less room will be provided for 
‘alternative’ interpretations, subsequent routines and challenges of the hege-
monic interpretation. 
3.3 Conclusion: Implications of the Regulations 
This chapter started with the statement that each regulation is triggered by a 
problem to which the regulation proposes a solution. The establishment of 
normative expectations regarding the safety of GM Food has been defined as 
the shared regulatory trigger of the legal frameworks in Germany and in the 
United States. In both these cases, the cognitive uncertainty that is underlying 
the issue has to be resolved, if certain, stabile behavioral expectations are to be 
                                                     
53  As a proof for the success of this regulatory scheme, often the lack of such high-profile 
food scares as BSE in the American food supply is cited. 
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established. Nevertheless, both these regulatory frameworks differ in their 
ways of dealing with the cognitive uncertainty and, thus introduce different 
‘solutions’ to the fields that they are designed to regulate. These differences 
can tentatively be traced back to the disparate definitions of the issue GM Food 
that pervade the succeeding regulation as well as the instruments provided 
thereby. 
Germany 
Within the German context, the nature of the conflict – or, more moderately, 
the problem – that has to be solved by the legal regulation of GM Food, has 
been defined as cognitive conflict. Consequently, knowledge-based problem 
solving strategies have been invoked to solve this problem. But since the rule 
does not provide a substantial definition of the issue itself, it leaves broad room 
for interpretation among those to whom it is addressed. Thus, it is left up to the 
field to fill the phrase ‘novel food’ with meaning. Despite this lack of a sub-
stantial – and thus probably guiding – definition of the issue, the regulatory 
scheme in Germany is not backed by as powerful consumer protection laws as 
the ones provided for in the United States.54 In addition, German industry does 
not fear litigation as the US industry does since the instruments for public in-
terest litigation are not as established in Germany as they are in the United 
States (see chapter 1.2.1). Therefore, the rules regulating the introduction of 
GM Food into the German network have merely to rely on their own ‘force’, 
i.e., the force that is derived from its status as official law of the state (and the 
sanctions build into it). But as the rule remains ambiguous about its very char-
acter and at the same time is likely to enter a field in which a variety of defini-
tions of the issue and, consequently, practices and routines for its handling, 
compete with each other in order to become the dominating, appropriate rou-
tine it is unlikely that this regulation has the capacity to establish the expecta-
tion that GM Food is – if not uncontested – but at least safe. 
Consequently, as the rule offers itself as only one draft of how to handle 
the issue GM Food it is likely that the rule will be accompanied – if not resisted 
or avoided – by knowledge that is generated by the constituents of the field, 
throughout their attempts to cope with the issue. Thus, it will be confronted 
with other ‘drafts’ and will have to stand the ‘test of practice’. Instead of pro-
viding an even possibly contested answer to the abstract question of the net-
work what is considered as an adequate way of dealing with the issue GM 
Food? the outlined regulatory framework asks this question in return. In doing 
so, it opens the network for a variety of answers that can be expected to com-
                                                     
54  This is not to say that German consumers are not protected by legal obligations but the 
German system of consumer protection has increasingly been criticized as still neglecting 
the aspect of precaution, for instance (Hippel 2001). 
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pete with each other, in order to become the dominant one throughout the net-
work. Thus, in the German case a conflict ridden, ‘untilled’ field is likely to 
evolve and – the legal rule itself has prepared the ground for it. 
United States 
Within the American context, a different picture was presented: the regulatory 
framework here introduced a very precise definition of what has to be under-
stood as ‘GM Food’ into the field. By referring to institutionalized and tested 
knowledge, a very precise framework for an appropriate way of dealing with 
the issue could be provided. The problem that has to be resolved in this case is 
the subsumtion of a new case under existing categories, an endeavor that in the 
given case is backed by the existence of strong laws in the background. It is 
thus likely that the (normative) expectation of food security can be established 
throughout the network – at the cost of abolishing, suppressing or neglecting 
interpretations, which are not in tune with what the rules have proposed. Thus, 
the regulatory framework in the United States can be expected to be accompa-
nied by power in the first place. In sum, the American field ‘GM Food’ can in 
contrast be expected as a tilled field wherein categories are coined, tested 
strategies are employed and less opportunities for friction are provided. 
In sum, to take up the discussion at the beginning of the present chapter, 
the particular regulatory framework prepares part of the ground of what is go-
ing to happen when it is introduced into the field it was originally designed to 
regulate. Against the background of the outlined regulatory approaches of both 
these cases, the assumption can be made that these will affect the relations 
among those to whom the rules are addressed to as well as their relations and 
the particular issue GM Food. It will therefore be one aim of the next chapter to 
analyze in what ways the respective organizations that constituted the networks 
have responded not only, or not exactly to these regulations but to what they 
have perceived as their respective legal environment and the expectations, con-
straints, pressures and chances contained therein. 
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“When you make policy that way you really run the risk 
that when it becomes a matter of public discussion  
you won’t have asked or answered the questions  
that the public has and I think that has happened.” 
(Interview #14#/USA) 
 
4 From Norm to Action: Organizational Responses 
While the previous chapter was dedicated to the description of the respective 
regulatory schemes that have been issued in order to guide the introduction of 
GM Food, the present chapter aims to fathom what has become of their ‘origi-
nal’ normative meanings throughout the processes of rereading, reobserving, 
reinterpreting, thus throughout organizational responses to these norms? 
One decisive claim of the present study is that the role of organizations in 
the regulatory process is underdeveloped or at least underestimated and that by 
focusing on organizations as social systems a more appropriate understanding 
of the regulatory process can be achieved. This argument has been developed 
against the theoretical background of modern systems theory and a new institu-
tionalist approach that focuses on organizational studies. On this theoretical 
level, several reasons could be identified for considering organizations when 
one wants to investigate what happens when a legal rule becomes implemented 
into its field that is characterized by cognitive uncertainty. These theoretical 
considerations concluded with an understanding of the regulatory process as 
the interplay of law, knowledge and power that is orchestrated by the problem, 
which has to be resolved and fulfilled by the organizations of the given net-
work. Depending on the case, the legal rule will be accompanied either by 
power or by knowledge in the first place. This interplay between law, knowl-
edge or power and the organizations will become manifest in specific regula-
tory structures, that evolve as decisive characteristics of a given interorganiza-
tional network. As each issue will develop its ‘own’ network, such structures 
will differ contingent on the problem. 
This approach is expected to contribute to the domain of comparative re-
search on regulation, especially to the question of what exactly is hidden be-
hind a so-called national style of regulation. Even though the prevailing under-
standing of national regulatory styles employs those as explanatory variable, it 
remains fairly unexplained what they are about. By focusing on organizations 
instead, these ‘black boxes’ can be unpacked, as organizations have to be un-
derstood as the central parts of the regulatory process. Thus, the ground floor 
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level of regulation becomes revealed as the various organizations’ perceptions 
of their legal environment(s) are addressed. These perceptions are likely to 
impact on the organization’s particular way of dealing with the issue GM Food, 
in that they determine what will be understood as ‘appropriate’, ‘rationale’ and 
‘sensible’ in the context of a given organization. 
Here, one has to distinguish between the normative and the cognitive 
rules, which in their total as its script, guide the organization’s operations (de-
cision-making). While the normative rules are fed by the organization’s respec-
tive function system, the cognitive rules are fed by the organization’s percep-
tion of its environment. Therefore, a given organization will make sense on the 
background of its normative orientation and then operate because of this 
knowledge, thus enact its environment. It is in this phase, that an organization 
is confronted with its environment, thus not only with norms and expectations 
but also with other organization’s knowledge, interpretations, strategies and the 
like. As discussed in chapter 2.1, organizational scripts function soundless and 
unreflected as long as they are not confronted with opposition. If organizations 
observe a deviation from their own description, this becomes scrutinized and, 
dependent upon environmental pressures, constraints and possibilities, it will 
become revised or upheld. Dependent upon the dominance of that environment, 
the organization can thus uphold its normatively derived interpretation or it is 
forced into a revision of its (decision-) premises. Therefore, as confronted with 
an environment, the question arises to what extent an organization can uphold 
its interpretation of the focal issue and the subsequent strategies against the 
challenges of what it perceives as ‘reality’. In sum, this embeddedness deter-
mines which organization(s) gain the power of definition throughout their net-
work. Against this background, the observable differences in the way of deal-
ing with GM Food in Germany and in the United States are now put in a new 
perspective.  
Firstly, given that world society is defined as being enclosed in each sin-
gle social subsystem's communication, a similarity between the German and 
the American network can be expected in that each ‘national’ GM Food-
network is likely to be constituted by the same types of organizations. At the 
surface, there will be legal, economic, scientific, political, and probably reli-
gious organizations that (at least) in the first place interpret GM Food based on 
the functional primacy of their respective social subsystem. Decisions concern-
ing the issue will follow a scheme – or a decision-program – that are guided by 
distinctions such as legal/illegal, payment/nonpayment or truthful/untruthful. 
Therefore, one can assume that the organizations’ perceptions in Germany as 
well as in the United States will be guided by these same distinctions. At this 
stage, and without any specification of the context, it cannot be claimed in a 
meaningful way what the decisive characteristics of, for instance, a specific 
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‘American truth’ would be, in contrast to a German, Italian or French truth. 
Instead, homogeneity among the organizations of the given networks is likely 
to occur.  
However, as has been claimed in chapter 2, this is not the entire ‘truth’ 
about world society, or, more specifically, about the processes by which it be-
comes established. Importantly, this perspective does not explain the observ-
able differences in the societal way of dealing with a seemingly identical issue 
such as GM Food in differing national contexts like Germany and the United 
States. These differences (or, world society’s heterogeneity) come into sight if 
one considers that each organization has not only to be described as norma-
tively closed but also as cognitively open at the same time. In so doing, it can 
be expected that its actual embeddedness into its respective environment will 
affect the organization’s perception and thus on its subsequent way of dealing 
with the issue. Further, the aforementioned binary oppositions are filled with 
meaning only throughout their application in varying organizational contexts. 
As they cannot be considered as ontologically given but moreover as depend-
ent from an observer, they also cannot be considered as existing beyond all 
contexts. Consequently, the meaning of the distinction between legal and ille-
gal cannot be taken as a constant but rather as dependent variable. By taking 
into account that the actual meaning of superficial identical terms and concepts 
depends upon the context of their application, a perspective is taken that re-
veals the hidden, fundamental differences behind these terms and concepts. 
Consequently, it will become obvious that the fundamental differences 
are not to be found between an ‘American regulatory culture’ and a ‘German 
regulatory culture’, thus between national approaches to GM Food. Instead, it 
will be argued that the decisive differences lie between the embeddedness of 
the single organizations of the various societal subsystems that not only consti-
tute the interorganizational network(s) but that also traverse countries. There-
fore, both these networks are in a very fundamental sense characterized by a 
heterogeneity that follows from a plurality of organizational perspectives on 
the focal issue.  
The present chapter therefore is dedicated to the presentation of the vari-
ous organizational responses as manifestations of the organizational scripts. By 
reconstructing and describing organizational responses, the rules are made ex-
plicit that guide the single organization’s perception of its environment and 
consequently its perception of ‘its’ network that has emerged around the focal 
issue. Finally, but most notably, also the perception of this issue is guided  by 
the script and will become explicit in the given organizational response.  
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4.1 Methodological Remarks 
When conducting comparative research on organizations, firstly the basis of 
the comparison has to be clearly defined. The guiding question of the present 
comparison is to what extent have the organizations under the effect of their 
respective legal environments revised their normative assumptions regarding 
the nature of the issue GM Food and, consequently, adjusted their decisions 
according to these revisions? As the legal environments in Germany and in the 
United States are likely to be perceived differently by the various organizations 
of the network, different regulatory structures are expected to unfold at the 
respective network’s surface. 
Consequently, not only the ‘naked’ legal regulations (that is, law on the 
books) but also rather the legal environments (that is, law in action) are con-
ceived of as one part of the explanation for the observable differences whereas 
the organizations to whom the regulations were addressed to must be under-
stood as their ‘complement’. They mobilize the regulation and, in so doing, not 
only shape the law but also the actual meaning of the focal issue.  
As the present study considers organizations as the central parts of the 
regulatory process it has to be understood as a comparison not of two countries 
but of interorganizational networks within two countries. That this does make a 
difference has already been elaborated in chapter 1, where the claim was made 
that observable differences in the regulatory approaches of various countries 
can be traced back to the involved organizations, their composition and their 
interplay. It has further been argued that each issue will develop its own inter-
organizational network, thus creating its very own legal environment wherein 
not only the respective laws but also societal expectations, norms, and demands 
are inscribed. 
Since these networks are thus regarded as the units of analysis, they have 
to be defined with regard to their constituents as well as to their boundaries. 
Like organizational fields, interorganizational networks are not just “investiga-
tors’ aggregative constructs but are meaningful to participants“ (DiMaggio 
1991: 268). Thus, their boundaries cannot exactly be defined a priori but firstly 
and foremost are to be found within the descriptions of the particular organiza-
tions that form a network. Nevertheless, as each organization constructs its 
own environment, one can assume that the organizations’ descriptions of a 
given network and its boundaries will differ. Moreover, the boundaries will 
remain somewhat blurred, at least until one has examined the organizations 
involved. Even then can an interorganizational network not be considered as a 
fully definable entity; it rather has to be understood as fluent and marked by 
constant appearances as well as disappearances of particular organizations. In 
this context, one has to draw the conclusion that a given network such as the 
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one that emerges around the issue GM Food cannot be completely described, at 
least not concretely. However, in defining it in a more abstract manner, un-
varying units can be defined that set the foundation for the comparison, i.e., in 
statistical terms, the independent variable. Within the given context of an inter-
organizational network, the constituting organizations can be considered as the 
independent variable(s), i.e., a group of unvarying units. This does not refer to 
particular organizations but to types of organizations that are likely to consti-
tute a network that emerges around a certain issue. Before the network ‘GM 
Food’ in the both given countries will be portrayed in detail, the way the data 
have been collected is addressed. 
Data Retrieval 
The research interest of the present study focuses on the interplay between the 
legal regulations and its original addressees, the organizations that emerge 
around GM Food. The assumption that guides research is, that this interplay 
will depend upon the nature of the regulatory framework as well as upon the 
organization’s perception of the issue GM Food. Although an organization’s 
perception of its environment is expressed also in its publications1, for purpose 
of this study interviews with representatives of the particular organizations 
have been chosen as empirical database. Even though interviews are a common 
instrument of data generation within organization studies (e.g. Hiller 2001; 
Tacke 2001), also a systematic reason can be derived from the theoretical 
considerations on organizations as they have been outlined in chapter 2. 
In the scope of that chapter, organizations have been defined as social 
systems that emerge within function systems by increasing differentiation. The 
underlying principle of the formation of an organization is membership, i.e., 
each organization provides a formal procedure by which its members are cho-
sen. By so doing, they regulate their boundaries by membership. However, by 
defining roles of membership, organizations also formulate behavioral expecta-
tions within the organization. A person who takes over a role within a formal 
organization subscribes to the expectations attributed to this role and thus has 
to fulfill them. Otherwise the membership becomes invalid since a continuing 
non-recognition or a non-fulfillment of these expectations is incompatible with 
the continuation of a membership (Luhmann 1995: 38).  
These theoretical implications of the concept of membership make it 
plausible to conduct interviews as a method of data generation in organization 
studies. Persons that hold a membership role within an organization now have 
to be considered as representatives of ‘their’ particular organization. Addition-
                                                     
1  These comprise press releases as well as all sorts of documents which are developed, proc-
essed, and circulated inside an organization like protocols, file records, and the like. 
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ally, they function as addresses within an organization. In fulfilling their role of 
membership, they have to a certain extent taken over the organization’s view – 
of the organization itself as well as of its environment. Against this back-
ground, the conclusion can be drawn that the protocol of an interview with an 
organization’s representative contains the organization’s perception of its envi-
ronment in a condensed manner. Such a protocol can then serve as the basis for 
the empirical analysis. 
The empirical database of the present study consists of 38 semi-
structured interviews that have been carried out with representatives of the 
relevant organizations in Germany and in the United States.2 These organiza-
tions have been identified by observing the public debate3 over a period of one 
year (1999), with high profile organizations in the debate having been consid-
ered relevant. The interviewees then have been chosen by a snowball-system in 
which course the representatives of the particular organizations have been in-
terviewed and been asked for further organizations that are considered as rele-
vant in their point of view. By this procedure, a comprehensive sample of or-
ganizations was gained. This procedure was applied in both countries. 
By observing the public debate also a deeper insight into the field was 
provided that was helpful for the design of the questionnaire. The questionnaire 
thus has been developed against the background of theoretical considerations 
but has also considered public debate. Except for some marginality, the ques-
tionnaires applied in Germany and in the United States were almost identical. 
They contained questions concerning the organization’s perception of the issue 
GM Food, the perception of the legal regulation as well as the perception of the 
network itself.4 
Composition of the Sample 
As mentioned before, the interviewees were chosen from a variety of organiza-
tions that form the network within both countries. Moreover, since an interor-
ganizational network is not an isolated entity that can be fully described, the 
samples do not claim completeness but can be regarded as representing the 
relevant types of the networks’ organizations.  
The German sample comprises a total of 21 interviews, the US sample a 
total of 17 interviews that are distributed among the several groups as follows. 
In Germany, three interviews have been carried out with representatives of 
regulatory agencies whereas in the United States one interview has been car-
ried out with a representative of a regulatory agency and two interviews with 
                                                     
2  All interviews lasted approximately one hour. They were recorded on tape and fully tran-
scribed. For an overview see Appendix Section A. 
3  This comprises the observation of the print media as well as e-mail lists. 
4  For the questionnaires see Appendix Section B. 
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state representatives. Within the field of industry, this has been subdivided in 
crop producers, food processors and food retailers. In addition, whereas in the 
US five interviews have been conducted with representatives of this group, in 
Germany eleven representatives of this group have been interviewed. Turning 
to consumer groups, four interviews in the US have been conducted, compared 
to two interviews in Germany. A total of five interviews have been carried out 
with representatives of critical groups, three interviews in the US and two in-
terviews in Germany. In both these countries one interview representing scien-
tific expertise could be conducted. In order to avoid any misunderstandings it 
also has to be mentioned that not all these interviews have been analyzed in the 
strict sense of the word but rather functioned as background information.  
Further, this oversight in its total reveals some variation within the sam-
ple that is due to several factors. 
Variation within the Sample 
The variation within the sample that became evident in the detailed overview 
can be explained by the following factors. 
First of all the preconditions for the data generation differed in both 
countries. While the German sample was generated over a period of nine 
months, all 17 interviews in the United States were conducted during a re-
search stay in October and November 2000. Due to this tight timeframe some 
potential interviewees had to be canceled, thus explaining part of the imbalance 
between the samples. Additionally, also the current situation during the period 
of the data generation has to be taken into account. Since the introduction of 
GM Food is a sensitive issue for most of the groups involved, some potential 
interviewees refused the request for an interview. Such a declining attitude was 
not limited to a particular group but could be observed throughout all groups 
even though the particular reasons for the refusal differed among the groups. 
For instance, in the German case one representative of a prominent, worldwide 
food processor refused the request for an interview because the organization 
considered the issue GM Food no longer an interesting field for industry due to 
the lack of consumer acceptance. Even though they did not fully reject, a very 
vocal critical group in Germany was quite skeptical about an interview as they 
considered the researcher a part of the network and thus as a potential adver-
sary. In the United States in contrast, neither the critical groups nor industry 
played ‘hard to get’ but were rather approaching. Here, the competent authori-
ties turned out to be quite skeptical about interviews and one interview was 
refused as the organization did not feel responsible for the issue GM Food, 
even though it was involved in GM Crops. 
However, apart from these ‘logistic’ problems, the variation also is due to 
peculiarities of each of the fields. For instance, the prevalence of consumer 
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organizations within the US sample bears witness to the fact that consumer 
groups have been more vocal in the American debate than in the German de-
bate. Further, there are no state representatives to be found within the German 
sample which is due to a lesser party political engagement in the German GM 
Food network. And even though these differences that to a certain extent are 
due to political traditions do not fully explain the differences within the regula-
tory approaches, but have rather to be considered as the outcome of the dynam-
ics unfolding in the both networks. Therefore, the revealed variation within the 
samples does not render them as incomparable but gives a first impression of 
the differences between the both networks. 
Data Interpretation 
The protocols of the interviews have been interpreted by means of a hermeneu-
tic method.5 An interview with a representative of an organization provides at 
least two different ways of reading it, firstly as an interview with a representa-
tive of an organization or, secondly, as an interview with a representative of a 
given organization. While in the first case the role of the representative is the 
object of research, the latter case focuses on the organization and its views. In 
this case, the representative functions as the organization’s mouthpiece (see 
above). The analysis of the interview therefore does not focus on personal mo-
tivations and the like but upon the organization’s view.  
As each interpretation of empirical data is guided by theoretical assump-
tions those have to be made explicit in order to point out in how far these as-
sumptions converge with the theoretical background of the study. In the given 
case, the linkage between the theoretical assumptions and the empirical re-
search design has to be taken even more serious since large parts of the theo-
retical assumptions draw on modern systems theory. Within the context of sys-
tems theory no unique method has been developed, which has frequently led to 
the conclusion that modern systems theory and empirical research exclude each 
                                                     
5  There has been (and still is!) considerable debate about the question if this method can also 
be applied in the analysis of interviews as it has originally been developed to analyze non-
standardized data (e.g. Oevermann 2000: 67). Two reasons can be offered that may ques-
tion these doubts. Firstly, the generation of non-standardized data may be impossible for 
reasons that are to be found within the object of research, so that the researcher is forced to 
generate standardized data such as interviews (e.g. Reichertz 1996). Secondly, the so-called 
case structure [Fallstruktur] is to be found in the structure of the interaction between the in-
terview and the interviewee as well as in the report of passed actions (e.g. Schneider 1988). 
If interaction is defined as a social system that emerges through a face-to-face communica-
tion, thus invoking the distinction between presence and absence as the constitutive differ-
ence (e.g. Luhmann 1975), no obvious reason can be given to distinguish between an ‘arti-
ficial’ and a ‘natural’ interaction. As with non-standardized data, the opening of the interac-
tion remains the important starting point of the analysis, the point from which the case 
structure can be reconstructed.  
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other. This conclusion has not only been disproved by a growing number of 
empirical studies, but can also be rejected on theoretical grounds, as will be 
outlined in the following.  
A common assumption of modern systems theory and the sociological 
new institutionalism, both of which have been (in parts) applied as the theoreti-
cal background is that ‘meaning’ is generated unintentionally. Meaning is 
something that evolves beyond the single organization even though each single 
organization partakes in this process of generating meaning. Insofar ‘meaning’ 
can be described as objective as it does not refer to the subjective meaning of a 
single actor (organization). Moreover, it is this understanding of ‘meaning’ that 
is shared by the method objective hermeneutics.6 Both, the talk about objective 
meaning as well as objective hermeneutics roots in the assumption that the 
rules by which ‘meaning’ is generated have to be conceived of as “emergent 
structures of the social system” (e.g. Schneider 1995: 141).that cannot be re-
duced to individual structures of the mind. In the context of this method, it is 
therefore not referred to a speaker’s intentions [Sinnintentionen] but to socially 
generalized expectations. 
As the research interest of the present study focuses on the reconstruction 
of the organizations’ perception of the issue GM Food as well as of its legal 
regulation, this method appears to deliver appropriate findings, i.e., an ade-
quate understanding for the observable differences in the regulatory interplay 
surrounding GM Food in Germany and in the United States. Analyzing the 
protocols by means of hermeneutics opens up the opportunity to reconstruct the 
organizational rules of interpretation of the given issue and its legal rules. 
4.2 Organizational Responses 
Although national boundaries no longer can be described as constitutive for 
society, they pervade (world) society with lines of demarcation. Beyond these 
lines, processes of internal differentiation can be observed that become mani-
fest not only in the actual design of the legal norms (see chapter 3) but also in 
the organizational responses to these norms. This is not to say that the re-
sponses differ simply because the respective regulations differ – which would 
not only be a circular argument but would also insinuate a legalistic under-
standing of the regulatory process. If one takes into account that the relation 
between organizations and law has to be understood as complex as described in 
chapter 2.2, one has to assume that organizations answer to their respective 
legal environment that includes “laws, public policy, societal norms and the 
                                                     
6  This is not to say that objective hermeneutics is the only method. There have been several 
propositions to consider the ethnomethodological conversation analysis as a further appro-
priate or useful method for systems theory (e.g. Schneider 1996). 
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culture surrounding the law” (Edelman 1992: 1536, n. 31). Therefore, in re-
sponding to the legal environment, organizations will respond to a variety of 
(perceived) expectations and norms that in their total (and only in their total!) 
make a difference between the United States and Germany. Thus, although at 
first sight the focal issue GM Food pretends to be identical in both networks, 
its fundamental diverseness will become revealed throughout the interplay of 
given legal environments and the organizations’ responses to them, hence the 
regulatory process itself.  
Turning to the constituents of both networks, at first sight quite a similar 
picture is presented. Both, the interorganizational network in the United States 
as well as the network in Germany are for reasons mentioned at the outset of 
the present chapter constituted by the same types of organizations such as the 
single links of the GM Food supply chain, crop developers, food processors, 
food retailers and their associations. In the United States as well as in Germany 
representatives of the so-called ‘agribusiness’7 like Monsanto, Novartis8 and 
Aventis can with regard to GM Food not only be observed as the major devel-
opers of the gene constructs that genetically modified products are based upon 
but also as the major suppliers for the food processing industry. Companies 
such as Unilever/Bestfoods9, Nestlé and Kraft here take an outstanding position 
as they have gathered the majority of the world’s most popular food brands and 
have thus to be considered as decisive constituents of the GM Food network in 
both countries.  
As with the variety of economy branches also a variety of associations 
could be identified, that represents these branches in the policy process. Thus, 
they often try to influence the process of lawmaking, if necessary by mobiliz-
ing the public, for instance. Consequently, they are considered as participating 
“simultaneously in the world of politics and in their specialized fields within 
society“ (Teubner 1993: 557). These industry associations can thus be de-
scribed as situated at the intersection of economy and politics, where they ad-
vocate the economy’s need for collectively binding decisions to the political 
system and also function as the economy’s addressee for the political system. 
In the given GM Food network in Germany one of the most vocal associations 
has been the German Bund für Lebensmittelrecht und Lebensmittelkunde e.V. 
[BLL/German Federation of Food Law and Food Science], a so-called um-
                                                     
7  For purpose of clarity, the term ‘agribusiness’ is applied to the pharmaceutical-chemical-
agricultural corporations. Even though these corporations often are referred to as Life Sci-
ence Industry, this term does not appear appropriate any longer as in recent years several 
corporations have retreated from this ‘model’. 
8  In 2000 the Novartis Crop Protection and Seeds sectors and AstraZeneca’s agrochemicals 
business merged into Syngenta. 
9  In fall 2000 the separate companies Unilever and Bestfoods merged into one company, 
Unilever/Bestfoods. 
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brella organization that covers three types of members, associations such as the 
Verband Deutscher Oelmühlen e.V. [VDOe/Association of German Oil Mills], 
high-profile, global companies such as Unilever, Bestfoods and Nestlé, and also 
self-employed individuals. In the United States its corresponding complement 
is the Grocery Manufacturers of America (GMA), a trade association that also 
hosts the American settlements of the mentioned food companies and numer-
ous other, national as well as international companies such as Kraft or Gerber 
Food. Another group of the networks’ constituents are the food retailers, which 
have been more vocal in the German than in the American network, partly be-
cause they have been confronted with public unease about GM products di-
rectly as there have been products on the market that were labeled as contain-
ing genetically modified ingredients. The food retailing industry in Germany is 
represented by several associations, two of which were the former Bundesver-
band der Filialbetriebe und Selbstbedienungs-Warenhäuser e.V. [BFS]10 and 
the Bundesverband des Deutschen Lebensmitteleinzelhandels [BVL/National 
Association of German Grocers]. The developers of GM Crops, such as the 
already mentioned Life Science Industry, in Germany are represented by the 
Deutsche Industrievereinigung Biotechnologie [DIB/German Association of 
Biotechnology Industries] and in the United States by the Biotechnology Indus-
try Organization (BIO). Although those organizations have to be considered as 
the original addressees of the above outlined legal norms, they must not be 
misconceived as living in splendid isolation from their environments. In fact, 
they ‘coexist’ with consumer associations, environmental groups, scientific 
organizations and regulatory agencies, which all are differently related with the 
issue GM Food and thus constitute the given network as well. 
As consumer associations are located at the intersection between the po-
litical system and the consumer as part of the economic system, they under-
stand themselves as the mouthpiece for a societal group that, due to its hetero-
geneity, is difficult to organize. In order to represent their interests to the po-
litical system and – at the same time – function as addressees for the political 
system, consumer associations have taken over an advocative mode of repre-
sentation. Regardless the issue, these associations’ aim at consumer well-being 
[Wohl des Verbrauchers]. Beside topics such as financial services, health and 
safety care, also the field of food and agriculture are of vital importance to con-
sumer associations. Thus, consumer associations have to be considered as es-
sential parts in both, the American and the German network. In the United 
States the Consumer Federation of America (CFA), the Consumer’s Choice 
Council (CCC) and Consumer’s Union (CU) have to be mentioned. The con-
sumer group working on the topic GM Food in Germany has been the Arbeits-
                                                     
10  The BFS has merged in the Hauptverband des Deutschen Einzelhandels [HDE]. 
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gemeinschaft der Verbraucherverbände e.V. [AgV/Working group of con-
sumer associations]11. 
Environmental associations see their function as nature’s advocates, or as 
nature’s lobby. Thus, they can be described as communicating nature’s rights 
to the political system while they not necessarily serve as nature’s addressees 
in the view of the political system. If and to what extent they are perceived as 
such, depends upon the ‘willingness’ of the political system (e.g. Brodocz 
1996). As with genetic engineering in plants, a variety of environmental asso-
ciations have centered around the issue GM Food, such as the National Envi-
ronmental Trust (NET), Friends of the Earth (FoE), Greenpeace (US) as well 
as its German counterparts Greenpeace Germany, and the Bund für Umwelt 
und Naturschutz (BUND), which is the German section of FoE.  
Although scientific associations are situated between politics and science, 
they represent a special case as they do not advocate science’s interests to the 
political system. These so-called ‘counter experts’ rather observe science and 
ask critical questions, while the experts ‘practice’ science and answer the ques-
tions (Daele 1996). Consequently, an inside/outside-distinction is drawn, dis-
tinguishing the established scientific community and the scientific ‘underdogs’. 
Conflicts over technologies such as GM Food are characterized not only by a 
focus on the criteria for an adequate risk-assessment but also by a focus on the 
‘scientific facts’ that might serve as the basis for the assessment.12 Conse-
quently, experts as well as counter experts were likely to become constituents 
of the GM Food network. In the United States the Union of Concerned Scien-
tists (UCS) can exemplarily be mentioned as an organization that has con-
stantly questioning the ‘established’ scientific positions on the technology. In 
that, it can be compared to Öko-Institut [Institute for Applied Ecology] that has 
taken this position in the German debate. 
Finally, another group of organizations has to be mentioned as constitut-
ing part of the networks that can be labeled as public interest groups. Those 
groups have also been described as part of a “left-labor movement” (Reisner 
2001) that formerly included socialists, unions and communists. The critique of 
genetic engineering of the more recent groups such as the Public Interest Re-
search Group (PIRG) in the United States falls into line with traditional left-
labor concerns, that is “vertical control and monopoly capital issues” (ibid.: 
1397). Although they also mention health and environmental issues, the Ger-
man Gen-ethisches Netzwerk [GeN/Genetic Engineering Network] and the 
                                                     
11  In 2001, the AgV has merged with the newly founded Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband 
e.V. [VZBV/Federation of German Consumer Organisations], which is now the parent or-
ganization of 35 German consumer associations.  
12  This has also been described as a “politicization of the cognitive” [Politisierung des Kogni-
tiven”] (Daele 1996: 299).  
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Verbraucher Initiative [VI/Consumers’ Initiative], which describes itself as the 
association for critical consumers, can be subsumed under that label. 
A last group of organizations that can be considered as a crucial part in 
the both networks are the regulatory agencies that have been authorized by the 
given legal regulations. As already insinuated in chapter 2.1, public administra-
tions are – as are organizations – situated at the intersection between at least 
law and politics (Bora 2001a). Although those agencies have been introduced 
already in chapter 3.1.2, they may shortly be mentioned for purpose of com-
pleteness. In the United States the responsible agency for overseeing food 
safety is the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), an independent agency13, 
that can be compared in its function with the German Bundesinstitut für ge-
sundheitlichen Verbraucherschutz und Veterinärmedizin [BgVV/Federal Insti-
tute for Health Protection of Consumers and Veterinary Medicine] and the 
Robert Koch Institute (RKI) both of which function as the assessment bodies 
for the safety evaluation of novel food in Germany.  
Given presumably varying legal environments, the question is raised to 
what extent the original addressees have put the outlined legal norms into ac-
tion or, in contrast, to what extent they themselves have been put into action 
under the effect of their respective (legal) environment. As organizations have 
been described as normatively closed one can firstly assume that the addressees 
as economic organizations in the first place will perceive the issue in accor-
dance with their binary opposition payment/non-payment as a good that has to 
be sold. In order to cope with GM Food as an unfamiliar issue, the organiza-
tions are expected to reason on a variety of in their contexts familiar analogies, 
thus linking the unknown with the known, i.e., making sense of the issue upon 
their past wisdom. Moreover, as sensemaking also depends upon the organiza-
tions’ normative orientations, a certain homogeneity among the economic or-
ganizations can be expected, irrespective their national background.  
However, since organizations have also been described as cognitively 
open, their normative orientation only tells one part of the story. As outlined in 
chapter 2, this normative closure only counts with regard to an organization’s 
goal-oriented program [Zweckprogramm] whereas the organization with regard 
to its conditional program [Konditionalprogramm] has to be understood as 
cognitively open. While economic organizations all aim at refinancing them-
selves by selling goods (Luhmann 1988b), the conditional program of the sin-
gle organization determines how this aim can be achieved. Thus, it is the condi-
tional program that in the given perspective will determine what accounts as 
cost or as benefit, as a good or as market. Consequently, external information 
                                                     
13  ‘Independent’ in this context means that the agency is not responsible to one department. 
Even so, the head of FDA is appointed by the President of the United States. 
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will be seen as relevant, if the organization perceives this whether as useful and 
enabling or as hindrance and constraint for the achievement of its goal. 
Given that these organizations are embedded in differing environments, 
one has to assume that these environments will affect the organizations’ deci-
sion making in that their normative rules (decision premises) will be confirmed 
or questioned under the effect of the organization’s perceptions. Further, in 
confrontation with an environment that is perceived whether as enabling or at 
least confirming the organizations’ normative rules or as constraining and 
questioning those rules, the organizations in order to achieve their goal will 
tend to revise or cling to them – dependent upon the perception of the envi-
ronments’ dominance. Thus, the ultimate meaning of an economically sensible 
decision in the given field of GM Food will be designed throughout an organi-
zation’s maneuvering in the network and the support or opposition it comes to 
face therein. 
In order to make these enactment processes visible, firstly the normative 
rules of the respective organizations and the outcome regarding the ‘meaning’ 
of GM Food will be introduced. This description is followed by an outline of 
the cognitive rules that is the perception of the legal environment. Finally, 
these responses are reconsidered with respect to the extent to that the organiza-
tion’s cognitive rules have followed the normative rules or vice versa. Depend-
ent upon which orientation has dominated the organizations’ decision making 
processes, one can say that the single organizations have expected either cogni-
tively or normatively, thus leading to different coping strategies within their 
respective network. 
Although organizations have been described as located in between, they 
are normatively closed in that they align their decisions with the distinction of 
‘their’ functional primacy. The original addressees of the outlined legal norms 
have thus to be described as economic organizations in the first place in that 
they all – whether in Germany or in the United States – have transformed their 
function system’s binary opposition payment/nonpayment into a specific deci-
sion program. Thus, as economic organizations reproduce themselves by pay-
ments their foregoing knowledge has to be described as a knowledge about 
economic coherences, i.e., knowledge as to the question of which decisions in 
the past have led to the desired outcome, given that these decisions had turned 
out to be economically wise? 
Consequently, GM Food at the very outset has been observed as an eco-
nomic event and thus been described in economic terms. But as the single links 
of the GM Food supply chain follow different decision programs (which goods 
are sold to whom?) they have ascribed different meanings to the issue. 
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4.2.1 Agribusiness 
Germany 
By referring to their foregoing knowledge, agribusiness organizations in Ger-
many have conceived of GM Food as a product. In so doing, they remained in 
accordance with the binary code of their function system since a ‘product’ in 
an economic context must be understood as an item that has been manufactured 
for the purpose of being sold, thus to serve the organization’s goal: „wir sind 
Industrie, wir sind angetreten mit der Zielsetzung mit den Produkten Profite zu 
machen.“ More specifically, and with regard to the given network, this means 
that the organizations „machen Freisetzungen um ein Produkt zugelassen zu 
bekommen, um es letztendlich dann auch für die Verwendung in der Futtermit-
tel- und Nahrungsmittelkette einzusetzen.“ Thus, agribusiness organizations 
have conceived GM Food as part of a broader network that is the field of agri-
cultural biotechnology. Under this assumption, GM Food was seen as one part 
of the field beside other parts such as seed and animal feed. Therefore these 
organizations understood GM Food as an issue that they were not bothered by 
directly, since they described themselves as being in the business of rather sup-
plying (genetically modified) commodities to large food processors than devel-
oping GM Food themselves: „weil X per se hat bis heute ja mit Lebensmitteln 
nichts zu tun, sondern ist Vorlieferant der Lebensmittelindustrie“. Conse-
quently, it is rather the market for agricultural products that these organizations 
had in mind than the food market. 
As developers of agricultural products, agribusiness organizations have 
embraced genetic engineering as a more efficient extension of traditional bree-
ding methods „ich habe eine sehr elegante, sehr effiziente Methode mit der 
Gentechnik an der Hand, das Genom zu analysieren und meine Züchtungskan-
didaten in sehr frühen Entwicklungsstadien zu selektieren. Ich spare nicht nur 
Zeit dadurch, sondern der Züchtungsprozeß an sich wird sehr viel effizienter“. 
Thus, the technology perfectly seemed to fit with the overall goal of an eco-
nomic organization that is to achieve a maximum of benefit by a minimum of 
costs. Further, in so linking the new technology of genetic engineering with 
established breeding methods, also a reliable scientific knowledge base became 
invoked as breeding was referred to as a well known practice. 
As a result, GM Food in that perspective did not appear as ridden with 
cognitive uncertainty but rather as carried by a certain (secure) technology that 
lets GM Products evolve as an economic chance rather than a health risk in the 
first place. 
United States 
Turning to the United States, a very similar picture is presented. As with the 
German case, the developers of gene constructs have referred to genetic engi-
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neering as an extension of traditional breeding: “it’s the introduction of DNA 
and we’ve done that forever”. Thus, a proven record of scientific experience 
became invoked. In so subsuming the technology under an already existing 
category, existing scientific knowledge was invoked as the exclusive basis for 
organizational decision-making. 
Although these organizations admitted that there might be open questions 
regarding the technology, this uncertainty was communicated in terms of 
chances: “The things we don’t know about biotechnology and the possibilities 
for its long-term advantages for the population are probably only in the imagi-
nation of some really good young scientists.” Instead of ‘dissolving’ the under-
lying uncertainty of the issue towards a description in terms of risk, the ob-
served uncertainty rather was reflected as a yet unknown advantage inherent in 
this technology’s products.  
In sum, these organizations have conceived of GM Food as products that 
not only are safe but that even bear great potentials. Consequently, possible 
risks were considered as negligible in the context of these observations. 
Given these assumptions, the question is raised if, under the effect of 
their respective legal environments, the organizations have either clung to these 
assumptions or rather revised them. 
Germany  
In coming to face their legal environment, the organizations in Germany ob-
served themselves as confronted with a legal norm that was phrased in too 
broad a language: „was ich im Moment sehe, (...) ist, daß die Richtlinien so 
vage sind, daß die Durchführungsverordnungen wirklich ein Auslegungsprob-
lem haben.“ Consequently, they observed their own conception of GM Food 
and in that their understanding of its adequate handling as neither clearly con-
firmed nor clearly rejected. The organizations rather perceived themselves in 
an uncertain situation: „Für uns ist es im Prinzip ein Sachverhalt, der die In-
dustrie im Unklaren läßt. Ein solcher Sachverhalt ist genauso schlecht wie ein 
Sachverhalt der Gentechnik völlig ablehnen würde, weil sie gibt Ihnen keine 
Planungssicherheit.“ Nevertheless, as outlined above, planning reliability is a 
sine qua non for each organization in order to uphold their operations and re-
produce itself. It is thus not surprising that the organizations claimed for a 
probably more rigorous but at the same time less ambiguous regulation: 
„deswegen ist für die Industrie vielleicht eine schärfere, klare Verordnung 
eher akzeptabel, als eine schwammige, nicht durchführbare.“ In that perspec-
tive a less ambiguous norm was expected to deliver at least a clear rejection or 
a clear allowance of GM Food. Both these options could then function as the 
basis for further planning. 
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The reason for the law’s ambiguity was detected in its inadequacy given 
the organization’s understanding of the issue and its problems. In fact, they 
perceived the rules as designed ‘in theory’: „das Ganze ist so weit gespannt 
und mitunter so weit weg von der Praxis, daß die Praxis, die Vorfälle in der 
Praxis, die müssen nachher immer wieder lehren, was überhaupt machbar ist.“ 
In that perception, this lack of practical orientation naturally has to result in 
difficulties: „es gibt ja nichts Schlimmeres als ein Gesetz, das am grünen Tisch 
gemacht wird und nicht praktikabel ist, das führt ja immer zu Problemen.“ 
Consequently, while trying to market GM Food, these organizations 
came to face several difficulties. Firstly, they perceived that not even the regu-
latory agencies could cope with applications filed under the NFR: „(w)eil die 
sogenannten Competent Bodies, die in den Mitgliedstaaten zuständig sind für 
Novel Food nicht wissen, wie sie mit so’m Antrag umgehen sollen.“ This inca-
pability has resulted in a situation, where, although applications had been filed, 
none of those had undergone a full application procedure: “und es gibt einige 
Firmen, unter anderem auch wir, die schon mal ‘nen vollen Antrag gestellt 
haben, aber noch niemand hat diesen Prozeß bisher bis zu Ende geschafft“.  
Secondly, they observed that this uncertainty in the administrative branch 
has rather sharpened public opposition than pacified it: „und diese Tatsache ist 
natürlich für den besorgten Bürger, der in der Hoffnung darangegangen ist, 
tatsächlich mit der Kennzeichnung nun unterscheiden zu können, GVO/nicht 
GVO, ist so nicht erfüllt worden.“ 
Given these observations, the organizations have not observed them-
selves as walking on solid legal ground nor as being backed by governmental 
power. Although they could not see a prohibition of GM Food, they could also 
not perceive that the introduction of GM Food accordant to their understand-
ing, would be in tune with legal obligations as those were perceived as too am-
biguous.  
This uncertainty was even emphasized as the organizations were confron-
ted with protests against their products: „(e)rst als die Produkte unterwegs 
waren und man realisierte: Moment mal, es regt sich dort erheblicher Wider-
stand von Seiten bestimmter Gruppen aber auch aus der breiten Öffentlichkeit, 
hier müssen wir Rede und Antwort stehen, das heißt hier müssen wir tatsäch-
lich Informationen weitergeben und die auch vermitteln um Akzeptanz zu 
schaffen.“ And in observing themselves in a rather weak and insecure position 
these organizations could not help but admit that other, more critical organiza-
tions had taken the role of opinion leaders in the network: „in Deutschland (...) 
spielen sie [Greenpeace, AE] glaub ich die erste Geige.” 
In being thus confronted with an apparently not illegitimate resistance 
against their ‘products’, the organizations were forced to question two of their 
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decision premises, the first of which was that their clientele exclusively con-
sists in farmers and commercial buyers. Apparently, not only commercial con-
sumers and farmers but also private consumers had perceived themselves as 
affected by the marketing of genetically modified agricultural products. All of 
a sudden, the organizations thus saw themselves in a position they had, in the 
light of their experiences gained so far, not been expected as they were „ge-
zwungen, nicht nur mit unseren eigentlichen Kunden, den Landwirten, zu spre-
chen, zu kommunizieren, ihnen die Vorteile darzulegen, ihnen die Technologie 
darzulegen, sondern wir sind natürlich auch gezwungen uns mit dem Konsu-
menten der Produkte auseinanderzusetzen, das heißt letztendlich der gentech-
nisch veränderten Lebensmittel und daher hat XY eine Kommunikationsabtei-
lung, die sich ausschließlich mit diesem Thema beschäftigt, das heißt Akzep-
tanzschaffung wenn Sie so wollen im Bereich grüne Gentechnik.“ Obviously, 
they had to revise their self-description as only addressing the market for agri-
cultural products, and thus a limited circle. In fact, they found themselves as 
being addressed as a stakeholder in the food market. 
The second premise was that genetically modified products are equiva-
lent with traditional products. Nevertheless, in being confronted with an am-
biguous legal definition of the issue and public unease towards genetically 
modified products the organizations at least concluded that these products had 
to be conceived of as differing from traditional products. Obviously their up to 
that point in time unquestioned practice of marketing agricultural products no 
longer seemed to ‘fit’ these new products. Being positive about these products 
while at the same time being faced with resistance against them, the organiza-
tions concluded that these difficulties had to be traced back to a malpractice in 
the way of dealing with GM Food: „der Nutzen für die Umwelt ist da (...), aber 
es ist nicht gelungen in Europa diesen Aspekt ‘Umwelt’ dem Konsumenten zu 
vermitteln.“ Since the products’ benefits could not get across to the potential 
buying public, obviously an interpretation of GM Food had become dominant 
that rather emphasized the unsolved questions and thus the potential hazards.  
The consequences of this situation in view of these organizations became 
manifest in the refusal of GM Products by the potential buyership: „deswegen 
werden Produkte der ersten Generation auch strikt abgelehnt beziehungsweise 
das lernen wir aus dem Verhalten der Nahrungsmittelindustrie und wahr-
scheinlich des Handels, die uns lehren, daß sie solche Produkte nicht absetzen 
können, also werden sie auch nicht produziert.“ As these organizations had 
concluded that in the case of GM Food they would have to take into account 
the food market as relevant for the achievement of their goals, a threat for food 
industry now became observed as a threat for agribusiness as well.  
Since government for instance has not provided guidance for this diffi-
cult situation, the organizations consequently saw themselves forced to look for 
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orientation in their more dominant environment. As they found themselves as 
dependent upon the food processing industry, agribusiness revised part of their 
basic assumptions concerning an appropriate way of dealing with GM Food in 
accordance with what they had perceived as the food industry’s handling: 
„Zwischenzeitlich, so nehmen wir das wahr, ist die Lebensmittelindustrie den 
Argumenten der Kennzeichnungsforderern durchaus offen (...). Sie sagen, sie 
sehen die Notwendigkeit, man muß kennzeichnen und auch XY kann jetzt offen 
sagen: (...) wenn das die einzige Möglichkeit ist ein Produkt auf den Markt zu 
bringen, okay dann werden wir auch für die Kennzeichnung eintreten.” 
Further, the organizations decoupled their more active from their less ac-
tive parts by establishing public relations departments for instance, that deal 
exclusively with agricultural biotechnology. This strategy seemed to provide a 
solution for the quandary the organizations have found themselves in since as 
an economic organization they had to adhere to the basic assumption that GM 
Products are essential for their survival: „also ein Produkt X von dem wir im 
Prinzip leben, würden wir nicht aufgeben, zumal wir denk‘ ich ganz gute Ar-
gumente dafür haben, daß das Produkt verglichen mit anderen Produkten ein 
ganz gutes Profil abgibt“. However, in being confronted with a situation 
wherein the absence of clearly normative protected definitions, rules and 
guidelines has resulted in a hostile climate for GM Food, they rather observed 
their essential goal endangered and thus came to question their original condi-
tional program. Decoupling therefore has paved the way for clinging to their 
normative calculus and at the same time adjusting to societal demands for a 
debate over these products that does not merely focus on scientific facts: „Wir 
[waren, AE] seinerzeit der festen Überzeugung, daß das Problem grüne Gen-
technik und die mangelnde Akzeptanz ... das der nur zu begegnen ist mit einer 
ich nenn’s mal emotionslosen, durch wissenschaftliche Daten und Fakten ge-
tragenen Diskussion. Und das hat uns natürlich inbesondere die Bevölkerung 
mehr als übel genommen.“ 
United States 
When the American organizations came to face their respective legal environ-
ment in introducing GM Products to the market, their impression was most 
different than that of their German counterparts in that the United States have 
“not seen a major public outcry about genetically modified foods” which in 
other terms means that these organizations have not been confronted with a 
cognitive dissonance in their environment. The reason that there “has not been 
a major claimer in the US by the population in general about GM Foods and 
their safety” was perceived as an effect of the little interest that in this organi-
zation’s perspective is paid to food overall by the public, since “people in the 
US eat to do something else”. Even more important, these organizations have 
observed farmers as their original clientele as “very very supportive of the 
4 From Norm to Action: Organizational Responses 
 
117
technology”. 
As neither food nor the consumers were thus understood as an important 
environment, this branch of industry did not consider the food industry as po-
tentially threatening. Consequently, also the buying public was not perceived 
as relevant stakeholder in the network.  
But even though “there are people who are concerned about the poten-
tial allergenicity”, this unrest was not observed as a reason to reconsider these 
organizations’ original premises as they had observed these premises as not 
only backed by a vast majority of the population but rather as supported by the 
(legal) regulatory process: “when I look at the process I don’t have any con-
cerns about the regulation of biotech derived crops”. And this process most 
notably was observed as being fulfilled under a rigorous food safety legisla-
tion: “even though the consultation process for biotech derived crops was not 
mandatory – it is mandatory that you follow the law and that you do not intro-
duce foods into our food system that are unsafe, so that’s the part of the law”.  
The regulation for GM Food therefore was not perceived as relevant, in 
terms of having an effect on the organizations’ decisions. Thus, although there 
have been “discussions about making the consultation process mandatory, as 
far as I’m concerned it doesn’t matter. We won’t do any work any differently 
whether people have a statement that says it’s mandatory or not because we 
supply all the data to FDA anyway, for their process, for their review”. In that 
perspective, the organizations perceived their decisions (that is their way of 
dealing with the issue) as backed by the legal statutes. 
Consequently, not only the regulatory process as such was observed as 
well established and working but so were GM Products: “biotechnology is not 
gonna go away, it’s been here in cheese production (…), it’s been in wine pro-
duction, it’s been in insulin production forever or since its possibilities were 
here”. Thus, as GM Products were conceived as an integral part of the food 
supply, these organizations did not perceive their paramount goal of refinanc-
ing themselves by selling GM Products as endangered by the admittedly ob-
served little public unrest. 
Further, as these organizations observed themselves in perfect compli-
ance with legal obligations in “doing probably as much or more than would 
normally be required to ensure the safety of our products before we introduce 
them” they could not even observe themselves as being responsible for public 
unease nor could they in a meaningful way interpret the observation “that the 
image of XY is awful and if that’s the case then we did something wrong – I 
don’t know what it was”. Thus, this perception can be described as an irritation 
that does not resonate inside the organization, or, that was perceived ‘only’ as 
noise that will die away since the organizations could not make (any) sense of 
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it: “we don’t understand what we’ve done”. Because, one might add, in adher-
ing to the law, they had not done anything ‘wrong’. 
In fact, they had observed the reason for public unrest in the regulatory 
agencies’ malpractice: “I think I would take more time as a regulator to ex-
plain to the public why I was doing what I was doing and how I was ensuring 
the safety of the food.” Thus, while they had observed their duty in adhering to 
the legal obligation of introducing only food that according to scientific criteria 
was safe, they had perceived the state’s duty in educating the public about 
these processes and criteria. 
Finally, and in contrast to its German counterparts, these organizations 
had clung to scientific facts as the only valuable basis for the assessment of 
GM Food and, consequently, for legal decision making and subsequent label-
ing policies: “There have been studies show.. that have shown that people are 
firmly convinced that organic food is safer and more nutritious and there is 
absolutely no data in the world that shows that. That’s the implications you get 
into when you‘re talking about labeling foods, so as long as they can put the 
criteria in place that is honest, scientifically defensible, then they gonna make 
it a voluntary label or a mandatory label” 
Interim Result 
Against the background of these responses, some preliminary remarks will be 
given on the impact of the respective legal environments on the organizations’ 
original decision premises. As has been outlined, in both Germany and the 
United States, agribusiness organizations have conceived of GM Food as a 
product that is based upon reliable scientific knowledge since it has been linked 
with traditional breeding techniques. Therefore, GM Food was not understood 
as ‘novel’ but rather as ‘new’ in that it could be parallelized with well-known 
products. Consequently, the introduction of these products into the market has 
been understood as rather a normative problem in that already existing rules 
would have to be extended to these products. It was finally this understanding 
of GM Food that became the basis for the agribusiness organizations’ maneu-
vering in the network in Germany and in the United States. 
But in so doing, these organizations came to face quite disparate legal 
environments. In Germany, the organizations neither perceived their own de-
scription of GM Food as normatively secured and thus as dominant over other, 
probably unsecured descriptions nor did they perceive a clear-cut alternative 
interpretation. In fact, the German organizations found themselves in a norma-
tively open situation wherein various interpretations and practices existed in 
parallel, so that their own understanding of GM Food became increasingly 
challenged. Because of this perception, the organizations were forced to revise 
their way of dealing with GM Food since they increasingly were faced with 
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opposition against their decisions without being supported by governmental 
power, for instance. Consequently, this opposition no longer was observed as 
‘just’ providing alternatives but rather as threatening the organizations’ para-
mount goal in the network: to sell genetically modified ingredients to the food 
processing industry. In so observing the environment as a constraint that in the 
long run could hinder the organizations from reproducing themselves, those 
revised their behavior in the network, and thus their approach to GM Food. 
In the United States in contrast, agribusiness organizations observed their 
understanding of GM Food as normatively secured against other, deviating 
interpretations of GM Food. In addition, they did not perceive themselves in 
the midst of broad and bitter controversy (like their German counterparts) and 
this again has been observed as an effect of a ‘successful’ institutionalization of 
the expectation that food is safe – whether or not it contains GM ingredients. 
Therefore, these organizations have not felt to be threatened by observed public 
unrest as such doubts were found to be inferior against the dominant interpreta-
tion. Consequently, they did not question their way of dealing with GM Crops 
but rather upheld their original premise and subsequent decisions. 
These at last disparate maneuvers in the network became most evident in 
the organizations’ way of dealing with the ‘labeling-issue’. While in Germany 
the organizations originally have not seen the need to label GM products as 
they were found to be safe according to the available scientific knowledge, 
they revised this conclusion. In being confronted with public demands for 
mandatory labeling and a legal norm that on the exclusive basis of scientific 
knowledge had proven to be unable to assure a safe food supply to the consum-
ers, the organizations instead came to vote for mandatory labeling. In so doing, 
they observed themselves as yielding to public demands in order to gain at 
least acceptance for their products in the end. In the United States instead, the 
organizations also from the outset have seen no need for an obligatory, positive 
labeling of GM products, as according to the law’s interpretation, such prod-
ucts were not conceived of as differing from traditional. To label GM products 
in their perspective has been observed as a breach of the dominant interpreta-
tion and in that although not as a legal offence but as deviation from ‘the rule’ 
that therefore could have been perceived as a warning by the consumers. In 
sum, to abide by their goal oriented programs, these organizations have em-
ployed different conditional programs, in that they came to support and, in con-
trast, to reject mandatory positive labeling as an economically sensitive deci-
sion. 
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4.2.2 Food Processing Industry 
Germany 
In order to make sense of the issue GM Food, food processing organizations in 
Germany have referred to established scientific knowledge in that genetically 
derived ingredients have been regarded as derived by traditional breeding me-
thod: „man hat ja sehr unkontrolliert in vielen Jahren auch Pflanzen miteinan-
der verbunden, gekoppelt, gezüchtet, wie auch immer, nichts anderes ist das ja 
eigentlich auch, da hat man ja Gene miteinander verschmolzen in irgend‘ner 
Form, das war ja viel viel langwieriger und heute kann man’s sehr gezielt, sehr 
präzise machen“. These products thus appeared to serve these organizations’ 
goal in providing the ‘same’ ingredients by a less costly procedure in the dou-
ble sense of the word – less costly in terms of time and money. Because of this, 
reduced production costs have been anticipated in this perspective, leading to a 
positive assessment of these products: „vom Unternehmen her stehen wir ei-
gentlich der Gentechnik absolut nicht negativ gegenüber, wir sehen darin sehr 
gute Chancen, wir sehen durchaus auch sehr viele positive Aspekte.“ Conse-
quently, the potential benefits of these products were put in the fore in this way 
of understanding the issue. 
However, in conceiving of genetic engineering as an extension of tradi-
tional breeding methods also an established knowledge basis was claimed as 
breeding refers to an established, well-known and widely accepted technique. 
In so doing, cognitive deficits that could hide a hazard had been clearly rejec-
ted: „Das da gesundheitliche Risiken drin wären, ist einfach lachhaft, davon 
kann überhaupt nicht die Rede sein.“ But at the same time these organizations 
also described themselves as selling brands to the consumers and by so doing 
they saw consumer demands as decisive information for their decision making 
processes: „Wir möchten dem Verbraucher nichts aufzwingen, was er nicht 
haben will“ 
Finally, in order to achieve their paramount goal of selling brands and 
products that meet consumer demands and expectations, these organizations 
demanded for clear cut rules that would provide not only guidance but also a 
secure framework for economic competition „Ich meine Start- und 
Chancengleichheit im Markt ist oberstes Gebot und wenn man also Gesetze 
macht und Verordnungen, dann muß man von Seiten der Behörden dafür 
sorgen, daß sie auch eingehalten werden, damit also nicht wieder.. dieses Sys-
tem – der Gutmütige, der kennzeichnet, ist der Dumme dabei – herauskommt. 
Das ist also die Hauptforderung, die eigentlich die Lebensmittelwirtschaft 
stellt.“  
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These organizations in sum have conceived of GM Food as a product that 
under conditions of a reliable, clear cut legal framework bears the potential to 
increase their assets. 
United States 
Like the food processing industry in Germany, these organizations in the 
United States have described themselves as being in a business that serves the 
consumers and consequently they "don't want to have bad things happen and 
we’re in a business of selling brands and products and the worst thing in the 
world that can happen to you is to have something negative happen to a con-
sumer that implicates your product.” In that they differed from agribusiness 
since from the very outset they had focused on the food market as their original 
market and, secondly, were dealing not simply with products but rather with 
brands. In so doing, they had been affected much more imminently with the 
‘problem’ (or ‘non-problem’) of introducing GM Food than agribusiness since 
brands not only say something about the function of the product but rather refer 
to entire lifestyles, that the consumers identify themselves with and that they 
trust in to remain identical.  
But even so, the food processing industry in the United States conceived 
of GM Food first of all as new food ingredient that could be introduced into 
their products like traditionally derived ingredients without being harmful to 
the identity of their brands. This understanding of GM Food as not differing 
and thus as safe also was observed as confirmed by reputable scientific organi-
zations, saying that “there is simply too much data from too many reputable 
world organizations that support the safety of these foods and ingredients”.  
In trusting science, the food industry not only conceived of these prod-
ucts as safe but rather as bearing a potential for future benefits:“(T)he promise 
of the science is that someday we will be able to deliver tremendous benefits to 
consumers as a result of this technology” and, one might add, consequently 
benefits for the food processing industry in terms of money. Therefore, the 
understanding that “there is no direct benefit to us in the food industry from 
biotech crops and there’s nothing that we can at this point in time sell to a con-
sumer, saying ‘your product is enhanced in this way’”, was rather communi-
cated as chances as such potential benefits were perceived as already signaled 
in products like the above cited ‘golden rice’, which contains vitamin a, thus in 
products that already bear a tangible benefit for the consumers of food. Those 
promises of science were thus seen as “very exciting and very positive and we 
look forward to getting there”.  
In sum, the food processing industry has rather embraced GM ingredients 
and not conceived of their introduction as a problem at all. In fact, first wave 
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products were understood as an important intermediate step towards products 
that appear to promise saleable benefits for consumers. 
Given these understandings of the issue GM Food and the more or less 
implicit subsequent conceptions of what an appropriate way of dealing with 
GM Food would be, it will now be pointed out to what extent the perception of 
the respective legal environments has affected these organizations’ actual be-
havior (decision-making) in their given networks. And as the normative orien-
tation of these organizations must be described as an economic rationale, the 
question is raised, if and to what extent these premises could be upheld or if 
they became ‘overruled’. 
Germany 
The Food industry’s perception of the public and its opinion in Germany has 
led to the withdrawal or to the avoidance of GM ingredients from the very out-
set: „(G)leichwohl haben wir uns entschlossen keine Produkte auf den Markt 
zu bringen, weil die Akzeptanz beim Verbraucher schlicht und ergreifend nicht 
da ist und als Markenartikelhersteller sind wir drauf angewiesen, daß die Leu-
te unsere Produkte mögen, kaufen, sich damit identifizieren und da war's ein-
fach nicht möglich.“ Thus, although the organizations originally admitted po-
tential (future) benefits of these products, due to their perceptions of the envi-
ronment they had decided against the marketing of these products. In so doing 
they retreated from their ‘original’ position since „ein großer Teil der Bevölke-
rung bei Lebensmitteln Vorbehalte hinsichtlich der Anwendung gentechnischer 
Verfahren bei der Herstellung oder aber vor allen Dingen auch bei der Erzeu-
gung von landwirtschaftlichen Produkten, die dann in die Nahrungsmittel Ein-
gang finden, hat“. 
This yielding to their environment’s demands can be traced back to their 
perception of the legal norm. Even though the letters of the NFR can be read as 
explicitly allowing for the use GM ingredients in food, these organizations per-
ceived that GM Food is not conceived as safe but rather unwanted among their 
clientele, the consumers of food. NFR’s incapability of establishing and secur-
ing the expectation that GM Food is safe in this perception first of all was 
traced back to an increasingly precarious public status of science and a loss of 
its standing as uncontested epistemological authority. But since NFR is based 
upon scientific knowledge, these organizations rather observed that science’s 
loss of credibility also had infected NFR’s legitimacy: „Ich glaube das Ver-
trauen in Regulierungen, in behördliche Maßnahmen ist nicht mehr so unum-
stößlich und so groß wie es vielleicht noch vor 30 oder 40 Jahren gewesen ist, 
da hat man einfach darauf vertraut, daß es in Ordnung ist und daß unsere Wis-
senschaftler das schon richtig machen werden und soviel Wissen haben und die 
Behörden darauf achten.“ In so observing scientific knowledge as insufficient 
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to equip a legal rule with legitimacy, the NFR in its actual design rather be-
came observed as inadequate to meet public expectations, because „da ist auch 
sehr viel Emotionales enthalten und Emotionalität mit Recht zu bekämpfen.. 
gerade in diesem Fall, also ich glaube, daß es nicht die wissenschaftlichen 
Aspekte sind, die diskutiert werden, nicht nur die rechtlichen Aspekte sondern 
im Vordergrund steht die Emotionalität“. Thus the implicit claim was made 
that not only scientific criteria can serve as exclusive basis for decision making 
but that, in order to restore public trust in the safety of food, means and mecha-
nisms have to be mobilized that adequately take account of ‘soft’ criteria like 
consumers’ demands and fears. 
Since the legal answer to public demands in that perspective missed to 
dispel public’s doubts and reply adequately to questions public has had on GM 
Food, it rather had led to misunderstandings and uncertainty: “Und da glaub 
ich ist auch sehr viel unverstanden worden, also Unwissen, nicht Unverstand 
sondern Unwissen, ich kann die Ängste irgendwo verstehen, wenn ich nichts 
weiß hab ich Angst, aber deshalb sagt man lieber ‚nee’“. This perceived lack 
of trust into the legal regulation and the existence of other, dissenting voices 
(both of which have to be considered as constitutive for one another) has even 
heightened the smoldering uncertainty throughout the network: „sondern man 
hört auch auf andere Stimmen, auf Gegenstimmen und die Verunsicherung ist 
allgemein da und da nimmt man vielleicht auch sowas gerne auf und sagt 
‚dann lieber nicht‘.“ 
In order to uphold their short-term proceedings in the network while at 
the same time not losing sight of their paramount goal of reproducing them-
selves by selling goods and brands, these organizations decided for a double 
strategy. On the one side, they felt that since public has not trusted in the safety 
of these products due to a lack of transparency and information, trust and thus 
acceptance could be (re-)established by equipping the public with broader (thus 
‘objective’) information on these products: „Ich würde eher befürworten, daß 
man von allen beteiligten Seiten, sei es jetzt von der Industrie, (...)von der Re-
gulierungsbehörde, wie auch immer, daß man da einfach mehr Wert auf Auf-
klärung der Bevölkerung, der Schüler, der Hausfrauen, der Menschen insge-
samt, daß man da versucht, bessere, objektive Aufklärung zu betreiben, um 
Verständnis dafür zu kriegen“. Even more importantly, as neither science, nor 
the regulatory agencies and also industry itself were not observed as credible in 
the public’s eye („traditionell hat die Industrie ja oft nicht so’n gutes Image”), 
this challenge ought to be fulfilled in a „konzertierten Aktion, (…) gemein-
sam”, thus in cooperation. 
But as organizations cannot simply stop their ongoing proceedings, food 
processing industry on the other side reached out for mechanisms that would 
enable them to do both: assuring their consumers the safety of their products 
4 From Norm to Action: Organizational Responses 
 
124
and consequently uphold their economic transaction, which is selling. Since the 
food processing industry had found itself as the main target of pressure groups 
they thus aimed at the avoidance of GM ingredients: “jeder Hersteller ist weit-
gehend bemüht zu vermeiden, solche Produkte in Verkehr zu bringen, die er 
deklarieren muß, weil dann aus der Kennzeichnung etwas hervorgeht und dann 
kommt Greenpeace oder entsprechende Institutionen und üben Druck auf den 
Hersteller beziehungsweise auf den Handel, der solche Produkte führt, aus, 
damit er das unterläßt und das sind eben genau die Konsequenzen, die von 
vielen Unternehmen als gefährlich angesehen werden, weswegen sie weitge-
hend vermeiden, diese Produkte einzusetzen.” Consequently food processing 
industry made use of the labeling provisions contained in the NFR. Those had 
originally been welcomed as a means for supporting competition „(w)as die 
Kennzeichnung angeht, das ist ja durchaus auch im Sinne eines fairen Wettbe-
werbs, wenn es Regeln gibt die durchaus auch gewisse Spielräume lassen, aber 
die einen Rechtsraum regeln, die da Vorgaben geben, kann das ja durchaus 
auch zur Fairness beitragen, daß also nicht jeder machen kann, was er will.“ 
Under the conditions they came to face in their environment, that is that GM 
Food is unwanted, food processing industry had perceived these mandatory 
labeling provisions as a means for assuring their consumers that their products 
are GM Free. In order to avoid a positive label, and thus guarantee the absence 
of GM ingredients in their products not only to their consumers but also to 
avoid mislabeling for which they could be held liable, these organizations saw 
themselves in a position where they themselves had to install a system that 
would provide them sufficient unaltered ingredients to uphold the production. 
Consequently, the food processing industry established a system of certi-
fications beyond the applicable rule NFR: „man hat ja jetzt die beiden Alterna-
tiven geschaffen, entweder man hat praktisch eine mit entsprechenden Papie-
ren versehene Garantieerklärung der Vorlieferanten, daß die Produkte keine 
GMO enthalten (...). Wenn Sie aber ein solches Zertifikat nicht bekommen, weil 
kein Lieferant bereit ist, es Ihnen zu geben, dann müssen Sie selbst, wenn Spu-
ren vorhanden sind, das deklarieren.“ In order to adhere to their paramount 
goals, food processing industry finally came to the conclusion that only by con-
tracting a guarantee could be provided that their products do not contain gm 
ingredients. And since this condition was laid down by a contract, it also be-
came normatively secured whereby the organizations also discharged the risk 
of being held liable for unintended ‘contaminations’. 
United States 
Different from their German counterpart, the food processing industry in the 
United States had perceived GM Food as a “non-issue for the public”. More-
over, even though also dissenting voices were observed in the network, those 
were not considered as a threat: “I would say that a number of activist groups 
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are trying to make this an issue in the United States without much success”. In 
fact, these dissenting voices were perceived as a “minority point of view in this 
country”.  
In so perceiving a rather indifferent environment these organizations 
came to conclude that their original understanding of GM Food as based upon 
sound science and thus as not differing from traditional food, was in accor-
dance with the dominant interpretation throughout the American network, that 
they observed as characterized by trust in science: “the American people in 
general are very comfortable with science and very favorably inclined towards 
science and technology”. Consequently, they also observed the regulatory 
agencies as credible in the public’s eye in that there is “a great deal of trust 
and faith in the regulatory agencies in this country, in the FDA, in the USDA, 
to protect the public health”.  
Against the background of a credible agency and a policy that is based 
upon trusted science, these organizations have not only observed their under-
standing of GM Food as based upon a broad societal consensus but also their 
subsequent way of dealing with the issue since they “feel that having a sci-
ence-based regulatory system is very rigorous and that there is a huge amount 
of testing done, there is a huge amount of data that’s looked at.” The food in-
dustry thus had regarded scientific knowledge as sufficient and exclusive basis 
in legal decision making: “when you hear the National Academies of Sciences 
all over the world, saying that they’re finding that these products are not a 
threat to health or human safety, that means something you know, you know if 
we’re not going to believe this National Academies of Sciences all over the 
world then whom are we to believe.” 
In so observing their own conception of GM Food in perfect accordance 
with established science and in fully compliance with a science based regula-
tory process these organizations felt that they were walking on solid legal 
ground as the legal statutes referred to that same science base. Consequently, 
these organizations “don't see ourselves in the midst of a controversy”. Since 
the regulatory process was perceived as based upon scientific criteria, food 
processing industry had felt “very positive about the regulatory system in this 
country and I don’t think that it’s just a policy statement, I think it’s highly 
regulated and companies have to go through a great deal of rigor in order to 
get their products approved.” 
But even though food processing industry in the United States has not 
found itself in a controversy, they “know there’s some controversy”, which 
they observed as caused by misconceptions in the public since “the thing that‘s 
not well understood by the public is the number of field tests and trials and all 
kinds of things go on for years and years before these products are approved”.  
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Even though these organizations had described themselves as being in a 
business that must be understood as highly sensitive, even these rather weak 
signs of public unease had resonated within the food processing industry. In 
order to maintain the trust they need to sell their products they had perceived it 
as their duty “to help to educate the general public about this issue and get 
information out because there are questions and often times that people have 
their questions answered they may feel very comfortable. But if their questions 
are never answered than it becomes more and more mysterious”. In so doing, 
they had followed their self-description that “we’re in the business of serving 
the consumer, if the consumers don’t buy, we’re out of business”. However, 
educating the public only has been one of their strategies in replying to public 
expectations.  
Most notably, “food industry has been very closely with the regulatory 
agencies to move forward and to improve the situation” in that they went to the 
regulatory agencies and asked for changes14 in the regulatory process: “the 
food industry itself has urged the FDA to require mandatory consultation.” In 
so doing, the food industry had aimed to infiltrate the legal norms with their 
‘hands-on’ knowledge that has been generated throughout their maneuvers in 
the network. In addition, they “want to see specific criteria for [voluntary, AE] 
GM-free labeling so the consumers are not mislead and industry knows what to 
do to respond”. As neither positive nor negative labeling of GM Food is man-
datory in the United States so far, any labeling that refers to genetic engineer-
ing is an exception (or rather a supplement to) from the rule, that therefore has 
to be specified. Even so, food processing industry did not see the need to urge 
for mandatory labeling as mandatory labeling had been observed as a probable 
threat to the organizations’ paramount goal. Since labeling in the United States 
is only required if the product on the background of scientific criteria has 
proven to be significantly different and in that bearing a potential threat to hu-
man health (e.g. by containing substances that are well known for having an 
allergenic effect), mandatory labeling was rather perceived as potentially ‘star-
tling’ the consumers from their everyday habits: “The one reason that we are 
so opposed to mandatory labeling is that when consumers see new labels on 
products that they used to buy everyday, I mean everyday grocery items, that is 
not a positive message to them”. More importantly, in so doing, the dominant 
interpretation of GM Food as not differing from traditional food and thus as 
safe could become challenged. Therefore mandatory labeling from the perspec-
tive of the food industry would not only be a threat to their proceedings but 
was also observed as unnecessary as they conceived the current situation as 
                                                     
14  These changes refer to the above outlined changes whereby the consultation process has 
been made mandatory and more precise rules for voluntary labeling were issued (see 3.2).  
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well regulated: “I don’t think that we need any legislation in this area at pre-
sent, I think the regulatory agencies are doing their job, they have been em-
powered to do and they have the jurisdiction to do.”  
Interim Result 
Both, the American and the German food industry have made sense of GM 
Food based on scientific knowledge. In doing so, genetic engineering evolved 
not only as a refined but also rather as a more efficient traditional breeding 
method. Consequently, genetic engineering was understood as a technology 
that bears the potential for faster production of a greater amount of goods for 
less costs – and thus appeared as perfectly fitting with these organizations’ 
paramount goal: reproducing themselves by selling goods. Most notably, as 
these products were understood as based upon a reliable knowledge base, their 
introduction into the respective market was considered a normative problem – 
if a ‘problem’ at all. Therefore, the food industry in Germany and in the United 
States have shared a common interpretation of GM Food as beneficial and 
wanted that has become the premise for their subsequent maneuvers in their 
respective networks. 
However, these respective networks have been perceived as most varying 
by the organizations in both these countries. In Germany, the food processing 
industry was faced with opposition to its original understanding and rather per-
ceived GM Food as characterized by an insufficient knowledge base. There-
fore, not only GM Food itself had evolved as potentially harmful for human 
health but also the legal rule in exclusively referring to scientific knowledge 
has proven unable to properly cope with the complexity of the problem, that is 
to adequately reply to public demands for a socially acceptable way of dealing 
with the issue. Consequently, even if the organizations have observed their 
own understanding of GM Food in accordance with the legal rule, they had to 
conclude that this understanding, exclusively based on scientific knowledge, 
could not be established as normatively secured. As a result, food processing 
industry came to question at least their decisions regarding GM Food, and thus 
adapted to what they had perceived as public demands. 
In the United States instead, food processing industry has not observed 
itself as faced with noteworthy opposition to its original understanding of GM 
Food. In fact, these organizations have perceived their interpretation in accor-
dance with the legal interpretation and, most notably, this interpretation of GM 
Food as not differing from traditional food has been observed as accepted in 
the public’s eye. This ‘felicitous’ institutionalization of the expectation that 
GM Food is safe was observed as the outcome of a science based regulatory 
process on the one side and the existence of trust into science among the 
greater parts of the public on the other side. Therefore, scientific knowledge 
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was regarded as sufficient basis for legal decision-making. Because of that, 
these organizations felt that their interpretation was backed by powerful legal 
statutes and thus normatively secured while alternative interpretations rather 
had to be abolished as wrong or untruthful. In that, food processing industry in 
its self-description has taken in a powerful position that also ‘prevented’ these 
organizations from questioning their decision premises. 
Consequently, these differences in the organizational responses to their 
various legal environments became most evident in the way the organizations’ 
went about the labeling of GM Food. Given that in the United States exclu-
sively scientific criteria not only serve as sufficient but also as the only valid 
basis for legal decision making and the legal rule only allows for a positive 
label if GM Food has proven to be substantially different than its traditional 
counterpart, mandatory labeling of GM Food rather became observed as 
unlawful. Thus, in order to maintain the ‘calm’ status quo, food processing 
industry in the United States strongly rejected mandatory labeling as not neces-
sary. Throughout their perception of their environment, the decision for a posi-
tive mandatory labeling of GM Food has turned out as an economically unwise 
decision in that it could have caused uncertainty about the safety of GM Food 
even more. In Germany instead, food processing industry had to conclude that 
scientific knowledge no longer accounts as sufficient basis for legitimate deci-
sions, that is for decisions that will be accepted in the future. Thus, even 
though mandatory labeling in their opinion does not refer to a difference of 
GM Food in a strong scientific sense, it rather refers to their perception that 
GM Food are understood as differing from traditional food throughout the food 
processing industry’s relevant environment. Consequently, they came to sup-
port mandatory labeling as a means to assure their product’s safety by avoiding 
GM ingredients by establishing as systems of certifications that would be seen 
as guarantee for GM-free ingredients. Finally, throughout this disparate strate-
gies the food processing industry in Germany and in the United States have 
employed, the notion of what has been considered as an economically rationale 
decision-making became defined differently.  
4.2.3 Industry Associations15 
As those associations refer to politics as well as to the economy it can be ex-
pected that they will to a certain extent share the (normative) persuasions (ex-
pectations) of their members that are based upon an economic rationale but, at 
the same time, also refer to politics since the quest for political influence is 
inherent to any kind of associations.  
                                                     
15  The term associations has been chosen as it seems to have a less normative connotation 
than often used terms such as ‘pressure groups’ or ‘interest groups’, to name but a few 
(Brodocz 1996). 
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Germany 
As representing the potential beneficiaries of GM Products, industry associa-
tions in Germany have aligned their understanding of these products with one 
established scientific opinion that genetic engineering as scientific method 
cannot be regarded as differing from traditional methods: „ich denk mir, man 
muß immer weiter forschen, denn man weiß als Wissenschaftler natürlich nie 
alles, aber das ist bei Gentechnik nicht anders als bei anderen Sachen auch“. 
In fact, products derived by genetic engineering rather were conceived as pro-
bably safer than conventional products in that they have undergone thorough 
safety assessments: „Sie können sicherlich bestimmte gentechnisch veränderte 
Produkte, wo Sie auch mehr so ’ne Historie in der Sicherheitsbewertung jetzt 
schon haben, vielleicht einfacher bewerten, als wenn Sie so’ne Nuß haben, die 
jetzt bewertet werden muß.“  
In so making use of scientific knowledge for their purpose to support 
these products, their benefits also were regarded not only as weighing out po-
tential but unknown hazards but rather as justifying the application of these 
products: “...in vorgelagerten Bereichen, ich find das ist ein absolut legitimer 
Nutzen, (...) natürlich ist es auch legitim, wenn beispielsweise die landwirt-
schaftliche Seite oder der Enzymproduzent ‘n Vorteil mit dem Einsatz gentech-
nischer Verfahren verbinden können”. 
GM Food had thus been understood as a product that did not pose more 
open questions than any traditional food. In so doing, the benefits the technol-
ogy bears in agriculture had been regarded as justified even though at that point 
in time the products did not provide tangible benefits for food processing in-
dustry: „der Nutzen dieser Produkte ist im Moment in den Bereichen, die jetzt 
der Lebensmittelindustrie und dem Lebensmittelhandel selbst eigentlich nichts 
bringen.“ But even so, potential benefits in form of more nutritious basic 
commodities such as rice for consumers and thus for food processing industry 
were conceived as potentially provided by the current first wave products: 
„wenn sie so etwas haben, was sie dem Verbraucher dann anbieten können, 
dann wird wahrscheinlich das Interesse der Industrie wachsen oder auch wenn 
sie Produkte haben, die bestimmte Verfahren im industriellen Fertigungspro-
zeß erleichtern oder optimieren.”  
In sum, GM Products were regarded as bearing potentials for agribusi-
ness as well as for food processing industry and thus were supported in princi-
ple by these associations. Since these products also had been conceived of as 
based on reliable scientific knowledge, their introduction into the market was 
rather seen as a normative than a cognitive problem in the first place. 
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United States 
Industry associations also in the United States had regarded GM Food as rather 
bearing positive potential than posing a risk to human health in that they “be-
lieve there are great benefits in biotech foods and we believe that the promise 
of biotechnology needs to be allowed to play out”. These potential benefits for 
consumers were understood as insinuated by already ‘existing’ benefits in that 
“as a matter of fact, the environment has been improved by this because the 
farmers have less run off by using less water, they’re using fewer pesticides”. 
In citing these science based assessment, the American associations had used 
scientific knowledge in order to categorize GM Food not only as another new 
product but rather as potentially enhanced products that therefore were ex-
pected to bear a competitive advantage. Thus, since “science if you really look 
at it, is on the side of pro-biotech folks” these associations understood GM 
Food as products that sell, as they also had to take consumer demands into ac-
count: “We can’t give consumers what they don’t want, our brands are too 
important to us.” Moreover, given that these products had appeared as advan-
tageous in the food market, “the food industry would argue you let the market 
decide.” 
As a result, industry associations in the United States had conceived of 
GM Food as products that seemed to fit their member’s underlying economic 
rationale. By doing so, the introduction of GM Food had rather evolved as a 
normative problem since no noteworthy knowledge lacks were observed that 
could function as an entrance for risk and hazards. In addition, these organiza-
tions had also regarded the existing rules of the market as a reliable and suffi-
cient basis for their members’ guidance in the network.  
Therefore, at this stage, the introduction of GM Food into the market was 
considered a normative problem that has or can be solved by the application of 
power. Given this background, in the following it will be outlined to what ex-
tent this interpretation was upheld by the given organizations, or at least modi-
fied due to perceived environmental constraints. 
Germany 
In being confronted with its environment, industry organizations in Germany 
came to conclude that „(w)ir hatten sicherlich vor zwei bis drei Jahren eine 
positivere Einstellung auch von Seiten der Industrie, der Landwirtschaft und 
des Handels. Das hat sich im Laufe der letzten Monate etwas gewandelt.“ The 
cause for this ‘climate change’ in these organizations’ perspective was an inc-
reased public pressure „weil der Druck bestimmter pressure groups oder soge-
nannter Umweltorganisationen wie Greenpeace auf einzelne Unternehmen 
sehr stark geworden ist“. And since industry associations from the outset had 
conceived of GM Food as based upon reliable scientific knowledge, the ob-
served controversy was rather understood as political (normative): „Das ist 
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hauptsächlich ein politischer Konflikt, also ich sehe wenig wissenschaftliche 
Fakten hinter dem Konflikt“. 
The fact that these organizations have perceived public pressure groups 
as vocal and influential in the debate can only be fully understood, if industry 
associations’ perception of German administration and their role in the network 
is taken into account. Neither administration („(d)er Deutsche hat ein grundle-
gendes Mißtrauen gegenüber Behörden”) nor industry were observed as being 
credible in the public’s eye: „es gibt ja so schöne Meinungsbefragungen, wem 
man traut und wem man nicht traut und da steht eigentlich zwischen den Zu-
lassungsbehörden, den deutschen und der Industrie ist da gar nicht mehr so 
viel Platz, also wir stehen eigentlich beide relativ hinten“. Therefore, the sci-
ence based regulatory agencies were observed as incapable of dispelling doubts 
about the safety of GM Food: „wenn jemand sagt, das ist sicher, dann kann 
das auch das BgVV sein oder so, dann glaubt er [the citizen, AE] das erstmal 
nicht“. In that, these organizations observed that their original understanding of 
GM Food as safe could not be established as a normative expectation 
throughout the network, although they observed this interpretation as accordant 
with the ‘official’ opinion. Nevertheless, due to the perceived weakness of this 
official opinion, other alternative interpretations of GM Food as uncertain and 
therefore posing potential hazards to human health could establish themselves 
in the network as equally legitimate interpretation. Consequently, these associ-
ations’ members were driven into a quandary by the advocates of this ‘deviant’ 
interpretation: „die Schwierigkeit ist nur, daß derjenige, der jetzt diese Produk-
te einsetzt und letztendlich dann im Supermarkt anbietet, keinen Nutzen, 
sondern nur Probleme hat, indem er sich gegenüber Greenpeace rechtfertigen 
muß, indem er die Verbraucheranfragen oder die Medienanfragen erhält und 
indem er eine Kennzeichnung aufbringen muß. Und das ist das Dilemma, vor 
dem wir stehen”.  
In this situation, also the introduction of the NFR had not been perceived 
as helpful for the organizations’ way of dealing with the apparently contested 
issue GM Food throughout the network. In fact, „je länger wir mit der Novel 
Food-Verordnung leben, desto mehr sehen wir die Schwierigkeiten, die jetzt 
auch hier in der Anwendung sind“. Thus, the rule did not provide tangible gui-
dance for organizational behavior but rather had proven to be nonpractical in 
its actual implementation:“was sich vielleicht auf dem Papier ganz nett anhört, 
aber wenn man das dann in die Praxis umsetzen will, tauchen sehr sehr viele 
Fragestellungen auf und diese Fragestellungen müssen einfach gelöst werden, 
um ein reibungsloseres Funktionieren überhaupt möglich zu machen“. As a 
result, these associations’ members found themselves in a situation wherein 
neither the legislators nor the administration were able to build or restore pub-
lic’s believe in the safety of GM Food nor had industry itself been equipped 
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with a regulation that would have enabled them to develop unambiguous prac-
tices in the way of dealing with these products. In so observing their original 
understanding of the issue as normatively unsupported, they rather adapted 
their behavior to what they had perceived as dominant environment and at least 
tried to retreat from GM Products. This decision in retrospect was observed as 
a failure by the industry associations: „denn so durch ihr Verhalten, durch den 
Rückzug oder den scheinbaren Rückzug aus der Gentechnik muß man sagen, 
ist auch den Verbrauchern, der Öffentlichkeit suggeriert worden: ah ja, da ist 
ja irgendwas Schädliches dran und warum sollte ich als Kunde mich dafür 
einsetzen, wenn schon mein Produzent, der die Lebensmittel produziert, das 
Zeug nicht haben will.“ Instead, industry associations would have voted for a 
more aggressive way of dealing with the issue that in their perspective could 
have assured the consumers of their products’ safety: „wenn sich die Lebens-
mittelindustrie und der Lebensmittelhandel hinter die Produkte gestellt hätten 
(...), dann hätten auch die Verbraucher hier nicht so negativ reagiert, wie das 
immer befürchtet worden war.“ But this has not happened as the food process-
ing industry had perceived itself neither as walking on solid legal ground nor as 
observing a majority for their original interpretation of GM Food but rather as 
the main target of pressure groups in the network: „XY, die da sehr geschickt 
steuern und sich da die Lebensmittelindustrie und Handel als Zielobjekt ausge-
sucht haben.“ 
As a result, not only the food processing industry but also the industry 
associations came to question their original position in observing their mem-
bers’ strategies in the network, that is the emergence of ‘alternative’, GM-free 
markets: „Und andererseits vertreten wir natürlich (...) die Position der Le-
bensmittelwirtschaft zur Gentechnik nach außen und wir äußern uns nach wie 
vor positiv, wenn wir auch natürlich darauf hinweisen, daß wir im Moment 
eine veränderte Marktsituation haben, daß sehr viele Unternehmen versuchen, 
gentechnikfreie Rohware zu verwenden und daß sich dafür auch Märkte im 
Moment schaffen, also Märkte entstehen“. 
United States 
The industry associations’ perceptions in the United States differed in contrast 
to their German counterpart in that “(t)hey’re [people, AE] worried about 
schools, they’re worried about taxes but they’re not worried about biotech.” 
Most notably, even food was not perceived as important to the American con-
sumer, instead “food is something you eat for fuel”. Although critical voices 
against GM Food had been perceived in the American network, those were not 
regarded as having an impact on the public’s opinion since these voices rather 
had a bad public reputation, for instance “Greenpeace is not credible in the 
United States, so their efforts to create concern about the issue have failed, just 
the opposite has happened”. In addition, this holds value not only for Green-
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peace but rather for all NGOs: “NGOs? – In the United States they’re mar-
ginal”. 
The fact that industry associations came to observe pressure groups as 
marginal in the GM Food network, has to be understood as constitutively inter-
related with the associations’ observation that “the government has said: bio-
tech foods are safe, biotech foods are no different from traditional foods, if 
there was danger we would label it but in the absence of a danger there’s no 
need to label it and there’s no need to ban it. People have accepted that”. Con-
sequently, these organizations had not only observed themselves in perfect 
unanimity with the ‘official’ opinion (or, more precisely, with the letters of the 
law) but more importantly they had found this opinion to be normatively sup-
ported, thus as accepted by its addressees. The cause for this ‘success’ was 
traced back to the public standing of the respective regulatory agency in the 
network FDA: “probably the most important single reason in the world is that 
there is trust and confidence in the Food and Drug Administration”. In per-
ceiving themselves backed by legal statutes and ‘side by side’ with a credible 
agency, these organizations had perceived themselves as part of a powerful 
alliance. Moreover, it was this perception that gave them ample room for reply-
ing to critical voices. 
As their members not only depend upon monetary resources but also 
upon trust in their brands and thus public credibility (that is, legitimacy), indus-
try associations observed themselves in a superior but not invulnerable posi-
tion. Therefore, they came to decide that they would have to respond to public 
demands for more transparency and information in order to stay trustworthy in 
their consumers’ perceptions. But due to its self-description as having ‘friends 
in high places’ they had perceived themselves as legitimized to at least dictate 
the rules for confrontation with critical voices: “Our issue in the food industry 
is how we gonna resolve that? We wanna have a reasonable debate in this 
country, we wanna have a reasonable discussion about biotech, we wanna 
hear all the issues, we wanna have platforms where we discuss them. We don’t 
want street theatre, we don’t want the decision being made by mobs in the 
streets.” Having the decision being made by the ‘mobs in the street’ would be 
synonymous with an irrational decision in that such a decision would not be 
based upon scientific criteria but rather made by “mobs who know nothing 
about science dictating how we move forward”. In contrast, industry associa-
tions had observed their own decisions (and those of their members) as based 
upon reliable scientific criteria: “what’s on the side of the other side that op-
poses biotech is uncertainty and the unknown but we do risk-benefit analysis 
with science.” 
Thus, instead of yielding to opposition these organizations rather had felt 
that they should undertake confidence-building, or, more precisely, actions that 
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would maintain the perceived business and science confidence in order to dis-
pel any doubts about their products’ safety and allow the market rules to be 
played out. Therefore, “food industry asked FDA to create the [new, AE] 
guidelines, so that when we label ‘non-biotech’ or ‘biotech-free’ we know what 
percentage that is otherwise one company might say ‘we’re non-biotech’ and 
they have 1% biotech and an other company might say ‘well I got 2% biotech, 
but that’s biotech-free’ and they put that on the label. We want a standard-
guideline so consumers know what it is when the labels goes on.” In doing so, 
not only transparency would be achieved but rather the market rule of equal 
opportunities for each market participants became (re-)secured. Something 
similar had been the case with the voluntary consultation process that has be-
come mandatory: "because of the sensitivity of biotech they [agribusiness, AE] 
do it anyway, it’s de facto, they check, it might as well be mandatory. But we 
feel, the food industry that we should make that mandatory so consumers know 
that under law they do have to check first before bringing it to market. So it 
goes to the transparency issue.” In sum, by urging FDA for new guidelines, 
industry associations had followed a double strategy in that the rules necessary 
for their members’ paramount goals were re-adjusted to a slightly changing 
environment while at the same time these new guidelines also supported the 
consumers trust into the regulatory process by making this process more trans-
parent.  
Consequently, like their members, industry associations had rejected 
mandatory positive labeling since in their view this would have been perceived 
as an exception from the rule that therefore could have startled consumers – as 
the associations had observed in other contexts: “we are for the kind of respon-
sible voluntary labeling we have now. And let me tell you why: in this country 
as in most countries when the government mandates a label consumers inter-
pret from that ‘there’s something wrong with the food otherwise why would the 
government put a label on it?’” In fact, industry associations had observed 
existing regulations not only as sufficient but rather as successful in securing 
the expectation of food safety: “the reason government’s there is to safeguard 
consumers, to make sure that we have standard laws to protect everyone and 
that’s why you have food safety.” 
Interim Result 
As could be shown, American as well as German industry associations in the 
beginning had conceived of GM Food as products that, based on a sufficient, 
scientific knowledge base, would bear competitive advantages for their mem-
bers, the food processing industry. This assessment had been achieved by the 
mobilization of established scientific knowledge for their means, that is, finally 
to sell these products. Consequently, they had based their subsequent decisions 
upon the premise that as GM Food does not differ from conventional products, 
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the established rules of the market, which are secured by a broader legal 
framework, would account as sufficient to guide the organizations in their way 
of dealing with these products.  
However, in the light of the perceptions of their respective environments, 
industry associations in Germany and in the United States had adopted differ-
ent strategies. While the American associations was faced with an environment 
that not only has confirmed their premises but rather has let them perceive 
themselves as part of a powerful alliance with regulatory agencies that were 
observed as trustworthy by the public, these organizations were not forced to 
revise their premises or at least their members’ behavior. In fact, even though 
they had observed alternative interpretations of GM Food and some public un-
ease, they decided to take action that would enable their members’ to uphold 
their usual business and, on the other side, account as a gesture of goodwill 
towards the perceived demands for more transparency. Therefore, these asso-
ciations had urged the responsible agency to adjust the current regulations to 
these demands by singling out the consultation process as mandatory and lay-
ing down precise guidance for the voluntary labeling of products as GM-free. 
But both these changes had not really affected their members’ habits as the 
consultation procedure throughout its long-term implementation nearly had 
become mandatory and, even more importantly for food processing industry, 
since these organizations concluded that each labeling connected with GM 
would be perceived as a warning, even a GM-free label would be an exception 
from the rule so that organizations who want voluntarily label as GM-free 
would have undergone a more costly procedure than rather stuck to the estab-
lished rules.  
In Germany instead, industry organizations came to face an environment 
wherein neither the science based regulatory agencies nor industry itself was 
observed as credible in the public eye. Therefore, their own premise that GM 
Food is safe was observed as not normatively secured throughout the network 
but rather as challenged by competing interpretations as characterized by an 
insufficient knowledge base that probably hides risks for human health. Indus-
try associations thus have observed their members as put under pressure by 
critical groups since they could not rely on legal statutes as those have not been 
accepted as assuring food safety. In finding themselves in an unsupported and 
normatively uncertain situation, they retreated from GM products thus adapting 
their decisions to what they had perceived as public demands. Since the refer-
ence to law and scientific knowledge had been observed as useless in their ef-
forts to achieve acceptance for GM Products, industry associations rather had 
observed the emergence of private governance regimes that would ensure food 
industry GM-free ingredients. 
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These disparate maneuvers in the respective networks have again become 
most apparent in these organizations’ approach to labeling. Industry organiza-
tions in Germany came to conclude that mandatory labeling would be neces-
sary in order to respond adequately to public demands. As in Germany alterna-
tive markets had evolved, positive mandatory labeling was observed as an in-
strument to restore public confidence in food safety by on the one side guaran-
tee GM-free ingredients through contracting and, on the other side, refer to the 
legal obligation that GM Food would have to be labeled as such. To be suppor-
tive of mandatory labeling had evolved as an economically wise decision in 
that only by clear cut rules food processing industry’s goal in the network 
would not be endangered. In addition, mandatory labeling thus became enacted 
as a trigger for the avoidance of GM products in the German food supply. In-
stead, industry associations in the United States had rejected positive manda-
tory labeling as such labels would not be scientifically legitimated and thus be 
based upon knowledge that had not been considered as reasonable for decision 
making. Further, as scientific knowledge and criteria had been observed as 
sufficient and trustworthy basis, a labeling that thus would not refer to science 
exclusively would break the dominant rules in the network. In that, so the in-
dustry associations’ reasoning, it could be perceived as a warning signal by 
consumers and subsequently sow distrust in these widely accepted products so 
far. Finally, the notion of decisions that are based upon an economic rationale 
in theory, became differently filled with meaning throughout these organiza-
tion’s perceptions of and maneuvers in their respective environments. 
4.3 Preliminary Conclusion 
While the previous chapter was dedicated to the legal frameworks that aim to 
assure a safe food supply to consumers in Germany and in the United States, in 
the present chapter it has been outlined what became of their ‘original’ norma-
tive meaning. As these norms not only have put their addressees into action but 
rather have been put into action themselves, the ‘regulation’ of GM Food in 
both these networks was fulfilled quite differently. Part of this difference can 
be explained by the legal norms in that they rested upon differing understand-
ings of what the nature of the issue is about and how it should be dealt with 
adequately. By doing so, they also mobilized different means to the end of sta-
bilizing and securing the normative expectation that GM Food is safe. In that, 
they had prepared part of what was going to happen when they finally entered 
their respective network. However, another, equally important part of the ex-
planation is to be found within the networks themselves. Here, in Germany as 
well as in the United States crop developers, food processing industry and their 
respective associations have been the rule’s original addressees, but also far 
more ‘addressees’ felt affected by the issue GM Food and thus took part in the 
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regulatory process in shape of the organizations’ environment. In doing so, the 
most of all economic organizations were confronted with disparate environ-
ments, which to varying degrees were consequently perceived as more or less 
constraining these organizations’ maneuvers in their network. Consequently, 
the organizations ‘responded’ differently to their respective legal environ-
ments. Moreover, throughout these responses not only the notion of economic 
decision-making but also the meaning of the legal rules themselves became 
filled with meaning. In that, finally also the ‘nature’ of GM Food became more 
or less ultimately defined.  
The most striking differences in that context could be observed in the 
perception that a science based regulation in the United States was considered 
as sufficient to deal with GM Food since by referring to scientific criteria, 
doubts regarding the safety of these products could be dispelled. In contrast, in 
Germany, the legal rule has been observed as inadequate to deal with the ob-
served conflict since scientific knowledge no longer was observed as fully 
grasping the doubts public has about these products. Consequently, also sci-
ence based regulatory agencies were observed as not credible since public 
rather demanded for an assessment of GM Food that is not solely based on sci-
entific but rather soft criteria such as the need for these products. These percep-
tions have led to different coping strategies in the both networks and imprinted 
different meanings to the issue itself. 
While the dominant interpretation of GM Food in the United States was 
that it is rather a ‘normative’ problem – if a ‘problem’ at all – in the German 
network the prevailing interpretation became that GM Food is a cognitive 
problem since it cannot sufficiently be assessed by scientific criteria. In fact, 
‘knowledge’ has to be taken into account that stems from all affected spheres 
in order to achieve an appropriate way of dealing with these products. There-
fore, the distinction invoked at the outset of the present study now reappears in 
that in the case of cognitive uncertainty (as observed in the German network) 
knowledge became acknowledged as the outstanding medium to solve this un-
certainty in a more adequate way than power. Power in contrast, became in-
voked in the American network, since GM Food here has predominantly be 
characterized by a normative uncertainty – if there have been observed uncer-
tainties at all (see more below chapter 5). 
In addition, these findings can now be re-married with the abovemen-
tioned assessment of the disparate approaches to biotechnology in Germany 
and the United States, thus to the distinction between a product based approach 
(US) in contrast to a program based approach (Germany). This distinction can 
be integrated into the outlined distinction between a normative and a cognitive 
problem in that the definition of GM Food as a cognitive problem has led to a 
revaluation of so far neglected knowledge stocks (that is, societal knowledge) 
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in that those were found to provide more appropriate criteria for the ultimate 
design of coping strategies in that context. Thus, in whether intentionally or 
unintentionally not only triggering but also enabling a societal debate over the 
pros and cons of GM Food (thus, over the societal program for its handling), 
criteria evolved as relevant, that are not exclusively based on science but rather 
on everyday practices and experiences by those affected from these products. 
In contrast, in predominantly understanding GM Food as characterized by 
normative uncertainty as happened in the United States, first of all power in 
shape of legal rules that are backed by scientific knowledge became invoked, 
that merely focused on the products and no longer on the process by which 
they were derived nor on probably implicated societal impacts. Thereby, the 
‘naked’ product was put in the fore in that approach. 
While the present chapter was dedicated to the organizational responses 
to the legal regulation of GM Food in both Germany and in the United States, it 
will thus be the aim of the next chapter to point out to what extent these results 
may account as the empirical proof for the implicitly claimed superiority of the 
organizational-based approach developed in this study over nation-stated cen-
tered models of explanation for observable differences between the German 
and the American network ‘GM Food’. Most notably, it will also be examined 
which regulatory structures have evolved within the both networks as an effect 
of the interplay among the respective legal norms and the subsequent organiza-
tional responses. 
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“Macht bedeutet den Luxus, 
nicht lernen zu müssen, um ein Problem zu lösen, 
weil das Problem normativ geregelt ist. 
Wissen bedeutet den Luxus  
etwas gelernt zu haben, was ein Problem löst,  
für das keine normative Erwartungsbildung  
zum Zuge gekommen ist.“ 
(Helmut Willke, 2001) 
 
5 Unpacking ‘National Styles’: Discussion  
Against the background of the findings presented in the previous chapter, an 
often made assumption regarding the reasons for the observable differences 
between Germany and the United States in their societal way of dealing with 
GM Food can be rejected: that is the assumption that with regard to the defini-
tion of GM Food there will be less dissent in the United States than in Ger-
many. This assumption can no longer be upheld as in both these networks dis-
parate definitions of GM Food could be observed. The differences that oc-
curred at the societal ‘surface’ could thus not be traced back to a fundamental 
different understanding of the issue itself, that would in the given case be a 
typical American or German understanding of GM Food.  
At the outset of chapter 4 the claim was made that, under conditions of 
world society, organizations will constitute the network that base their deci-
sions upon distinctions such as legal/illegal, true/untrue or payment/non-
payment. Thus, in both these networks organizations were to be expected that 
could roughly be characterized as scientific, legal or economic organizations in 
the first place. In this generality, no difference between Germany and the 
United States could be claimed in a meaningful way as on either sides of the 
Atlantic those distinctions, or more precisely, binary oppositions count as the 
functional primacies of the respective subsystems law, science, and economy. 
For this reason, homogeneity has been expected as a GM Food network will be 
constituted by legal, political, scientific, and economic organizations regardless 
the national background. In addition, as demonstrated, this expectation was 
fulfilled in that the original addressees of the legal rules observed themselves 
as surrounded by regulatory agencies, social movement organizations and vari-
ous kinds of associations that in their total have constituted the networks in the 
United States as well as in Germany. Given that organizations make sense of 
their environment partly based on these binary oppositions it could be observed 
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that the most of all economic organizations in Germany as well as in the United 
States had defined GM Food as a product that can be sold in order to make 
profit with it. In that, a homogeneity regarding the issue’s definition could be 
observed among the legal rules’ original addressees that criss-crosses territorial 
borders. 
Nevertheless, as organizations are not only conceived of as normatively 
closed but also as cognitively open, it was expected that as soon as the organi-
zations introduced their respective definitions of the issue into the network, 
they were likely to meet with opposition. As organizations that constitute part 
of their environments also had – accordingly to their normative orientation – 
defined GM Food and arranged their strategies in accordance with what from 
their point of view appeared as an appropriate, rational handling, this plurality 
of sensemaking processes apparently resulted in multiple, conflicting or at 
worst contradicting meanings of what GM Food is about. Therefore, instead of 
conceiving of GM Food as a seemingly identical issue it rather has to be de-
scribed as a member of various organizational environments, which has been 
embedded in differing contexts and thus been ascribed differing meanings. 
Since it is one expectation society charges the law with that it solves con-
flicts, which arise within and between the various social subsystems and which 
are triggered by different understandings of an appropriate way of dealing with 
a given issue also in the case of GM Food the law was invoked in order to ul-
timately decide which definition accounts as the valuable, legitimate definition 
throughout the network. As outlined in chapter 3, this task has been fulfilled 
differently in Germany and the United States. While the American legal 
framework has provided a definition of GM Food as not differing from conven-
tional food the German (European) framework did not provide a clear cut defi-
nition but rather defined GM Food as ‘novel’ and in that as formerly unknown. 
By doing so, both these legal frameworks defined their regulatory trigger as a 
normative problem (US) or, in contrast, as a cognitive problem (Germany). 
Consequently, either power or knowledge was expected to accompany the mo-
bilization process of the legal rule in the given interorganizational network. 
Moreover, given that these processes of mobilization by means of either power 
or knowledge have been carried out by the organizations that have emerged 
around the issue, their power or knowledge based strategies were likely to 
shape not only the legal rule and the issue itself, but also the overall appearance 
of the network. Thus, in confrontation with their legal environment and contin-
gent on the perceived dominance of that environment, organizations were 
forced whether to adjust to that environment, which is to learn, or rather them-
selves forced other organizations to adjust to their very interpretation that is to 
cling to their own original premises. Consequently, one or the other tendency 
was expected to imprint the respective network with its seal. Finally, what 
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could be observed was that although the most of all economic organizations 
had defined the issue identically in both networks, contingent on the perceived 
‘environmental’ impact, they had developed different coping strategies, thus 
reappearing as national differences at the surface of the network. 
Therefore, instead of claiming a German or American understanding of 
GM Food, the observable differences between both these investigated interor-
ganizational networks in the following will be discussed as an effect of the 
complex interplay among the organizations as the networks’ constituents, their 
respective legal environments, and, finally, GM Food as the issue in question. 
5.1 The German Case: ‘Corporatism’? 
The introduction of GM Food into the German market has been described as 
accompanied by resistance and protest. Although this opposition could not 
fully prevent the penetration of these products into the food supply, it has at 
least triggered a broad public discussion that neither industry nor politics could 
evade and which also demanded concessions in form of withdrawals of GM 
Foods. In contrast to what would have been an explanation in terms of ‘na-
tional styles’, these findings cannot adequately be described as the outcome of 
a typical ‘German’ corporatism. 
In fact, the interorganizational network GM Food in Germany has not 
shown any signs of ‘corporatism’. On the contrary, in the context of this issue 
groups have been perceived as having taken the lead that usually are not char-
acterized as established associations, which have strong ties with the govern-
ment and can thus rely or participate from governmental power. However, re-
calling the characterization outlined in chapter 1.2.1, this would be one out-
standing feature of a presumed ‘German’ regulatory style.  
Instead, the German network has been dominated by the influence of 
pressure groups, whereby Greenpeace has been observed as taken over an out-
standing position as opinion leader. Also probably well established relations 
among industry and the regulatory agencies have in this given case not been 
observed as an advantage as both, industry and the agencies were perceived has 
having no credibility in the public’s eye. Instead, public interest groups were 
observed as credible in the public debate. Consequently, a probably close co-
operation of influential associations and state agencies in the given case has not 
been observed as helpful to overcome the perceived public unrest with GM 
Food.  
As with the visibility of public interest groups, also the assessment has to 
be rejected that science in Germany is established in a hierarchical way. The 
perception of the respective organizations in the German network has instead 
been that science was characterized not only by plurality, but also by a decreas-
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ing legitimacy. Organizations have rather observed that decisions, which were 
solely based upon established scientific knowledge would not be adequate an-
swers to the public’s demands and expectations. Thus, established science ex-
perts have in this case no longer been ascribed a monopoly role in the decision 
making process while critical science has rather been observed as offering 
more appropriate even though not unambiguous answers.  
Thus, instead of clinging to the national styles approach, the overall ap-
pearance of the GM Food network in Germany can more adequately be de-
scribed on the background of the theoretical assumptions outlined in chapter 2. 
In that perspective, the central claim was that the overall appearance of a net-
work can be traced back to the legal regulation of the issue in question. With 
regard to GM Food, one can now say that the original addressees of the legal 
norms in the German network in their total have not perceived the existence of 
clear-cut normative expectations throughout their network. In that, they had 
been forced to expect cognitively, thus running the risk of being disappointed 
at any time. Consequently, they had two options: whether to adjust constantly 
their own expectations to ever-changing environmental circumstances or to 
establish reliable rules themselves. The first option clearly has to be discarded 
as organizations depend upon a minimum amount of planning reliability in 
order to uphold their operations in the short run and thus to achieve their goals 
in the long run. As a result, in the German network the emergence of rules 
could be observed that established a system of guidance and governance be-
yond the official law of the state that is a private governance regime. 
The overall impression of a conflict-ridden situation thus has in the light 
of these findings be reconsidered as the effect of negotiation and trial-and-error 
processes among the constituents of the network and their legal environ-
ment(s), consequently not only of the respective laws but also of the culture 
surrounding them.  
5.1.1 Activating instead of Settling: NFR as legal environment 
The introduction of the NFR into its networks has to be described as a re-
opening of the norm-setting process. Instead of marking the closure of a fore-
going societal debate, the introduction of the regulatory framework re-opened 
this process not only among its original addressees but rather among all or-
ganizations that have evolved as constituents of the interorganizational network 
GM Food in Germany, thus producing further paradigms for arguments.  
Here, at least two interrelated reasons for this re-opening could be identi-
fied, the first of which was that the rule could not be applied in practice as it 
was perceived as phrased in too broad a language. The rule has provided am-
ple room for its very interpretation in introducing not only vague legal terms 
such as a “significant degree” [nennenswerter Umfang] in Article 1 NFR (e.g. 
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Berg 1995: 116) or “equivalent” [gleichwertig] in Article 8 NFR (e.g. Unland 
2003) but also vague demands as to what data are needed for the application 
procedure. This is also remarkable as at first sight it seemed to be narrowly 
drawn and, in contrast to its American counterpart, providing a “more detailed 
regulatory scheme” (Echols 1998: 533). But as it became introduced into its 
field, the rule was perceived as weak in its wording and, irrespective the exact 
number of rules and directives that constitute the regulatory framework in its 
total, as not capable of preventing or settling the public unrest with GM Prod-
ucts by establishing one dominant and thus legitimate interpretation of what 
GM Food is about, consequently to secure the expectation that GM Food is 
safe.  
However, this ‘failure’ has been observed merely as an effect of a second 
and more central problem of the NFR, which is the perception that it has been 
designed ‘in theory’ [am grünen Tisch]. As a result, the rule was observed as 
lacking a hands-on knowledge for its original addressees in a double sense. 
Firstly, with regard to the organizations’ paramount goal of selling GM Food in 
the German market, the rule did not provide guidance in that it neither clearly 
allowed for the marketing of these products nor did it clearly forbid the market-
ing. Secondly, with regard to the organizations’ perceptions of their societal 
environment, the rule also was perceived as inappropriate in referring to scien-
tific knowledge as exclusive basis for decision-making. In fact, the organiza-
tions’ perceptions had been that science alone did not provide adequate an-
swers to their environment’s expectations and demands. Solely following 
NFR’s obligation has rather been perceived as illegitimate and consequently as 
unwanted. 
Therefore, the rule has rather activated an in-context production of 
knowledge whereby disparate interpretations of the issue as unnecessary versus 
beneficiary, thus as safe versus dangerous, consequently as wanted versus un-
wanted not only were acknowledged but also were perceived as equally legiti-
mate. Since the rule was not capable of singling out one of these interpretations 
as the only valid interpretation in the future, this ultimate decision process has 
been left to the various organizations partaking in the network.  
Thus, in the aftermath of NFR’s introduction a debate was triggered that 
can now be described as making up for missed opportunities in the past, to at 
least try to fathom what could be accepted as an appropriate way of dealing 
with GM Food.1 In this debate, not only GM Food and the way of dealing with 
                                                     
1  It seems that society has ‘learned’ as for instance the process of lawmaking for stem cell 
research has been accompanied by a broad (although mass media centered) debate wherein 
the various facets – possible benefits as well as disadvantages of the issue – have been 
thoroughly fathomed (see chapter 1, n. 6). To what degree this debate will prevent future 
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it became questioned but also the regulation and its ability to assure the safety 
of these products. The perception that the rule was not accepted by the poten-
tial buying public and its representatives even amplified its weakness as its 
original addressees (again) came to the conclusion that decisions based upon 
that rule would not be accepted or rather be perceived as illegitimate in the 
network. In view of an unsettled legal environment, the organizations thus ob-
served themselves in an uncertain situation concerning the question of how to 
deal with the issue – thus, whether or not to introduce and whether or not to 
label – and if, in what manner. The legal environment, as it has been perceived 
by the addressees of the rule, has charged the organizations with an amount of 
uncertainty that has rather paralyzed instead of encourage them to introduce 
GM Food into the German food supply. Finally, while in its original normative 
meaning the rule aimed to provide guidance for the introduction of GM Food 
into the market, throughout the organizational coping strategies it rather be-
came enacted as guidance for the avoidance of GM Food.  
5.1.2 Organizational Maneuvers in the Dark: Decoupling and Avoidance 
The developing, processing and retailing industry as original addressees of the 
outlined regulatory framework, have conceived of GM Food as a normative 
problem in the first place. This definition was the outcome of their sensemak-
ing processes wherein they had categorized GM Food under the familiar cate-
gory of (traditional) food. In so doing, the cognitive uncertainty of the issue has 
been made invisible by the invocation of an established scientific knowledge 
base. Still remaining open questions concerning GM Food then were consid-
ered as a negligible risk in contrast to the (economic) benefits, thus chances 
that have been ascribed to the issue. This is consistent as far as these organiza-
tions originally have described themselves as decision makers concerning the 
question whether or not these products will enter the market. Based upon the 
premise that GM Food bears more benefits than risks - for them - those organi-
zations have decided to market these products like any other products. 
Nevertheless, as outlined above, in confrontation with their legal envi-
ronments, the organizations found themselves in the midst of a controversy 
they had not anticipated, thus not built into their premises. More importantly, 
they perceived themselves in an unregulated situation in that the applicable 
legal regulation NFR has not been capable of providing a reliable normative 
basis by distinguishing one interpretation as the valid one. Consequently, they 
faced a situation in which their interpretation of the issue was only one among 
other, alternative interpretations. As they did not observe themselves backed by 
legal statutes, the opposition against their interpretation of GM Food as safe 
                                                                                                                                            
conflicts in that field cannot be assessed yet, but from that point in time it appears as one 
step into the ‘right’ direction (see more below, chapter 6). 
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and beneficial was observed as a threat to their paramount goals that is selling 
these products in order to refinance themselves. In so observing their means for 
survival endangered and at the same time unsupported by the law, they devel-
oped their own strategies in order to cope with their environment’s demands. 
Those coping strategies can now be described as contingent on the indi-
vidual organizations’ self-descriptions as to their ‘distance’ to GM Food. This 
description has determined the organizations’ flexibility to their environment’s 
demands in that agribusiness organizations have described the food market and 
thus the GM Food market as only one part of their circle of clientele (beside 
the market for agricultural products). Even so, under the effect of the attitude 
of the food processing organizations, they observed themselves as forced to 
take even food consumers as relevant clientele into account. Consequently they 
yielded to public demands in a way that they had observed not only as an ap-
propriate answer to these demands but also as a possibility to uphold their iden-
tity as the producer of genetically modified crops, thus by decoupling. In con-
trast, food processing organizations have described private food consumers as 
their ultimate clientele, thus observing themselves as highly dependent upon 
the (GM) food market. In that, they perceived themselves as less flexible than 
agribusiness, and under the effect of the network’s dominant interpretation of 
GM Food as unwanted and illegitimate they came to adhere to this interpreta-
tion by avoiding genetically modified products.  
Decoupling 
By establishing public relations departments that exclusively deal with green 
biotechnology, agribusiness observed themselves as answering to public de-
mands, which in their perception has been more information and transparency. 
As GM Food has not been perceived as bearing an insufficient cognitive basis, 
the perceived resistance could only be observed in a meaningful way as the 
outcome of misinformation. Therefore, the problem appeared to be resolvable 
by ‘better’ ways to educate the public about the ‘real’ benefits and possible 
risks, which is by information meetings, for instance.  
However, in so changing their policy of disclosure in order to meet pub-
lic demands and finally gain acceptance for their products on the one side, ag-
ribusiness could also hold on to their original meaning of GM Products as bear-
ing a competitive advantage. In that, they abided by their paramount and thus 
long-term goal to convert this advantage into monetary resources while at the 
same time adapting to the probably short-term demands of an ever-changing 
environment (e.g. Meyer & Rowan 1977). 
Thus, by establishing a new department and in so changing their internal 
structure, the organizations decoupled their action segments (the production of 
gene constructs and genetically modified seed and crops) from their less active 
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parts (the talk about these products). Consequently, by decoupling the organi-
zations achieved the ability to do contradictory things at the same time: loosely 
coupled talk and action (Brunsson 1989).  
Avoidance 
On the background of their perception of their respective legal environment, 
food processing organizations concluded that the introduction of GM Food is 
unwanted by their clientele, the food consumers. In addition, as these organiza-
tions understood themselves as depending upon the food market, they decided 
to avoid GM ingredients since they had to perceive the public unease as a 
threat to their paramount goal and thus their survival.  
But as the legal regulation for GM Food has not provided clear guidance 
for the introduction as well as for the labeling of such products, food process-
ing industry in order to ensure GM-free products chose to fall back upon estab-
lished economic practices such as a system of certification and contract farm-
ing2 [Vertragsanbau], thus on contracting. 
By setting up a system of certifications food processing organizations 
aimed at establishing rules that would guarantee not only GM-free commodi-
ties but that would also be resistant to factual disappointment. In a system of 
certifications, each distributor has to proof by a certificate that his commodities 
have not been genetically engineered. The distributor can hence be held liable 
if this expectation becomes disappointed, thus if it turns out that his commodi-
ties have been intermingled with GM soy, for instance. The establishment of a 
system of certification was expected to produce document trails that in the end 
would account as a functional equivalent for the normative expectation that 
‘GM-free’ does mean that products labeled as such do not contain any GM 
ingredients, an expectation that so far could not be established by the applica-
ble legal regulation. In that, food processing organizations also discharged the 
risk of probably being held liable for wrong labeling. 
Another way to ensure GM-free products has been contract farming. 
Contract farming aims at exacting a standard of quality, in the given case the 
absence of genetically engineered products. Usually, contract farming is ap-
plied in order to ensure a certain amount of goods that hold certain characteris-
tics, such as the absence of herbicides, or, in the given case the absence of ge-
netic engineering. By contract, the distributor thus obliges to cultivate a given 
amount of goods while the purchaser obliges to take delivery. Such a purchase 
                                                     
2  In order to prevent misunderstandings it has to be mentioned that while the German term 
Vertragsanbau refers to a purchase commitment, the translated term contract farming 
seems to refer to farm management systems at least in British English. 
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commitment provides the necessary planning reliability that allows for longer 
horizons in economic planning. 
Both these outlined coping strategies now can be described as contracting 
and thus as an economic transaction for the efficient allocation of resources 
such as GM free ingredients. However, contracting also contrafactually secures 
the expectation that these resources are delivered in that a breach or non-
fulfillment of the contract is legally sanctioned. By establishing these contract 
systems, food processing organizations have generated rules that bind future 
and thus provide planning reliability. Consequently, by contracting these or-
ganizations developed a strategy whereby they could adequately answer to 
their environments’ demands for GM Free products in avoiding3 genetically 
modified ingredients. In making use of the normative power of the legal insti-
tution ‘contract’, they aimed to establish the expectation that their products are 
GM-free and thus safe. On the other side, in so doing, they also established a 
framework under which they could uphold their operations of producing sale-
able goods in order to reproduce themselves, thus to survive.  
In more abstract, these coping strategies can now be described as the re-
sults of organizational learning processes. As could be shown, although these 
organizations clung to their original decision premise – that is, that GM Food is 
based upon a sufficient knowledge base and has thus to be considered as safe – 
they came to question the appropriateness of their subsequent decisions when 
they were faced with opposition in their respective environments. Since they 
observed their premise as not normatively secured, they were rather forced to 
expect cognitively. Consequently, even though they could not question their 
original premise4 they questioned their behavior and corrected it in accordance 
with what they had perceived as appropriate instead, thus rebuilding their cog-
nitive frame. 
To conclude, one can now say that in being confronted with their envi-
ronments the original addressees of the NFR came to question their original 
decision premises in that they observed dissenting interpretations of GM Food. 
These interpretations of the issue as ridden with cognitive uncertainty and thus 
as probably hazardous had to be taken into account as relevant as the organiza-
tions perceived their own interpretations as not being backed by the legal stat-
utes. Thus, these organizations found themselves as left to their own devices 
and designed coping strategies beyond the legal framework in order to uphold 
their proceedings. Contingent on their self-descriptions as more or less depend-
ing upon the market for GM Food, they made use of strategies that would en-
                                                     
3  For responses to food safety regulation in general see Henson & Heasman 1998. 
4  They could not because this would have threatened not only their paramount goal and thus 
their survival but, more importantly, it would have threatened the identity of these organi-
zations as economic organizations in the first place. 
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able them to uphold their economic actions in order to reproduce (that is, refi-
nance) themselves by selling goods (Luhmann 2000: 467) while at the same 
time yielding to their environment’s demands since both these requirements in 
the given context have been perceived as constitutive for one another. Never-
theless, in view of the absence of clear legal guidance the organizations were 
forced to mobilize ‘indigenous’ knowledge, thus knowledge that most of all 
stems from their specialized realm economy. This knowledge about economic 
coherences, the perception of lacking legal support and resistance towards their 
products in their total have then led to above outlined strategies. Given these 
strategies, the network GM Food in Germany has now to be re-examined anew. 
5.1.3 The Network Revisited: Regulation beyond the Shadow of Law 
The observations outlined in the previous two sections demand for some cor-
rections in common assessments of the German approach to GM Food in that 
the network no longer sufficiently can be described as ridden with conflict. 
What has appeared as a conflict at the network’s surface is rather the outcome 
of the interplay among the NFR, its original addressees and their perception of 
their legal environment whereby the legal norm must be assigned an out-
standing position.  
Instead of preventing or settling the smoldering conflict over the intro-
duction of GM Food into the German food supply, the NFR for reasons out-
lined above, was not perceived as providing guidance, neither in allowing nor 
in forbidding the introduction of such products. Thus, no unambiguous defini-
tion of the issue has been observed as normatively supported nor has the expec-
tation been observed as established, that GM Food is safe to eat. In fact, the 
organizations came to perceive their own definitions of GM Food ‘merely’ as 
one definition among other, equally legitimate definitions. As a result, the de-
bate over GM Food, its nature, its problems and how they should be solved 
properly was re-opened not only among the original addressees of the legal 
norm but rather among all organizations that have felt affected by GM Food. 
Those groups have taken part in the regulatory process since they suddenly 
were observed as relevant constituents of the respective organizational envi-
ronments. In that normatively unsettled situation, the original addressees of the 
rule found themselves in a situation where they were forced to revise if not 
their original definition of the issue but their decisions that have followed from 
this definition. In being confronted with obviously equally legitimate but dis-
senting interpretations of GM Food and thus varying understandings of its ap-
propriate handling, the organizations rebuilt their cognitive structure, thus 
learned. As an outcome of these learning processes, they also established con-
tracting as (self-) regulating mode that enabled them to uphold their proceed-
ings under the conditions of an uncertain environment.  
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Regulating by Contracting 
As the organizations in the German network observed themselves as left to 
their own devices they established their own private governance regime beyond 
the official law by contracting. But while contracting has so far been discussed 
as a means that secures economic transactions and thus as an economic event, 
contracting also has to be understood as a legal event in that special conditions 
are singled out as normatively secured, thus as legal (vs. illegal). Although this 
time binding function of contracting is one characteristic, the most decisive 
feature lies within the fact that a contract acknowledges the autonomy of the 
contractors in that it not only establishes normatively secured conditions but 
rather in that it leaves the actual definition of these conditions to the parties 
involved (Luhmann 1987a: 75). 
In so doing, knowledge stocks become activated that otherwise are easily 
overlooked. In the given case, this has been the organization’s knowledge not 
only about economic coherences but, most notably, about the GM Food net-
work in Germany in that the organizations have perceived the introduction of 
GM Food as unwanted. It is this ‘knowledge’ that is incorporated into the sys-
tems of contract farming and the systems of certification. And even more im-
portantly, these economic events could also be observed as legal events in that 
the law was enabled to productively misread the event contract growing as 
marking the introduction of GM Food as illegal in this network.  
Recent legal developments on the European level that have to be traced 
back to development in the various European member states, thus seem to pay 
witness for such a misreading (e.g. Fuchs & Herrmann 2001). For instance, the 
European Commission in 2001 launched a Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on genetically modified food and feed 
(EC 2001) that aims at a consistent and solid regulation of genetically modified 
crops all over Europe. This contains some qualitative changes that can now be 
read as a reply to the observations made in the present study in that not only the 
NFR and its subsequent regulations will be amended by this new regulatory 
framework5 but also some major changes will be made. Even though this 
framework still seems to contain conceptual inconsistencies, with regard to the 
question of labeling it aims to set up a more consistent and transparent system 
in that not only a process and production methods label (PPM Label) will be 
imposed but also a traceability system will be established. In doing so, infor-
mation provided on labels become controlled through a traceability system that 
helps to trace back potentially modified products throughout the distribution 
network to their origin. As a result, food processors will be enabled to clearly 
                                                     
5  This holds true (beside others) for Regulation (EC) No 258/97, for Commission Regulation 
(EC) No 49/2000 and for the Commission Regulation (EC) No 50/2000. 
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distinguish between conventional and genetically modified crops and avoid the 
latter ones if they perceive this as expected by their relevant environment. This 
system thus seems to reflect the certification systems set up by the organiza-
tions in the German network. Consequently, the organization’s knowledge 
about the German network in that became the law’s knowledge about what 
accounts for as an appropriate way of dealing with GM Food throughout the 
network.  
By setting up contract systems to keep their products GM-free, the or-
ganizations have established a private governance system beyond the official 
norm that has made use of so far neglected knowledge stocks. In so doing, 
‘thicker’ knowledge was mobilized that did not exclusively focus on scientific 
‘facts’ but rather on context-sensitive knowledge. By contracting this knowl-
edge was translated into the norm producing logic of the law, that, as demon-
strated re-appeared as the law’s tacit knowledge in shape of legal norms.  
Contracting in that has led to the production of legal rules out of the so-
cietal conflict over GM Food. Those rules finally bear the potential to reply at 
least more appropriately to this conflict, even though perfect adequacy can, due 
to the sensemaking and enactment processes outlined in the present study, not 
be reached. In its total, contracting can now be described not only as a means 
to ensure economic transactions but rather as the decisive mode of regulation in 
the German network. 
Conclusion: Expenses and Opportunities of Loose Ties  
The outcome of the above outlined regulatory processes has become most evi-
dent at the point of sale as the German food supply at present has to be consid-
ered as GM-free. Moreover, this outcome is as ambiguous as the issue GM 
Food itself since it has to be considered as achieved at expenses while at the 
same time new opportunities were opened up – contingent on the respective 
perspective.  
Given that the original aim of agribusiness and food processors in the 
network has been to make profits with GM Food and presumably have invested 
resources into the development and the processing of these products, they 
would have to conclude that the regulation of GM Food has been costly, in 
terms of money and time and in the end not ‘successful’. In being confronted 
with their environments, they came to revise their original decisions and had 
rather to install mechanisms to avoid GM products. In that, economic organiza-
tions found themselves in an inferior position in the network whereby the ob-
servation is confirmed that the economic system does not take a central role in 
modern society. Even though it is the only system that can provide money and 
ensure the willingness to adopt money, its organizations not only depend upon 
money but also upon legitimacy. Therefore, assigning them a ‘natural’ superior 
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role has rather to be rejected as an optical distortion (Luhmann 2000: 46). In 
fact, in the German GM Food network, their original interpretation of GM 
Food became overruled by the alternative interpretation of these products as 
unsafe and thus unwanted. In addition, if the intention of a legal rule is seen in 
its ability to guide social behavior and, in so doing, prevent or solve a conflict, 
also the introduction of the NFR into its field has in the light of the results pre-
sented, to be described as a ‘failure’. For the reasons outlined in the present 
chapter, the rule was not capable of providing guidance, nor could it solve the 
conflict over GM Food. Instead, it triggered a new conflict-ridden debate over 
these products wherein not only these products but also itself was targeted. 
However, the findings presented here have on the background of the out-
lined theoretical framework to be understood as less pessimistic. Even tough 
the NFR has proven incapable of dealing with the complexity of the introduc-
tion of GM Food adequately, it has triggered not only a new conflict but rather 
encouraged the establishment of a regulatory mode that probably is more capa-
ble of replying to the difficulties that have occurred in the network. In ‘failing’ 
to secure the expectation that GM Food is safe and by so doing, distinguishing 
this interpretation of the issue as the only valuable, it has at the same time 
opened up the opportunity for alternative voices to be heard. These divergent 
interpretations were regarded as equally legitimate as none of them had been 
singled out as valuable. Consequently, attention was called to the irreducible 
heterogeneity of the network. Those organizations that had perceived of GM 
Food as characterized by normative uncertainty that thus appeared to be re-
solvable by the employment of political and economic power, were forced to 
revise their premises, thus to learn.  
In that normatively unsettled situation, power no longer appeared the 
adequate medium to pacify the open conflict over GM Food. Instead, the or-
ganizations fell back upon established economic knowledge, thus setting up a 
heterarchical contracting system wherein the social autonomy of those in-
volved was acknowledged. Throughout the subsequent negotiation and trial-
and-error processes a regulatory structure was achieved that is based upon 
‘thicker strategies’ in that it takes into account the plurality of interpretations 
and practices that, as a result of these processes, appeared to be legitimate. 
Consequently, not only economic but also the economic organization’s knowl-
edge about the ‘informal’ rules of the network has been inscribed into these 
contracting systems, which was translated then into the norm producing logic 
of the law. Therefore, rules could be derived that seem to be more responsive 
to the network’s demands since they have appeared to be closer to the ‘reality’ 
of the multiple perspectives, which exist throughout the network. And since 
rules have been based upon the assumption that GM Food is rather been char-
acterized by cognitive uncertainty, knowledge that had been neglected so far, 
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came to evolve as a resource by which a more adequate handling seemed pos-
sible, thus as a medium of social guidance. 
Finally, the GM Food network in Germany no longer can only be de-
scribed as ridden with conflict but rather as a loosely coupled network wherein 
the variety of existing interpretations of the issue appeared to be equally le-
gitimate. In sum, this untilled field has in the end led to cooperation among 
those who had observed themselves as affected by GM Food. Consequently, 
the ‘regulation of GM Food’ now must rather be understood as regulation be-
yond the shadow of law than a regulatory failure. And in this respect, society 
has filled the meaning of what accounts as legal resp. illegal action with regard 
to GM Food, in that confirming the statement that “it is society that controls 
law and not the reverse” (Cochrane 1971: 93-94). 
5.2 The American Case: ‘Exceptionalism’? 
The interorganizational network in the United States has been described as 
comparatively ‘calm’ in the way of dealing with GM Food. Even though there 
have been protests in the process of the introduction of GM Food and occa-
sionally thereafter, these protests have not proven to be as socially explosive as 
in Germany. Nevertheless, in the light of the findings presented so far, this na-
tional disparity no longer can be explained as the effect of a typical American 
regulatory style, i.e., an American ‘exceptionalism’. 
As with German corporatism, the talk about an ‘American exceptional-
ism’ in the realm of the regulation of risk technologies has lost its plausibility 
against the background of the presented results. If one wants to invoke these 
distinctions, one would now have to argue that the GM Food network in the 
United States is rather characterized by what has been called ‘corporatism’ 
than by signs of ‘exceptionalism’.  
Given that strong ties could be observed between influential associations 
and state agencies, the chances for pressure groups to influence the decision 
making process on GM Food have been dramatically diminished. Although 
there is broad legal access to the courts for pressure groups, as demonstrated by 
the existence of legal institutions such as public interest litigation and class 
action suits, these possibilities have not proven supportive for such groups – as 
has admittedly been the case in the context of the Clean Air Act. These legal 
institutions in this context have rather become edgeless instruments for two 
reasons. Firstly, suits against the state agencies such as FDA have been ob-
served as a common event that is not perceived as a threat for the superior or-
ganizations’ goals. Secondly, also administration has adapted to legalistic ex-
pectations of openness and transparency by rather burying critical groups in a 
flood of data than obscuring key information, those have difficulties to work 
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through due to their scarce resources not only in terms of money but also in 
terms of staff. Consequently, the institutions of broad legal access and the 
freedom of information in the context of GM Food have become impeded. In 
fact, they have become edgeless instruments as regulation has rather taken 
place in the shadow of the official law of the state.6 
Something similar can also be stated for the claimed scientific plurality 
as a characteristic in an at least asserted American regulatory approach. Instead 
of scientific pluralism, the scientific realm has been perceived much more uni-
form than in the German network by assigning established science a monopoly 
role in the debate. That is not to say that critical expertise does not exist in the 
United States, but in the given case of GM Food this has not been perceived as 
relevant for decision-making. 
Again the national styles approach does not seem to grasp these findings 
adequately. As with the German case, they seem rather the result of the inter-
play among the respective organizations and their perceptions of the legal envi-
ronment, thus encompassing not only the respective law but rather the whole 
host of expectations, pressures and opportunities inscribed into it. In contrast to 
the German case, the original addressees have unanimously observed the exis-
tence not only of clear-cut rules for organizational guidance but also the exis-
tence of stabile normative expectations that have provided a convenient 
framework for economic action. As the organizations have perceived them-
selves in fully agreement with these contrafactually secured expectations, they 
were not forced to adapt to deviant interpretations or demands in their envi-
ronments. In fact, they did not even perceive those alternative demands as rele-
vant.  
The overall impression of a rather settled and pacified network more 
adequately has to be described as the ‘successful’ establishment of one domi-
nant interpretation throughout the network, which at the same time has led to 
the neglect of alternative interpretations.  
5.2.1 Threatening and Responding: Plant Derived Foods Policy 
Different from Germany, the Plant Derived Foods Policy as the applicable 
regulation for the introduction of GM into the American market has established 
reliable normative conditions for organizational decision making in that it con-
trafactually secured the expectation that GM Food is safe to eat. In contrast to 
the first impression, this is remarkable as far as the regulatory scheme appeared 
to be weak in its enforcing power as it is ‘merely’ a declaration of intent and 
thus does not provide legal sanctions in case of non-compliance. Consequently, 
a common impression is that “the U.S. regulatory approach permits a great deal 
                                                     
6  For a critical assessment of class action litigation see Parmer 2002. 
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of industry self-regulation” (Echols 1998: 533). However, although this im-
pression holds true, based on the findings presented in the previous chapter, it 
has to be revised, or at least modified. In merely stressing the ‘self-regulative’ 
aspect of the regulatory approach to GM Food in the United States, one easily 
overlooks that this self-regulation is fulfilled under a ‘benign big gun’ (see 
chapter 1.1.2). In the given case of GM Food, these sanctions refer to the com-
pliance not only with the aforementioned FDCA but also to strict product li-
ability legislation and extensive consumer protection laws. And even though it 
has been questioned to what extent product liability legislation would act as a 
deterrent in the realm of biotechnology (e.g. Stovsky 1992) the amount of con-
sumer related legal action as well as the already mentioned size of compensa-
tions can be regarded as in their total having created a climate wherein biotech-
related companies are likely to avoid a breach of these rules. Therefore, the 
‘successful’ application of the Plant Derived Foods Policy in the light of the 
outlined organizational responses and under the aforementioned premises can 
now be traced back to the following, interrelated factors.  
The most central cause for the perception of a highly regulated network 
is to be found in the organizations’ perceptions that the policy has rather been 
designed in practice than in theory. This has become most obvious as they 
have described themselves as regulators7 in that they urged FDA to adjust ex-
isting guidelines to what they had perceived as necessary in order to uphold 
their routines while at the same complying with the broader legal framework. 
For instance, the additional and more precise guidelines for the voluntary label-
ing of GM Food as well as the change from a voluntary to a mandatory consul-
tation process both were described as encouraged by the food processing indus-
try. Consequently, these organizations came to recognize their own definitions 
– most evidently, the definition of GM Food as not differing from conventional 
– and practices as contrafactually secured not only by the Plant Derived Foods 
Policy and their amendments but also by the benign big gun. Unsurprisingly, 
the organizations have perceived the rules as precisely and narrowly drawn and 
thus as a guidance that seems to reply adequately to the organizations’ circum-
stances in the network. In addition, the rules also were observed as being based 
                                                     
7  These perceptions can also be supported by some background information over the devel-
opment process of the policy since its ‘original’ stimulus was given by Calgene in the late 
1980s. As mentioned, Calgene was the first company to produce a genetically modified 
consumer-ready food (the Flavr Savr™ tomato) and in order avoid the risk of being held li-
able for non-compliance with food safety and consumer protection legislation, Calgene 
formally asked the FDA for guidance of GM Food. Consequently, the Plant Derived Foods 
Policy was issued as a result of Calgene’s initiative and is therefore likely to have intro-
duced definitions and practices that have been coined by Calgene in original. But as the de-
velopment of the policy falls beyond the period of time examined in the present study this 
is rather an assumption than the result of a thorough analysis. 
5 Unpacking ‘National Styles’: Discussion 
 
155
upon scientific criteria, and thus upon the same criteria that they themselves 
have regarded not only as exclusively valid but also as sufficient to assess the 
safety of GM Products.  
The Plant Derived Foods Policy and its amendments in sum have been 
perceived as highly corresponding to the organizations’ original definitions and 
applied practices. Since it functions in the shadow of powerful, deterrence 
based laws, the policy was regarded as ‘successful’ in that it not only provides 
adequate guidance but also has had the power to assure the consumers of a safe 
food supply. In that, it had established the necessary conditions for the organi-
zations’ basic economic actions that rely on certainty and planning reliability. 
In more abstract, this outcome was achieved by a regulatory framework that 
was built upon two mechanisms. On the one side it threatened its addressees 
with severe (e.g. monetary) sanctions in the case of a breach of their basic du-
ties, that is to secure the safety of their foods, while on the other side it pro-
vided a highly responsive structure for them to achieve the goal of food safety 
by instruments and mechanisms that rather seem to be ‘borrowed’ from them. 
As a service in return, the organizations were from dealing with conflicts since 
the administrative branch provided the infrastructure for the settlement of con-
flicts. This was demonstrated for instance by public meetings on GM Food, 
which FDA has held in November and December 1999 (FDA 1999) and which 
aimed at the information of the public about the FDA policy for assuring the 
safety of GM Foods. 
5.2.2 Organizational Maneuvers on the ‘Safe’ Side: Confidence Building 
Like in Germany, the original addressees of the outlined regulatory framework 
have regarded GM Food as not differing from conventional products, thus 
rather as a normative problem – if a problem at all. This understanding of the 
issue was achieved by the employment of scientific knowledge that was made 
use of in order to emphasize the potential benefits while neglecting possible 
risks. In so doing, GM Products were conceived of as promising products that 
serve the organizations’ paramount goal in being less costly in their developing 
processes and, with regard to food processing industry, provide cheaper ingre-
dients. Consequently, GM Food was understood as a product that has been de-
rived by a refined, more effective breeding method, which therefore should be 
dealt with like its conventional counterpart.  
In basing its subsequent decision upon that premise, the organizations 
came to face an environment wherein their interpretation of the issue not only 
was confirmed by the letters of the law but rather contrafactually secured 
throughout the network. Since they found the legal definition of GM Food as 
not differing from conventional as widely accepted by the consumers through-
out the network they came to conclude that their subsequent practices and 
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strategies of the issue is accepted as the adequate way of dealing by their rele-
vant environment. Moreover, they observed themselves side by side with ac-
cepted, trustworthy regulatory agencies whereby they claimed a superior stand-
ing in the network in being ‘on the right side’. In addition, they had perceived a 
‘division of labor’ in that they more or less implicitly agreed in guaranteeing 
the safety of their products (by, for instance, the establishment of company-
owned laboratories) while the administrative branch was held responsible to 
cope with probably arising conflicts. 
By so doing, they were set in a position most differing from that of their 
German counterparts. Because the American organizations have observed not 
only the law, but also a powerful and accepted law on their side, the perception 
of alternative interpretations and opposition to their own understanding could 
in a meaningful way only be regarded as untruthful and wrong. In so institu-
tionalizing themselves as epistemological authority with regard to the issue 
itself but also with regard to the public’s demands, they saw no need to take 
deviant interpretations of GM Food as unsafe, risky or simply unwanted seri-
ous, since these voices could endanger their paramount goals. In fact, the or-
ganizations have not observed it as their own duty to deal with public unease 
over these products but rather as the government’s very own task. It is this un-
derstanding of themselves and of their environment that becomes reflected in 
their maneuvers in the American GM Food network.  
Confidence Building 
Even so the organizations have observed themselves on the ‘right’ side and 
thus upheld their normative premises, they also had perceived themselves as 
dependent upon consumer’s confidence in the technology to go forward and 
thus upon confidence in their brands and products. While at the same time be-
ing convinced of the harmlessness and the use of their products but observing 
even though weak signs of public unease with these products, that became 
most manifest in the demand for mandatory labeling, the organizations have 
felt that action should be taken to dispel these doubts. By strongly adhering to 
the scientifically confirmed opinion that GM Food does not differ from con-
ventional food, the organizations could only make sense of these doubts by 
explaining them as an effect of the public’s misinformation. Consequently, in 
order to countersteer these tendencies of growing unease, they made use of 
what had been observed as a division of labor and formally asked for changes 
of the current practice.  
The first change to be made was making the voluntary consultation pro-
cedure mandatory. So far, the developers of GM Food were recommended to 
consult with FDA prior to the marketing of these products although the market-
ing of these products without consultation would not have been a legal offence. 
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After these changes, that is according to the Proposed Rule (see also above 
3.2.2), this consultation procedure became mandatory in that developers now 
were obliged to consult with FDA at least 120 days prior to the commercial 
distribution of their products. The second change was that FDA issued guide-
lines for the voluntary labeling of GM Food that would enable the processors 
to label their products as being developed by or not by the use of genetic engi-
neering (FDA 2001a). These changes were considered as confidence building 
in that – by referring to these legal rules – consumers could be assured that 
every GM Product would have to undergo the consultation procedure. In addi-
tion, even though mandatory labeling of GM Food was considered not only as 
unnecessary but rather as misleading by the organizations, voluntary labeling 
was regarded as an instrument whereby the public’s demands for transparency 
could be answered while the organizations could uphold their established rou-
tines in the network. These changes were considered to demonstrate the public 
that the introduction of GM Food is highly regulated. In sum, these changes 
were expected to maintain the observed confidence in GM Products.  
Nevertheless, even though these changes were triggered by the organiza-
tions as an effect of their perception of their relevant environment they have 
not led to revisions of the organizations’ original premises and not even to a 
revision of their subsequent decisions, thus their actual way of dealing with 
GM Food. This is only natural since both these proposed changes were antici-
pated not to impact on the organizations’ ongoing practices. As each label con-
nected with genetic engineering – whether positive or negative – was consid-
ered to be perceived as a warning by the consumers, organizations concluded 
that no organization would dare to label its products. Even though there would 
at least be precise guidance for this, each such label would be an exception 
from a well-established rule and therefore would require additional reasoning. 
In addition, this assumption has proven true so far, as to date no such labeled 
products have entered the American food supply.8 Something similar can be 
stated for the consultation procedure since by urging the FDA to make the vol-
untary procedure mandatory rather an already well-established practice among 
the organizations of the field was turned into a legal rule. Because of that, it 
was made visible for the public and in that could be ‘sold’ as a reform by 
which the regulatory process has been made stricter.  
Thus, in contrast to the organizations in the German network, their 
American counterparts were not forced into adapting or rather learning since 
they had observed their premises and subsequent decision as backed by power-
ful legal statutes. Consequently, they did not even have to reply to public de-
                                                     
8  Even though this would go beyond the scope of the present study, it would be interesting to 
see if these labeling guidelines will become a boomerang as soon as the first labeled prod-
uct enters the market. 
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mands for more transparency but delegated these problems to the administra-
tive branch instead. In so doing, they reproduced an already observed division 
of labor in that they guaranteed the safety of their products while the state pro-
vided for conflict-solving mechanisms, in case such conflicts occur. In sum, 
this also answers Wildavsky’s (1988) question “Why is everyone acting as if 
they are being regulated?” (170). Even though the legal regulation of GM Food 
in the United States has not followed a simply deterrence based approach to 
regulation and thus does not built upon prescriptive instruments that would 
unambiguously be described as ‘regulation’, the introduction of GM Food into 
the American market has nevertheless to be described as highly regulated. But 
this only became visible on the premise that ‘regulation’ is not only understood 
as the function of control and power as performed by the government, but is 
also understood as the effect of powerful organizational responses to govern-
mental power and control. 
5.2.3 The Network Revisited: Regulation in the Shadow of Law 
Against the background of the observations presented in the previous two sec-
tions, the common assessment of the American GM Food network as ‘calm’ 
and indifferent towards the issue has to be revised. What has appeared as a 
homogeneous network concerning GM Food rather has to be described as the 
effect of the interplay between the legal statutes applied to these products, their 
original addressees and these organizations’ perceptions of their legal envi-
ronment. And even though not all of these legal statutes such as the Plant De-
rived Foods Policy were powerful themselves, they were backed up with the 
threat that regulatory pressure will be increased if the more self-regulative ap-
proach of the policy would not deliver the desired outcome. In so being backed 
by enforcing power, not only its original addressees but most of all the majority 
of the public has perceived these rules as trustworthy and capable of assuring 
the safety of GM Foods as they already did in the past with conventional food. 
Consequently, by establishing the dominant interpretation of GM Food as not 
different from its conventional counterparts, also the expectation could be es-
tablished that these new foods were safe. 
Different from the German network, the interplay among the rules, its 
addressees and their environment in the United States has thus resulted in the 
felicitous subsumtion of a new case under existing legal statutes, whereby the 
definition of GM Food as not differing from its conventional counterparts be-
came established as the dominant interpretation throughout the network. In so 
doing, an open normative problem was settled even before a broad public de-
bate could start. Most notably, by singling out one clear-cut interpretation of 
GM Food as the only valuable, thus as contrafactually secured definition, alter-
native interpretations of GM Food as different from traditional, therefore un-
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certain and probably unsafe, have been rendered as deviant and inferior. In 
addition, as the dominant interpretation of GM Food exclusively rests upon 
scientific criteria, the definition of GM Food as not differing from conventional 
food is not only the valid definition in the legal sense but has also been ac-
cepted as the true (‘right’) definition in the scientific sense. Consequently, al-
ternative interpretations also became observed simply as wrong. 
Since the developing and manufacturing industry as the original address-
ees both have observed their own interpretation of GM Food in fully concor-
dance with the normatively secured definition they did not have to revise their 
premises, even though they came to face with opposition in their environment. 
However, given that normatively settled situation, the organizations felt no 
need to adapt to these demands since they had observed their own definition as 
the right one. In being confronted with more or less weak signs of public un-
rest, the organizations fell back upon a well-established division of labor be-
tween themselves and the administrative branch, in that the economic organiza-
tions formally asked the regulatory agency to adjust the current rules to per-
ceived public unrest while at the same time delivering the knowledge about 
what changes would be adequate. This event has made visible what accounts 
for as ‘regulation’ in the GM Food network in the United States. 
Cooperative Regulation 
The organizations in the United States have found themselves in a situation 
where their rules for the assessment of GM Food nearly were identical with the 
legal rules. This observation now can be described as a result of the coopera-
tive regulation as the decisive regulatory mode in the American network. 
Cooperative regulation is distinguished by shared responsibilities be-
tween the administrative branch and its original addressees since both these 
parties agree upon a clear-cut division of labor that is considered as advanta-
geous for both of them. In the observed case, FDA and the developers and 
manufacturers of GM Food have shared their responsibility not only for the 
safety of these foods but rather for the securing of the expectation that these 
foods are safe. This division of work in the given case became manifest in that 
the companies run their own laboratories that assess the safety of the products 
before they are marketed. Although FDA does no safety assessment itself, that 
is no chemical or toxicological analyses, it relies on the safety of these products 
since both parties involved ‘know’ that they act in the shadow of powerful 
laws. FDA therefore implies the soundness of the organizations’ investigations 
and, in so doing, avoids running costly laboratories itself. This arrangement on 
side of the organizations must be regarded as advantageous as they ‘only’ have 
to guarantee the safety of the products. Nevertheless, they are free to achieve 
this goal by instruments that they consider to be most efficiently, thus by 
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means that are attuned to their self-descriptions as economic organizations in 
the first place. Consequently, their autonomy has been acknowledged by this 
arrangement. By conceding a greater degree of freedom to the organizations, 
those are likely to develop knowledge for the way of dealing with GM Food 
that is close to the ‘reality’ of the issue.  
It is this hands-on knowledge that the regulatory agencies in the end can 
benefit from in their normative way of dealing with GM Food, thus disclosing 
the administrative branch’s task in this agreement. Since part of the protective 
services have been privatized by assigning the responsibility for scientific 
safety testing of GM Food to the manufacturing companies, the regulatory 
agencies on the other side have taken over the responsibility to secure the 
safety of GM Food contrafactually. They have to built or maintain the public 
expectation that these products are safe by building confidence. Consequently, 
they also have to provide instruments for the settlement of probably arising 
conflicts or disputes. By so doing, they keep the companies’ backs covered. In 
order to respond to public demands in what they perceive would be an ade-
quate manner, they are enabled to fall back upon knowledge about the issue in 
its practice. Thus, they can re-attune their instruments for the settling of con-
flicts or measures for confidence building to insights about the nature of the 
GM Food as well as about realizable changes in its handling (e.g. the question 
for instance, if a processing method label would be practicable at all). This 
mechanism of being reciprocally dependent upon the services of the other party 
involved became manifest in the outlined changes to the current regulatory 
practice in the United States since the observable changes concerning the label-
ing guidelines and the consultation procedure both could be traced back to the 
companies’ notions of a desired way of dealing with GM Food.  
In sum, one can now say that the economic organizations in the Ameri-
can GM Food network have influenced the law intentionally by drafting pro-
posals for changes of the regulatory process but also unintentionally in that 
their practices in the network became the distinguished foil for legal guidance 
since they were based upon the legal definition of the issue. Thus, interpreta-
tions could be observed as legal actions by the law and thus unintentionally 
‘infiltrate’ the law and the labels contained therein. 
As with the German case this finally can be described as an example for 
legal pluralism as rules and practices that ‘originally’ have been designed by 
those to whom the legal norm was addressed to, have become legal norms 
themselves by enacting the original norm. However, different from Germany, 
in the latter case these observed misreadings between law and its relevant so-
cietal field have rather re-affirmed the traditionally tight couplings between the 
legal and the economic system instead of making the law more responsive for 
the plurality of perspectives on GM Food. In fact, as an effect of these tight 
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couplings and the dominance of one interpretation of GM Food throughout the 
network in the United States, alternative interpretations rather became sup-
pressed.  
Conclusion: Assets and Expenses of Strong Ties 
As the regulatory process was carried out differently in the United States than 
in Germany, also the actual market situation has turned out disparate in that 
GM Food extensively has penetrated the American food supply. Nevertheless, 
similar to the Germany case, this ‘manifest’ result of the regulatory process 
refers not only to assets that have been achieved but also to expenses that were 
accepted – intentionally as well as unintentionally.  
Given that the paramount goal of the manufacturers and the processing 
industry in the network has been turning GM Products to tangible profits in 
terms of money, these organizations would have to conclude that the imple-
mentation of the legal rule and the subsequent mobilization process has been 
carried out most ‘successful’. In being confronted with their legal environ-
ments these organizations found themselves in a superior situation as they ob-
served their original premises as normatively secured by accepted legal rules. 
Therefore, these organizations were not forced to adapt their behavior to their 
environment’s demands but rather delegated the way of dealing with occurred 
public unrest to the administrative branch. By doing so, they reproduced a 
well-established division of labor and thus strengthened their ties with the 
regulatory agencies. Further, if ‘regulation’ is understood according to the clas-
sical technocratic model wherein scientific knowledge takes in a monopoly role 
as basis for decision making, the outlined observations could account as an 
example for the properly fulfillment of such a regulation. Based on scientific 
knowledge, the Plant Derived Foods Policy was capable of providing guidance 
and, by so doing, prevents a socially explosive conflict by establishing the ex-
pectation that due to the sound scientific criteria GM Foods are as safe as con-
ventional food. Nevertheless, as such an understanding of the regulatory has 
been rejected as obsolete and insufficient to grasp the complex dynamics that 
occur when a legal rule enters its field, the observations made in the American 
GM Food network shall rather be reflected as another piece that adds to the 
mosaic of regulatory processes themselves.  
The interorganizational network GM Food in the United States finally 
has to be described rather as a tightly coupled, hierarchical system wherein one 
interpretation of GM Food has turned out to be the dominant interpretation. 
The assets of such a tight-coupled network could be observed in the ‘fact’ that 
legal certainty and secured expectations were achieved, thus providing a reli-
able framework for the economic organizations’ way of dealing with GM 
Food. In this situation not even the StarLink-Case could unfold the force of a 
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policy window since no science-based arguments for the hazardousness of 
these products could be mobilized. Thus, the established definition of GM 
Food was not challenged even though there had been several StarLink-related 
lawsuits. In fact, throughout these lawsuits the dominant interpretation rather 
became reaffirmed than upset. Consequently, the introduction of GM Food was 
carried out in an unambiguous environment, thus in a less costly process than 
in the German counterpart: less costly for the respective economic organiza-
tions but also less costly for society at whole. The marketing of GM Food had 
not stopped ongoing procedures nor has it challenged or questioned the appli-
cable legal regulations. As a result, this overall process has appeared as less 
conflict-ridden than in Germany.  
However, as there is a downside to everything so there is one to this pic-
ture. Given that ‘only’ one single interpretation of GM Food has been taken 
seriously throughout the introduction process of these products while on the 
other side alternative interpretations had been observed as deviant throughout 
the network, the chance was missed to fathom to what degree these alternative 
interpretations probably rested upon criteria that could add to so far neglected 
aspects to that interpretation. Most striking, this accounts for the perceived 
demands for mandatory positive labeling of such products. These demands 
could have functioned as a vehicle for basing the assessment of GM Food on a 
more comprehend, thus robust knowledge than scientific knowledge could turn 
out to be in the future. This leads over to potential conflicts since the repeated 
neglect of alternative interpretations has led to a – at present – sufficient 
knowledge base that could turn out as vulnerable in the future, should resis-
tance to these products mount (e.g. by perceived growing resistance in Europe). 
In that case, the current definition that is most of all the result of economic in-
teraction with the issue, could become observed as based upon knowledge, 
which is too ‘thin’ to lead to more adequate coping strategies in the end.  
Yet another observation could be made that refers to the adequacy of ex-
clusively legally based instruments as tools in a societal debate like the one 
surrounding GM Food. While on the one side strong ties bear the risk of ne-
glecting if not suppressing the plurality of existing interpretations, on the other 
side the potential for socially disruptive conflict and opposition to the dominant 
interpretation still remains in its shadow. In the given case it could be observed 
that the dominant interpretation has been tried to challenge by lawsuits against 
FDA that finally were thrown out and not even perceived as relevant by the 
economic organizations in the network. In that, this instrument of suing FDA 
rather could be regarded as an edgeless instrument in the quest for the appre-
ciation of differing interpretations of GM Food. If this observation is reformu-
lated, the somewhat bold conclusion can be drawn that in strong tied, hierar-
chical networks, the legal systems increasingly becomes overtaxed with con-
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flicts that emerge in the various social systems because of the tight coupling. 
The subsequent utilization of legal instruments to solve these conflicts thus 
may lead to decreasing chances for the more inferior voices in the debate to be 
heard since these instruments do not affect the ‘core’ of what is really going 
on, but rather remain at the periphery. Nevertheless, even though from that 
point of time, there are no signs for this, these insinuated ‘signs of wear’ in the 
legal instruments could turn out as a boomerang for the more superior organi-
zations if their leading interpretation should once be attacked. Given these re-
marks, neither the description of the introduction of the legal regulation into its 
field in the United States as ‘successful’ nor as ‘failure’ has thus seemed to 
grasp adequately the implications of processes observed.  
Finally the conclusion has to be drawn, that in this given case, power has 
become mobilized as the adequate medium to keep smoldering opposition to 
GM Food in check while knowledge has ‘only’ become relevant in terms of 
scientific criteria and economically based coping strategies. In addition, those 
strategies have built upon power on the one side but to the same extent upon 
trust in these power-based practices. 
5.3 Conclusion: Trust versus Contract 
In thus having ‘unpacked’ national styles of regulation, the question is solved 
where the differences in the regulation of GM Food in Germany and the United 
States are to be found and how they can be grasped sufficiently. These ob-
served differences in the way of dealing with GM Food as a seemingly identi-
cal issue have been discussed based on the findings gained in the two last chap-
ters. This discussion has drawn on theoretical assumptions outlined in chapter 2 
that in their essence have claimed an understanding of regulatory processes, 
which acknowledges organizations as social systems as the central parts of 
these processes. In so doing, organizations were conceived of as not only 
normatively closed but also as cognitively open, and thus as knowledge-
generating systems of interpretation. Consequently, a double movement has 
been made as, firstly, the claim was made that under conditions of world soci-
ety both these networks will be constituted by legal, economic, scientific and 
political organizations that align their decisions with the binary oppositions of 
their respective function systems, thus pretending homogeneity. However, 
secondly, it was further argued that as organizations are cognitively open, their 
respective legal environments would be perceived differently in the given 
networks, thus leading to heterogeneity between these territorially bordered 
entities.  The locus of significant difference between these countries has thus been lo-
cated in the organizations’ perceptions of the legal environments that comprise 
not only the laws but rather societal norms and the culture surrounding it, thus 
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expectations and demands that in their total have created a more or less con-
straining, or, in contrast, enabling legal environment. These differences in the 
dominance of the respective legal environments have finally resulted in the 
observable disparate ways that Germany and the United States went about GM 
Food. These ways are rather characterized by the distinction between trust and 
contract than merely by the contrast between product and program. This latter 
distinction has not to be rejected but can more sufficiently be understood as the 
outcome of the outlined regulatory processes in both these networks by now. 
These regulatory processes can be characterized as self-regulation in that trust 
and contract both are modes of self-regulation, which finally have led to differ-
ing results, as demonstrated in the this chapter. 
On the background of these results, it has now to be questioned to what 
extent the general talk about ‘national’ differences in regulatory approaches 
can be upheld in a meaningful way if the respective empirical matter remains 
unspecified. As demonstrated, the network GM Food has not shown any signs 
of ‘corporatism’ in Germany nor of an ‘American exceptionalism’ in the 
United States. Instead, elements of what has been defined as an ‘American ex-
ceptionalism’ could be identified in the German network while corporatist fea-
tures were detected in the United States. This observation is in tune with Vo-
gel’s observation of an increasing convergence between Germany and the 
United States (Vogel 2001). However, since his analysis remained in the pre-
vailing scheme of the national styles it could not provide an adequate explana-
tion for these observations. In addition, in the scheme of the national styles-
approach, these observations were rather treated as exceptions from the rule 
than as an independent result. 
The findings of the present study instead are treated as the empirical 
proof for the theoretically claimed superiority of an organizational-based un-
derstanding of regulation. Consequently, the general talk about a national style 
of regulation has to be rejected, which is not to say that there are no national 
differences in regulatory approaches. Nevertheless, such differences can only 
sufficiently be explained if the empirical matter of regulation is also taken into 
account in the analysis. This calls attention to the fact that each issue will pro-
duce its own interorganizational network, thus its own interplay of law, socie-
tal norms, and the organizations as ‘original’ addressees. These ‘variables’ in 
their total will result in a regulatory structure that can then be observed as 
typical for the regulation of a given issue in its given organizational context.9 In 
                                                     
9  For another example see Special Report: Abortion in America. The war that never ends 
(The Economist, January 18, 2003). The major claim made in this article is that the way the 
Americans went about legislation on this issue has divided the country “bitterly as 
ever”(24). As the United States declared abortion a constitutional right, so the authors rea-
soning, a controversy was stirred up since “opponents were furious about being denied their 
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sum, one can now say that there is a German and an American approach to GM 
Food – but what is hidden behind these approaches has been outlined in this 
chapter.  
The next chapter will now be dedicated to final considerations on the 
theoretical implications of these findings by referring to the difficulties that 
have been outlined at the very outset of the present study 
 
                                                                                                                                            
say” (ibid.) while “supporters had to rely on the precarious balance of power on the Su-
preme Court” (ibid.). In its total, “(l)egislation did not have the legitimacy of majority sup-
port” (ibid.) but rather rested upon “a highly controversial interpretation of the constitution” 
(ibid.). Thus instead of resolving the controversy, this legislation has “trapped America in a 
clash of absolutes” (26). Resting upon this assessment, the conclusion is drawn that the 
“one safe prediction is that the issue will continue to shape the conflict between left and 
right for years to come” (ibid.). For a comparative study on this topic see also Gerhards & 
Lindgens 1995. 
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“Differing cultural ways 
can provide adequate solutions 
to the same problem.” 
(Paul Bohannan 1995) 
 
6 The ‘Regulatory Dilemma’ Reconsidered: Outlook 
At the outset of the present study, the law was described as being in conflict 
when confronted with the regulation of a so-called risk technology such as GM 
Food. Moreover, as could be shown, the law indeed has to be considered as ‘in 
conflict’ in that it inherently is incapable of providing adequate solutions to 
societal conflicts. Each solution the law offers has been created against the 
background of the law’s construction of that conflict and has thus to be per-
ceived as the legal reconstruction of a social conflict, i.e., the juridification of a 
social phenomenon (Teubner 1992: 1455). That this legal distortion [Rechtsent-
fremdung] (Teubner & Zumbansen 2000) is no extraordinary or pathological 
but rather the normal case has become obvious by the focus on organizations as 
central parts of the regulatory process. This shift in perspective has clarified 
that the legal solution to a social conflict always has to be considered as inap-
propriate in a non-normative sense and this has challenged the classical notion 
of regulation. Stating the fundamental inappropriateness of regulation does not 
necessarily imply that there is no regulation, but that the regulatory process is 
fulfilled by organizational sensemaking that becomes the basis for their unin-
tentional and intentional enactment processes. As each legal regulation will be 
perceived as inappropriate by its original addressees it will inescapably become 
interpreted and in so doing, redefined.  
The extent to that the legal norm will enact its addressees or be enacted 
by its original addressees itself does not only depend upon the rule itself but 
rather upon the legal environment, i.e., what the organizations perceive as in-
formation about the law. Each legal rule and consequently each empirical mat-
ter will create an idiomatic legal environment that entails not only the letters of 
the law but rather societal norms, conventions, expectations that in their total 
can be perceived as dominant and contradictory at the same time. Therefore, 
organizations adopt differing strategies in order to reply to these demands and 
expectations on the one side while pursuing their original goals on the other. In 
addition, as legal environments not necessarily have to be perceived as in con-
trast to the organization’s decision premises, these processes of adaptation will 
be carried out contingent on that very perception. Consequently, these enact-
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ment processes between a legal rule and its original addresses will finally de-
termine, to what extent a regulatory goal can be achieved, that is to what extent 
the concerns of the respective network are met in the end. However, the man-
ner in which these enactment processes will be carried out depends upon the 
design of the legal rule, its definition of the regulatory trigger and the organiza-
tions that observe themselves as affected by this trigger. Contingent on the in-
struments the law provides on the one side and the perception of the organiza-
tions’ environments on the other, the organizations to differing extents will 
become whether the objects or the subjects of regulation in the first place. Es-
pecially in the latter case, the organizations will employ different modes of 
self-regulation and by so doing, base the regulatory process on their knowledge 
that they have generated in their way of dealing with the original regulatory 
trigger. Consequently, these modes of self-regulation can be productively mis-
read by the law as legal actions, thus as actions that are distinguished as being 
legal or, in contrast, illegal. Throughout these productive misreadings of organ-
izational decisions as legal decisions, organizational norms are translated into 
legal norms, leading to plural normsetting. In addition, these norms in turn im-
pose on the organizations in future as legal norms. But which organizations are 
most vocal and visible and employ ‘law-like’ strategies is determined by the 
legal rule itself, by the organizations’ flexibility and capability of dealing with 
probably contradictory environmental demands and finally by the issue in 
question.  
Given these remarks, regulation no longer is understood as only between 
the state as regulator and industry as regulatees, but rather turns out to be a 
dense social act that to various degrees is accompanied by either knowledge or 
power.  
The quest for an adequate understanding of ‘regulation’ has also reso-
nated in comparative research on regulation in that prevailing concepts about 
the causes for observable national differences in regulatory approaches became 
questioned throughout the present study. As organizations have been conceived 
of as normatively closed but cognitively open at the same time, the conclusion 
had to be drawn that every organization will perceive its respective legal envi-
ronment differently. Moreover, this does not only depend upon the normative 
orientation of the organization and upon the empirical matter but also upon the 
respective local conditions. Not only will each empirical matter constitute a 
different network but this network is also likely to differ within a territorially 
bordered entity not because of a national culture, but most of all because of the 
interplay that will occur among the legal rules, their addressees, and their per-
ceptions of what is considered as information about the legal rules. This under-
standing of the regulatory process must also be conceived of as momentous for 
transnational developments since it insinuates limitations for legal frameworks 
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to be translated from one context into another as well as for emerging transna-
tional law and its locally restricted implementation. 
Finally, an understanding of regulatory processes and variations among 
those had to be abolished that follows a one size fits all understanding of legal 
regulations. In fact, such an understanding of regulation ignores variations in 
local conditions and in the conditions of the respective empirical matter. There-
fore, in the remainder of this final chapter the two main lines will be re-married 
that have pervaded the present study, in that the revision of the concept of 
regulation under conditions of knowledge society and a revision of fundamen-
tal understandings regarding the ‘nature’ of national disparities in regulatory 
approaches will be highlighted in their interrelatedness. 
6.1 A New Production of Legal Knowledge? 
At the very outset of the present study implicitly the question was raised to 
what extent scientific knowledge still can function as a legitimate basis for le-
gal decision making in the regulation of risk technologies, given the increasing 
awareness of non-knowledge. In the light of the findings presented in the pre-
sent study, the assumption became confirmed that legal rules that exclusively 
are based upon scientific criteria no longer account as a guarantee for their le-
gitimacy. In contrast, in the German case, scientific knowledge was observed 
as inadequate to deliver a basis for solutions to the observed problems in the 
network. Consequently, the law runs the risk of being increasingly overtaxed 
with the deliverance of socially accepted solutions to complex problems. Those 
problems can be characterized not only by a lack of reliable, scientific knowl-
edge but rather by the fact that not one single actor (the law, for instance) has 
all the information necessary to solve these problems. In these cases, law’s 
legitimacy becomes undermined, thus rendering the law itself illegitimate. 
In order to avoid this loss of legitimacy, the law has to adapt to these 
changing societal conditions that in their total are characteristics of knowledge 
society. If the law wants to stay attuned to these conditions it will have to take 
account of societal knowledge stocks that have been neglected so far, or exclu-
sively led a shadowy existence in the respective societal realms wherein they 
were generated. In the present study, these knowledge stocks were distin-
guished as organizational knowledge since organizations by sensemaking and 
enacting generate knowledge that is produced in the respective relevant con-
text. Therefore, this knowledge can be conceived of as potentially more adept 
to the specific difficulties that arise in the way of dealing with a given empiri-
cal matter.  
Nevertheless, those knowledge stocks can only be taken into account as a 
basis for legal decision making if certain conditions are fulfilled, one of which 
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is the acknowledgement of the parties involved. This refers to the range of ac-
tors that are taken into account as relevant as well as to the way in which the 
acknowledgement is carried out specifically. Thus, the law has to install 
mechanisms by which a variety of possibly affected actors and their particular 
perspective on the issue in question are made detectable. In addition, those 
mechanisms at the same time have to be attuned to these actors’ autonomy, in 
order to encourage and enable an in-context production of knowledge. Recall-
ing the findings of the present study, these conditions had been fulfilled differ-
ently in that in the American case the autonomy of those who had been re-
garded as affected by GM Food had been acknowledged, thus leading to a 
strong bias on economic organizations and their perspective. In contrast, in the 
German case although more by chance than intentionally, the law has provided 
a framework that made way for a variety of interpretations to emerge as 
equally legitimate. Consequently, organizations in both these networks have 
evolved as agents of change (Galanter 1974) or resistance (to change).  
6.1.1 Organizations as Agents of Change and Resistance 
The broader context into which these remarks are embedded is that of legal 
pluralism and plural normsetting. As organizations have been conceived of as 
the central parts of the regulatory process, they can be considered not only as 
knowledge-generating but also as norm-producing systems. In so doing, atten-
tion is called to the fact that “the debate that surrounds legal pluralism is not 
just an argument about words, but is often a debate about the state of the state 
today, one that asks where power actually resides” (Moore 2001: 11). In the 
light of the findings presented one has to resume that power as well as knowl-
edge and, consequently, control is fragmented among the constituents of an 
interorganizational network. In being confronted with a given empirical matter, 
organizations on the background of their understanding of the matter design 
coping strategies, coin new labels, and thus take undefined space. However, as 
this organizational knowledge is confronted with knowledge generated in the 
organizations’ environment the question arises in how far an organization may 
succeed with its interpretations and subsequent practices. Therefore, “no single 
actor can dominate the regulatory process unilaterally as all actors can be re-
stricted in reaching their objectives not just by limitations in their own knowl-
edge but also by the autonomy of others” (Black 2002: 5). These conditions in 
their total finally determine to what extent organizations are able to cling to 
existing legal norms and, by so doing, confirm these rules or become the driv-
ing force in legal changes. 
Contingent on how the regulatory process is carried out in particular, in-
terorganizational networks evolve whether as loosely or as tight-coupled sys-
tems. Given that organizations observe themselves in accordance with power-
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ful legal rules, they are not forced to change their definition of the issue in 
question. In being backed by legal statutes, they rather observe themselves as 
part of a powerful alliance. Consequently, tight couplings between these or-
ganizations and the regulatory agencies can be expected which in turn will lead 
to a hierarchical structure of the given network. If on the contrary no powerful 
alliance can be forged since no dominant interpretation of the issue in question 
could be distinguished and contrafactually secured, a loosely coupled, heterar-
chical network is more likely to evolve. 
Both these shapes of networks will provide different opportunities for se-
curing established dominant interpretations or for challenging these interpreta-
tions by coining new labels. While hierarchical networks will rather tend to 
affirm already well-established relations and therefore also confirm established 
coping strategies, it is difficult for alternative interpretations of the respective 
issue to be heard and acknowledged throughout the network. In fact, a hierar-
chical network nearly only can be undermined if a policy window opens up, 
that for a short amount of time provides the necessary structures for less vocal 
organizations to state their case from a more visible, superior position. In con-
trast, a heterarchical network is rather supportive for alternative interpretations 
to be heard since no single interpretation has yet become institutionalized as 
the only valuable throughout the network. Moreover, as heterarchical, loosely 
coupled networks “create opportunities for sharing the learning experience of 
cooperating partners that results from their exchange relations with third par-
ties” (Grabher 1993: 271) their learning capacity is increased. In addition, since 
“one of the key advantages of loosely coupled networks is their ability to dis-
seminate and interpret new information [they, AE] are particularly adept at 
generating new interpretations” (ibid.: 272). 
While hierarchical networks tend to support regulation that is mainly be-
tween the state and the regulatees, heterarchical networks encourage ‘regula-
tion’ that is rather the product of interactions between those affected by the 
issue than the exercise of the formal, constitutionally recognized authority of 
government (Black 2002). Under such conditions, organizations act as regula-
tors themselves (e.g. by contracting, or by forcing other organizations into 
something or bar them from doing something). In so doing, not only is an in-
context production of knowledge encouraged but also the likelihood is in-
creased for this ‘thicker’ knowledge to be productively misread as a source for 
legal norms. But even so, also in hierarchical networks organizational knowl-
edge is a source for legal norms since the powerful organizations not only in-
fluence the law by lobbying, drafting legislation and the like but rather by be-
coming legalistic themselves as they have the resources to establish not only 
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their own scientific laboratories but also their own legal departments1. Thus, in 
this latter case the law almost exclusively receives information through the 
cost-benefit calculations of economic organizations. 
In sum, organizations can be considered as institutions of the legal plural-
ism in that their knowledge can be considered as ‘new’ source for legal norms. 
But even so, it still has to be taken into account that it depends upon the design 
and implications of a legal rule itself, in how far not only organizational 
knowledge in this generality will become the law’s tacit knowledge but also 
which organizations’ knowledge. Consequently, at the same time as “legal plu-
ralism rediscovers the subversive power of suppressed discourses” (Teubner 
1992: 1443) it also bears the risk of reaffirming powerful discourses. 
6.1.2 Understanding Regulation as Revaluation of Knowledge Stocks 
Since an understanding of regulation as an “attempt to alter the behavior of 
others according to defined standards or purposes with the intention of produc-
ing a broadly identified outcome” (Black 2002: 21) has been rejected, the ques-
tion is raised how regulation can be conceptualized after all. Given that the 
regulatory process rather has to be understood as the outcome of productive 
misreadings, what are the in- and outputs of the regulatory process? 
In the previous section, organizational knowledge that is generated in the 
organizations’ interactions with the empirical matter in question, has been de-
scribed as law’s potential tacit knowledge. By so focusing more or less implic-
itly on all organizations that constitute a network, the fundamental plurality of 
perspectives on the matter is acknowledged, thus calling attention to the ca-
cophony and heterogeneity that can now be expected among each interorgani-
zational network. In that perspective it becomes obvious that in the regulation 
of ‘uncertain technologies’ conflict, or at least disputes, seem inescapable. In 
fact, as plurality and heterogeneity must be taken for granted in the regulatory 
process, throughout this process differences should not be understood as threats 
but rather as possible enrichments. But in order to achieve such an understand-
ing and by so doing reevaluate so far neglected knowledge stocks, mechanisms 
and instruments must be provided that enable the law to take account of this 
knowledge. Thus, even though “the context talks back” (Nowotny 1999: 13), 
the law has to develop sensory organs to detect these responses.  
In the present study cooperative regulation and contracting as an exam-
ple for a private governance regime have been observed as mechanisms which, 
although to differing extents, have acknowledged the autonomy of those in-
volved in the regulatory process. By doing so, those parties whether intention-
                                                     
1  See especially for the latter Powell (1996), who, in following Galanter (1974), claims the 
important mediating role of in-house staff in interpreting and implementing the law. 
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ally or unintentionally were enabled to produce their own coping strategies that 
were observed as more attuned to the conditions in the given networks than 
legal rules that had been designed in theory (i.e., in the German case). These 
strategies in turn became observed as referring to the law’s functional primacy 
legal/illegal, thus providing an opportunity for the law to benefit from these 
strategies by translating them into legal norms. Consequently, legal norms were 
produced that seem more likely to deliver adequate solutions to the difficulties 
in the respective networks since they were finally designed based on knowl-
edge generated within the field. 
The application of regulatory instruments that correspond to the prevail-
ing rules of the context to be regulated also is called “second order reflexivity 
in regulation” (Bora 1999: 387, Bora 2002). This mode of regulation is ex-
pected to increase the societal capacities for trouble shooting since knowledge 
becomes mobilized which was produced in confrontation with the given issue’s 
‘reality’. Nevertheless, such knowledge stocks can only be turned into societal 
useful knowledge if new ways managing knowledge are provided by legal 
instruments. In that perspective, the NFR can now be described as a stroke of 
luck for society in the German context, since it has unintentionally activated 
the knowledge production among its original addressees in being rather half-
hearted. But this half-heartedness or, more precise, indecisiveness of the rule 
also has to be criticized as it cannot really function as a role model for rules to 
be created in the future since it has led to expectations it could not fulfill and 
thus to uncertainty in the early days of its existence. Here the question may be 
raised if a rule would have ‘worked’ better that had not appeared as strict law 
at first glance but that already by its design could have left the actual solution 
of the problem to those involved with the issue. Such a rule could have func-
tioned rather as a framework in the background while the organizations in-
volved from the very beginning could have by negotiating and cooperation 
created a solution more autonomously. 
Such an understanding of the law’s role in societal conflicts – which is in 
other theoretical contexts also discussed as regulation at a distance (e.g. Rose 
1999) – must reject the problem solving nature of regulation. Instead of reduc-
ing possible interpretations of a problem and the consequences thereof, a legal 
framework that rather leaves the solution to the respective network is likely to 
produce more conflict in the short run since various alternative interpretations 
will have to be ‘tested’ in a complex and possibly conflict-ridden deliberation 
(e.g. Bora 2002: 268). The outcome of this process finally can function as a foil 
for legal interpretations, and thus are expected to become legal knowledge. 
In so providing a framework that acknowledges the autonomy of those 
involved in a conflict, their knowledge can become converted into a powerful 
resource under conditions of knowledge society. Thus, it seems more appropri-
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ate to talk of the revaluation of knowledge stocks that have been neglected so 
far than of a new production of knowledge. Finally, the function of regulation 
no longer may be found in preventing or settling conflicts but rather in its acti-
vating character. 
6.2 On Comparing Regulatory Approaches 
The findings of the present study have also to be regarded as momentous for 
comparative research on regulatory approaches in that commonly presumed 
national styles to regulation have to be rejected if the respective context of 
regulation remains unspecified. Just as little as there is a specific German or 
American Science there also is nothing like a specific German or American 
regulatory style. As already mentioned before, this is not to say that there are 
no differences in the regulatory approaches of various countries. In fact, as has 
been demonstrated by the regulatory approaches to GM Food in Germany and 
in the United States, there has been considerable variation as to the definition 
of the regulatory trigger as well as to the subsequent proposed coping strategies 
for its adequate handling. However, as interorganizational networks have been 
distinguished as the relevant entities for the analysis, the specific difficulties 
that arose with the given (and only with this!) issue were taken into account. In 
that, the issue itself was taken into regard as the decisive part of the subsequent 
regulatory processes since it determines which organizations perceive them-
selves as partaking in its regulation. Consequently, it could be shown that there 
is something like a German and an American approach to GM Food whereby 
the emphasis lies on ‘GM Food’ – and not on ‘German’ or ‘American’!  
This rejection of rather unspecified claims for national styles of regula-
tion as well as the analysis that has finally led to this conclusion must be con-
sidered as relevant for both, comparisons of regulatory approaches within terri-
torially bordered entities as well as for the assessments of emerging transna-
tional regulatory frameworks. Especially the latter become manifest in attempts 
to install worldwide measures to secure food safety and – at the same time – 
limit the influence of culture on food safety measures by international agree-
ments such as the abovementioned SPS Agreement (see chapter 3, note 5). Al-
though this agreement encourages reliance on a standardized, international, 
science-based approach to regulation, in the light of the results of the present 
study, it has to be argued that every invocation of science will be locally ap-
plied, thus leading to variation. Moreover, it is this example that is at least 
loosely related to the subject of the present study, which points to the fact that 
an increasing number of problems modern society is faced with have to be un-
derstood as problems that no longer are confined to territorial borders. Espe-
cially this border-crossing quality of certain events adds to the complexity of a 
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problem and increasingly demands for ‘solutions’ beyond the single countries 
capacities. 
6.2.1 Overcoming the ‘Territorial Trap’∗ 
In order to fathom how possible solutions to border-crossing problems can be 
achieved, insights gained in the present study may be helpful in that an organ-
izational-based approach to regulation seems to provide a perspective that lim-
its the analysis not to territorial boundaries. By doing so, also an understanding 
of organizations can be invoked that seems more appropriately to correspond to 
the conditions of world society as they have been outlined in chapter 2 in that 
organizations no longer are understood as German, American, Greek and the 
like. Instead, organizations first of all must be conceived of as legal, scientific 
and economic organizations that are embedded in a respective local context. In 
addition, it is this local context that no longer must necessarily be understood 
as a national context.  
As this study has suggested shifting the attention to the respective em-
pirical matter, a ‘local context’ must rather be understood as the interorganiza-
tional network that emerges around the matter than the country the organiza-
tions probably are located in. In so taken a perspective that first of all focuses 
on a specific problem, interorganizational networks, organizational fields or 
regions will evolve as the sites where the regulatory processes take place. 
Moreover, as insinuated above, none of these formations must be understood as 
limited to a territorial entity but rather traverse national boundaries. Therefore, 
the increasingly border crossing quality of problems can more adequately be 
grasped if the border crossing quality of organizational relations is emphasized 
in the analysis. 
Consequently, a methodological nationalism (Albert & Hilkermeier 
2001) can be avoided since in that perspective also organizations can be taken 
into account that first of all are characterized as transnational organizations 
(e.g. United Nations). Therefore, this perspective is considered as helpful for 
the analysis of increasingly evolving transnational regulatory processes. 
6.2.2 Regulatory Processes in World Society 
Under the effect of growing global relations as well as global reciprocal influ-
ences it does not seem to make much sense to think of ‘society’ as linked with 
the notion of nation-state as a territorially bordered entity. This corresponds to 
the widely consented observation that an increasing number of problems mod-
ern society is faced with no longer are restricted to individual countries. There-
fore, instruments mobilized by individual countries in order to cope with cer-
                                                     
∗  This term has been coined by Agnew (1994). 
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tain problems no longer seem to fit the complexity of these problems. As an 
effect, in various fields attempts can be observed that aim to install regulatory 
frameworks beyond the single countries’ legal regulations. And given that 
world society as it has been conceptualized in chapter 1.2 is most of all charac-
terized by a plurality of at least disparate perspectives and thus by heterogene-
ity, the development of a transnational regulatory framework that mirrors this 
plurality of perspectives can expected to be a most demanding endeavor.  
Given the findings of the present study, now the question must be raised 
under which conditions such a transnational regulatory framework can provide 
adequate solutions to border crossing problems. As shown in the previous 
chapters, each legal norm becomes applied locally by those to whom it was 
originally designed to regulate. Therefore, it can be assumed that each transna-
tional regulation will become implemented differently in the context of the 
various countries that are to be regulated by the given rule, since its process of 
implementation will be accompanied by locally generated knowledge or by 
locally relevant power. With regard to the original regulatory trigger, disparate 
outcomes can be expected. Even though this is not to say that transnational 
regulatory frameworks hopelessly are constrained by the dynamics that unfold 
in their local application, limitations to transnational regulations have to be 
assumed. Given the description of the dynamics that unfold when a legal rule 
enters its original field, those dynamics to a certain extent can be anticipated 
also in the case of transnational rules. In addition, given the relative ‘distance’ 
of these rules to their respective fields one can assume that the effect of distor-
tion will even be stronger in these cases. Therefore, it seems wise to invoke the 
understanding of regulation as a knowledge practice as helpful in the quest for 
more appropriate transnational regulations – more appropriate in that these 
regulations are likely to be attuned to its various local contexts’ demands. Nev-
ertheless, since the development of a full-fledged conception of transnational 
regulatory frameworks would go beyond the scope of this study, the following 
concluding remarks have to be considered as preliminary. 
On the premise that the conflict-solving function of regulation increas-
ingly has to be rejected, also the function of transnational regulatory frame-
works can be defined as ‘activating’ in the first place. Thus, what has been 
considered as relevant for national legal rules also counts for transnational le-
gal rules in that those have to provide mechanisms by which a most broad 
range of actors can be taken into account. However, while these actors on the 
side have to be acknowledged, on the other side their autonomy must be se-
cured in order to enable them to develop their own coping strategies. Only if 
this condition is fulfilled, attention is called to the fact that knowledge not only 
is produced in the context of applications (Nowotny 1999) but also that it can 
be turned into a useful societal resource. In this case of transnational regulatory 
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frameworks the respective ‘actors’ are the single countries, or, more precisely, 
the organizations of the single countries that feel affected by the given empiri-
cal matter. Consequently, the autonomy of the single countries must be upheld 
if solutions should be provided that correspond to these countries’ realities. 
This autonomy finally must be conceived of as sine qua non if the impor-
tance of local knowledge under conditions of globalization should become a 
resource for the solution of present and future border crossing problems. 
6.3 Conclusion: Coping with Uncertainty 
At the outset of the present study, the claim was made that the increasing rele-
vance of non-knowledge and uncertainty in modern society challenges law’s 
fundamental legitimacy. The traditional instruments of the law to secure certain 
conditions have become obsolete under the effect of a decreasing legitimacy of 
scientific knowledge. Therefore, the law tends to produce norms that no longer 
are accepted as such and that thus do not establish a certain horizon. On the 
other side, modern societies increasingly must be characterized by a develop-
ment towards knowledge society in that society becomes aware of uncertainties 
in various societal realms. Consequently, the societal demand for protective 
services will increase. This situation has driven the law into a quandary, since 
it is faced with growing demands for certainty while on the other side it has to 
admit its own uncertainty. In addition, this quandary has been observed as a 
threat to law’s basic function that is to secure certain expectations contrafactu-
ally and thereby prevent or settle conflicts. Given these altered societal condi-
tions, the question was raised, how law’s role can be adapted to these condi-
tions and what this role would be. Some of these adaptation strategies as well 
as the ‘new’ risks for the law that arise with them have been outlined and been 
described as a regulatory dilemma.  
However, in the light of the findings presented in the present study this 
dilemma has to be revisited in order to offer a less pessimistic view on these 
developments. In both cases presented, the law has retreated from its function 
to deliver a reliable normative base for the way of dealing with GM Food. 
While in the United States shared responsibilities between the state and the 
regulatees (here: industry) could be observed in that protective services have 
been privatized, in Germany the law has – probably unintended – activated a 
knowledge generation among those to whom the original rule was addressed to. 
In both cases finally regulatory structures evolved that whether functioned in or 
beyond the shadow of the law but that in their total can be described as differ-
ent modes of self-regulation. In so doing, it was finally not the law that by pro-
viding narrow and precisely drawn rules has guided the organizations’ maneu-
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vers in the respective networks, but the organizations’ maneuvers in turn be-
came the guiding principles for the law.  
Irrespective the concrete outcome, these developments also are instruc-
tive for law’s possible future role in knowledge society. Instead of clinging to 
... the law in both cases has acknowledged the autonomy of those involved in 
the regulatory process. In so doing, the regulatees (and those who felt affected 
by the issue) were given the opportunity to develop coping strategies that they 
had considered as appropriate, given their respective perception of the network. 
Consequently, they could design practices that seem to fit the demands of the 
network as well as the regulatees aim in the networks. However, this autonomy 
especially in the German case has been ‘bought’ at the expense of certainty. As 
in the German case the legal rule has mobilized a so far unusual self-
responsibility, the organizations had to go through a long and therefore costly 
process in order to finally achieve the certainty that was needed and on the 
other hand, adequately respond to their environments’ demands. This retreat 
from traditionally legal services points to an arrangement whereby not only the 
law but also the potential regulatees are assigned a new role in that the law 
‘only’ defines goals of a regulation while the organizations themselves define 
the performance program to achieve this goal. These programs can then draw 
on more heterarchical arrangements like contracting and cooperating, thus ac-
knowledging their autonomy. The law on the other side no longer runs the risk 
of being confronted with the avoidance of the breach of its rules, as is often the 
case since these rules seem to be based upon knowledge that does not seem to 
fit with the ‘realities’ of the given empirical matter. Thus, the law discharges 
itself with the need to regulate and the ‘risks’ contained therein (Luhmann 
1987). 
The drawback of this arrangement finally is to be found within a loss of 
certainty that gives expression to another feature of knowledge society. Its 
novel dependence on knowledge and non-knowledge has to be ‘bought’ at the 
expense of a destabilization of so far stabile institutions and rules and thus 
must lead to the development of new governance regimes and other ‘experi-
ments’, which are effects of an increasing ‘regulatory competition’ (Willke 
2001). But from that point in time, such an understanding of how ‘regulation’ 
can be fulfilled given the societal conditions, seems to be the less risky option 
for the law in that uncertainty is rather socially acceptable than is illegitimacy.  
In sum, this understanding of regulation can be brought into line with the 
conception of society as a laboratory (Krohn & Weyer 1994) in that ‘regula-
tion’ than evolves as a model of experimental decision-making. By doing so, 
regulation is carried out while at the same being aware of its insufficient 
knowledge base and thus its problems to control behavior and prevent or settle 
conflicts (Bora 2002). In that sense, the present study has presented neither evil 
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tidings nor a promise of salvation but rather stressed the various ways that can 
lead to accepted outcomes under the effect of cognitive uncertainty. Finally, in 
the opening chapter of the present study the assumption was made that private 
law’s reliance on social autonomy and structural coupling could become a 
model for the new ways in which law opens up to the dynamics of ‘civil soci-
ety’. Given that modern society increasingly has to be described as knowledge 
society, the conclusion can now be drawn that the outlined processes of regula-
tion can be described as the law’s way to cope with the increasing relevance of 
non-knowledge and uncertainty. 
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Appendices 
A Organizations 
A.1 Germany (March – September 2000) 
• Bundesinstitut für gesundheitlichen Verbraucherschutz und Veterninärme-
dizin (BgVV) 
• Robert Koch-Institut (RKI) 
• Bundesministerium für Gesundheit (BMG) 
• Bund für Lebensmittelrecht und Lebensmittelkunde (BLL) 
• Bundesverband des deutschen Lebensmittelhandels (BVL) 
• Bundesverband der Filialbetriebe und Selbstbedienungswarenhäuser (BFS) 
• Verband Deutscher Oelmühlen (VDOe) 
• Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Verbraucherverbände (AgV) 
• Transgen/Verbraucherinitiative (VI) 
• Greenpeace 
• Gen-ethisches Netzwerk (GeN) 
• Öko-Institut Freiburg 
• KWS Kleinwanzlebener Saatzucht AG  
• Unilever 
• Bestfoods 
• Monsanto 
• Aventis 
• Novartis 
• Bremke&Hoerster (Supermarktkette Famila) 
A.2 United States (October – November 2000) 
• Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
• Mitarbeiter von Congressman Dennis Kucinich (D-Ohio) 
• Mitarbeiter von Senator Richard Durbin (D-Illinois) 
• Grocery Manufacturers of America (GMA) 
• American Corn Growers Association (ACGA) 
• National Corn Growers Association (NCGA) 
• International Food Information Council (IFIC) 
Appendices 
 
192
• Consumer’s Choice Council (CCC) 
• Consumer’s Union (CU) 
• Consumer Federation of America (CFA) 
• Center for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI) 
• Public Interest Research Group (PIRG) 
• Friends of the Earth (FoE) 
• National Environment Trust (NET) 
• Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) 
• Monsanto 
• Bestfoods 
B Questionnaires 
B.1 Germany 
A. Formales  
1. Sie sind Vertreter/in welcher Organisation? 
2. Was sind die Aufgaben dieser Organisation?/Was sind die Ziele Ihrer Organisation?  
3. Was sind Ihre Aufgaben innerhalb der Organisation? (Tätigkeitsbereich?) 
B. Genfood allgemein 
4. Wie würden Sie das Klima gegenüber der Gentechnik in Lebensmitteln in Deutsch-
land beschreiben?  
5. Woran, glauben Sie, entzündet sich der Konflikt in Deutschland?  
6. Welche Rolle spielt aus Ihrer Sicht das Recht in diesem Konflikt? 
7. Wie beurteilen Sie den Nutzen/die Potentiale/Gefahren von Gentechnik in der Le-
bensmittelherstellung? 
8. Wie schätzen Sie die Chancen für die Markteinführung von Genfood ein? 
9. Welche Konsequenzen hat Ihre Organisation aus dieser Debatte gezogen? 
10. Wer sind die relevanten Akteure in dem Konflikt um Genfood in Deutschland? 
11. Stehen Sie in Kontakt zu anderen Akteuren aus dem Konfliktfeld Genfood? Wenn 
ja, mit wem? 
C. Regulierung von Novel Food: Die Einführung gentechnisch veränderter Lebensmit-
tel wird in Europa seit 1997 durch die Novel Food-Verordnung geregelt.  
12. Was wissen Sie über den Entstehungsprozeß der NFVO?  
13. Haben Sie auf die Regulierung Einfluß genommen? Wenn ja, wie? Wenn nein, 
warum nicht? 
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14. Was sind für Sie die wichtigsten Bestandteile dieser Verordnung?  
15. Ist die NFVO aus Ihrer Sicht eine ausreichende/nicht ausreichende Regulierung? 
16. Kommt die Novel Food Verordnungen Ihren Interessen entgegen? Inwiefern? 
Wenn nein, warum nicht? 
17. Was hat sich für Ihre Arbeit durch die NVFO verändert?  
18. Wie geht Ihre Organisation mit der Regulierung um?  
19. Welches Verhalten beobachten Sie bei den Behörden/Unternehmen/anderen 
relevanten Akteuren?  
20. Stehen Sie in Kontakt zu der relevanten Behörde (BgVV)? Wenn ja, wie sieht 
dieser Kontakt aus? 
21. Sollte an der Regulierung etwas verändert werden? Wenn ja, was? 
22. Sind die rechtlich vorgeschriebenen Sicherheitsmaßnahmen aus Ihrer Sicht ausrei-
chend/nicht ausreichend? Wenn nein, warum nicht? 
23. Wie beurteilen Sie die Kennzeichnungsvorschriften? 
24. Glauben Sie, es gibt einen Zusammenhang zwischen der Art der Regulierung und 
der Konflikthaftigkeit des Themas Genfood? 
25. Wie beurteilen Sie den Zusammenhang von Kennzeichnung und Akzeptanz? 
26. Welche nationalen Unterschiede in der Handhabung der NFVO gibt es?  
D Rechtspolitisch 
27. Können rechtliche Regulierungen zu einer Entspannung der Debatte um Genfood 
beitragen? (Recht als Konfliktlösungsinstrument?) 
E Schlußfragen 
28. Weitere Ansprechpartner? USA? 
29. Fällt Ihnen noch etwas ein, über das wir bislang noch nicht gesprochen haben? 
B.2 United States 
A Introduction 
1. Could you please introduce yourself?  
2. What are your main areas of responsibility in the organization? 
3. What is the aim of your organization? Which function does it have?  
B GM-Food 
At first I’d like to put some general questions on the GM food issue: 
4. How would you describe the current public opinion towards GM food in the U.S.?  
5. Has there been any public debate when GM food was first released to the market in 
1994? If yes – why? What was the issue? If not – why not, what do you think? 
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6. Have there been or are there any special campaigns against GM food and what do 
you know about these campaigns?  
7. How would you assess the risks/benefits of genetic engineering in food production?  
8. Is there still a market for GM food in the US? 
9. Has there been a change in the attitude of your organization towards GM foods? 
10. Who are the relevant actors in that conflict? 
11. How would you describe the relationship among these actors (you included)? 
C Regulation of GM Food in the US. 
There’s no such thing as a genetic engineering act, but in the case of food there is the 
FDA Statement of Policy of 1992 and new guidelines for labeling, coming out this 
fall. 
12. What do you know about the development of the statement of policy?  
13. What do you know about the new FDA-Guidelines for Labeling?  
14. What do you think about the „Genetically Engineered Food Right to Know Act“? 
15. Did or do you have any influence on the regulation? If yes, in which way? If not, 
why not?  
16. What is – from your point of view – the most important part/task (exercise) in the 
regulation of GM food?  
17. Do you think the regulation of GM food in the US is sufficient/not sufficient? 
18. How do you think, the public perceives the regulation? 
19. And how do you think, the people, who are confronted with the regulation in their 
practical work perceive the regulation? (e.g. food processors?) 
20. Is the legal regulation of GM food promotive for your work? To what extent? If 
not, why? 
21. How does your organization deal with the regulation?  
22. Are you in touch with the responsible agencies? What sort of cooperation is this? 
23. Has there been a change in the behavior of this agencies? 
24. If you could change the regulation – what would you change? 
25. Do you think labeling should be mandatory or voluntary? 
26. Does labeling have any impact on consumer’s acceptance? 
27. From your point of view, is there any connection between the way in which GM 
food is regulated and the way, in which the actors in that field deal with the issue? 
28. Does the regulation have any impact on the debate over GM food and how would 
you describe this impact? 
29. May legal regulations be a contribution to the relaxation in the debate on GM 
food? In what way? 
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D Ending 
30. More contact persons? 
31. Is there anything left, that might be important, but what we haven’t talked about 
yet? 
 
